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This thesis argues that censorship in eighteenth-century France was highly focused and 
could be remarkably successful.  It considers the way in which the French government 
attempted to impose its will on authors, journalists and publishers who operated outside 
France in the years 1770 to 1789.  By examining the way French and foreign officials 
worked together to manage the print industry, this study sheds light on the practicalities 
of external censorship.  The French government developed a relatively effective system 
for managing the spread of news information about French affairs of state.  The 
Bourbon regime also experienced particular successes in its attempts to keep the book 
trade in check.  It concentrated on curbing the dissemination of defamatory texts or 
libelles and was often able to stop these kinds of works from circulating in huge 
numbers.  The year 1783 was critical in the French government’s strategy of policing 
print beyond the borders of the kingdom.  It was at this point that the French state 
shifted its approach by combining a stronger system of inspection for imported books 
with a more pragmatic outlook abroad.  In doing so, it was able to intensify its hold 
over the print industry.  This thesis makes the case for a more nuanced interpretation of 
censorship in old regime France and underscores the need to appreciate how control 
fluctuated according to chronology and geography.  By pointing to the successes of 
censorship, it suggests that that forbidden book trade was perhaps weaker than once 
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Note on Sources 
 
The sources included in this thesis have been quoted in French.  To avoid any 
confusion, the French in these quotations has been modernised.  Job titles and the titles 






In February 1772 Emmanuel Marie Louis, marquis de Noailles, French ambassadeur in 
The Hague reported back to the foreign ministry on the subject of a book which was 
worrying the French government. 
 
J’ai parlé à M. le Pensionnaire du Libelle intitulé Le Gazettier Cuirassé.  Je lui ai dit que 
ce livre était le fruit de la licence la plus condamnable chez toutes les nations où la voie 
de poursuivre les délits était au reste.  Je lui ai ajouté que l’écrivain n’épargnait pas même 
dans son audace la personne sacrée du Roi mon Maitre.1   
 
In the early 1770s, the Bourbon regime called upon its network of diplomatic 
agents to restrict both the circulation of this book and the actions of its author, Charles 
Théveneau de Morande.  Le Gazetier cuirassé; ou, anecdotes scandaleuses de la cour de France 
was originally published late in July 1771 in London.2  It reached the market at the 
height of the backlash against the French Chancellor Maupeou’s controversial 
programme of reform for the French parlements.  Morande fanned the flames of this 
affair by levelling accusations of ministerial despotism at the French government.  Le 
Gazetier cuirassé was a series of scurrilous anecdotes which viciously attacked the pillars 
of ancien régime society, the King, his ministry, the clergy and the nobility.3  The text was 
                                                          
1 Paris, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (hereafter AMAE), Correspondance 
politique (hereafter CP) Hollande 524, fol. 29, Noailles to d’Aiguillon, 4 February 1772. 
2 Charles-Claude Théveneau de Morande, Le Gazetier cuirassé; ou, anecdotes scandaleuses de la cour de 
France (London: [n. pub.], 1771). 
3 For more on Le Gazetier cuirassé, see Simon Burrows, Blackmail, Scandal and Revolution: London’s 
French Libellistes, 1758-92 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), pp. 96-99; Simon 
Burrows, ‘A Literary Low-Life Reassessed: Charles Théveneau de Morande in London, 1769-
1791’, Eighteenth-Century Life, 22 (1998), 76-94 (pp. 79-81); Simon Burrows, A King’s Ransom: The 
Life of Charles Théveneau de Morande, Blackmailer, Scandalmonger and Master-Spy (London: Continuum, 
2010), pp. 36-50; Robert Darnton, The Devil in the Holy Water or, the Art of Slander in France from 




a particularly potent example of the libelle genre.  Libelles were defamatory texts which 
slandered social and political elites and members of the royal family.  Officials within 
the Bourbon ministry were appalled by this work and underlined the necessity of 
suppressing it in the summer of 1771.  This text became a more pressing problem early 
in 1772 for two reasons.  Firstly, the French government found out that Morande was 
planning to publish a scandalous biography of Louis XV’s mistress, Madame du Barry.  
This was a work which seemed likely to compound the damage done by Le Gazetier 
cuirassé.  Secondly, there were rumours that a new edition of Le Gazetier cuirassé was 
being published in Geneva.   
The French state appealed to the British government to silence Morande (who 
was resident in London) but little help was forthcoming.  The French government 
authorised agents it had working in London to negotiate with Morande and at the same 
time coordinated plans to kidnap the author.  Morande was finally tamed in March 1774 
when the playwright Pierre Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais was sent over to London 
on a special mission.4  Beaumarchais signed an agreement with him on behalf of the 
French government.  Morande agreed to burn the entire edition of the du Barry text 
and promised never to attack the French government in print again.  In return, his debts 
were cleared and he began to receive an annuity of 4,000 livres from the state.  In the 
years following this pay-off, Morande switched sides and began to work as a spy for the 
French government.   
French officials also worked hard to block the second edition of Le Gazetier 
cuirassé in January 1772.  Hennin, the French diplomat in Geneva, found that a local 
bookseller called Jacques-Benjamin Téron was disseminating the work.5  Nothing was 
found to indicate that Genevan traders had published Le Gazetier cuirassé but papers 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Darnton, ‘The High Enlightenment and the Low-Life of Literature in Pre-Revolutionary 
France’, Past and Present, 51 (1971), 81-115 (pp. 105-10). 
4 Burrows, Blackmail, Scandal and Revolution, p. 99.   




discovered in Téron’s shop showed that he had received one hundred copies of the text 
from Marc Michel Rey, the Genevan publisher who traded from Amsterdam.6  Téron 
was temporarily imprisoned by the authorities in Geneva and the investigation moved 
northwards. Noailles, the French diplomat in The Hague, was able to convince officials 
there to search Rey’s print-shop.  Once copies of Le Gazetier cuirassé were found with 
Rey, the Dutch States-General determined that this publisher should also be punished.7   
The scale of the campaign against Le Gazetier cuirassé clearly suggests that the 
French authorities saw this text as a serious threat to the stability of the Bourbon 
regime.  This is the view taken by Robert Darnton in one of his most influential articles 
where he introduced Morande and Le Gazetier cuirassé to the wider scholarly 
community.8  Darnton has stressed the importance of Le Gazetier cuirassé and used this 
text as a springboard to explore the subversive nature of forbidden literature in 
eighteenth-century France.  This thesis corroborates Darnton’s view that French 
officials were disgusted by Le Gazetier cuirassé but it also seeks to underscore the 
singularity of this work.  International crusades to suppress texts like this were relatively 
rare in the final years of the ancien régime.  There were only a limited number of works 
which impelled the authorities to become involved in censorship beyond French 
borders.  
This thesis centres on the French government’s attempts to control the kind of 
texts which were sent into France in the 1770s and 1780s.  On the basis of examples 
like the pursuit of Le Gazetier cuirassé, it will argue that the Bourbon ministry was able to 
impose its will beyond French borders.  It will showcase the huge challenges of extra-
territorial control but ultimately stress the successes of this system of policing.  This 
thesis also contends that texts like Le Gazetier cuirassé were somewhat atypical.  When 
                                                          
6 Paris, AMAE, CP Genève 80, fol. 183, Hennin to d’Aiguillon, 11 January 1772. 
7 Paris, AMAE, CP Hollande 524, fols. 29-32, Noailles to d’Aiguillon, 4 February 1772; Paris, 
AMAE, CP Hollande 524, fols. 34-35, Noailles to d’Aiguillon, 14 February 1772. 




they did appear, the French authorities orchestrated extraordinary crusades to block 
their circulation within France.  The French government recognised that it would never 
be able to have total power over the entirety of the foreign print trade.  As such, French 
officials sought to manage it as best they could: by throwing the spotlight on what they 
considered to be the most illicit titles.  French attempts to police print abroad in the 
later eighteenth century were highly focused.  It was this purposeful policing which 
helped the government to successfully regulate the kind of literature which came into 










Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
This thesis examines how the French government sought to extend its influence across 
Europe in the hope of influencing the kind of literature which was being sent into 
France between the years 1770 and 1789.  Controlling the dissemination of printed 
matter both within and beyond French borders was certainly an arduous task but the 
failure of the French authorities was not a foregone conclusion.  This thesis argues that 
the Bourbon administration could be remarkably successful in its attempts to police 
print towards the close of the eighteenth century.  French officials were well aware of 
the difficulties of regulating the production and distribution of the printed word and did 
their best to keep it within acceptable boundaries.  Tolerance was the byword and the 
regime only sprang into action when titles which seemed particularly threatening 
appeared on the scene.  When the worst titles appeared, the Bourbon administration 
used diplomats stationed abroad to direct efforts to prevent them from reaching French 
readers in large numbers.  This thesis will engage with historiography relating to the 
efficacy of censorship under the old regime.  Throughout it, the term censorship will be 
employed in a general sense to describe the French government’s attempts to control 
the printed word.  There is much evidence of the failings of the censorship system but 
the findings of this thesis underline that controlling the printed word was still possible 
in eighteenth-century France.  An appreciation of how far censorship could work will 






The Book Trade in Eighteenth-Century France 
 
For a long time, scholarship concerning censorship in ancien régime France was focused 
on Paris, the city which was the epicentre of both Enlightenment and Revolution.  Since 
many aspects of the official management of the republic of letters were centralised in 
the capital, it is easy to see why studies of the administration of the book trade have 
often been Paris-centric.  In the middle ages, it was the Church which took charge of 
censorship.  As printing became more widespread across the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, firmer structures of control were put into place.  By the early eighteenth 
century, the Church (along with the parlements and the Universities) retained the right to 
condemn works but in practice, the crown was the primary institution capable of 
enforcing its will on the print network.   
The basic regulations which governed the French book trade across most of the 
eighteenth century were collected together in 1723 in the Code de la librairie.1  This 
assortment of laws originally applied only in Paris but was extended to cover the entire 
kingdom in 1744.  Pre-publication censorship and the administration of privileges and 
permissions were managed through the direction de la librairie.2  This office was headed by 
the directeur and his activities were overseen by the garde des sceaux, one of the King’s 
principal ministers who was responsible for the administration of justice.  The directeur de 
la librairie took charge of the censors who assessed books prior to publication, as well as 
the provincial inspectors of the book trade who were responsible for making sure 
printers and booksellers were abiding by the rules of the trade.  He also worked closely 
with the lieutenant général de police de Paris and his police inspector subordinates who 
                                                          
1 Giles Barber, Studies in the Booktrade of the European Enlightenment (London: Pindar Press, 1994), 
pp. 159-62.  
2 Henri-Jean Martin, ‘ La Direction des lettres’, in Histoire de l’édition française. Tome 2, le livre 





raided print-shops, arrested book dealers and confiscated offensive works.3  Studies of 
these centralised mechanisms of control have long dominated the historiography.4  But 
historians have also begun to show that the Parisian system constituted only a fraction 
of a much larger picture.  Jane McLeod’s consideration of provincial book trade 
inspectors has highlighted that censorship had a life of its own outside the confines of 
the capital.5  Detailed empirical work by Thierry Rigogne has also emphasised the extent 
to which the regulation of the print trade varied across the huge expanse of the French 
kingdom.6  
Attempts to manage the French book trade also extended beyond France’s 
borders.  It was in the late seventeenth century that French began to overtake Latin as 
the language of the European elite.  By the middle of the eighteenth century French was 
established as the international language on the continent and Francophone literature 
was disseminated almost everywhere.  Many French booksellers looked outwards to 
traders in nearby states since these individuals were (in theory at least) free from the 
regulations which governed the circulation of printed matter within France.  The 
publishing industry flourished in the regions neighbouring France which included the 
                                                          
3 From 1763 to 1774 Antoine Raymond Jean Gualbert Gabriel de Sartine occupied the office of 
both directeur de la librairie and lieutenant-général de Police de Paris which demonstrates how many of 
the activities of these officials went on in parallel.       
4 J. P. Belin, Le Commerce des livres prohibés à Paris de 1750 à 1789 (New York: B. Franklin, 1967); 
Raymond F. Birn, Royal Censorship of Books in Eighteenth-Century France (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2012); Anne Goldgar, ‘The Absolutism of Taste: Journalists as Censors in 
Eighteenth-Century Paris’, in Censorship and the Control of Print in England and France, 1600-1910, 
ed. by Robin Myers and Michael Harris (Winchester: St Paul’s Bibliographies, 1992), pp. 87-110; 
Lisa Jane Graham, ‘Crimes of Opinion: Policing the Public in Eighteenth-Century Paris’, in 
Visions and Revisions of Eighteenth-Century France, ed. by Christine Adams, Jack R. Censer and Lisa 
Jane Graham (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), pp. 79-104; Thomas 
M. Luckett, ‘Book Seizures and the Politics of Repression in Paris, 1787-1789’, in Into Print: 
Limits and Legacies of the Enlightenment; Essays in Honor of Robert Darnton, ed. by Charles Walton 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011), pp. 113-27; Nicole Hermann-
Mascard,  La Censure des livres à Paris à la fin de l’ancien régime: 1750-1789 (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1968); Barbara Negroni, Lectures interdites: le travail des censeurs au XVIIIe 
siècle, 1723-1774 (Paris: Michel, 1995). 
5 Jane McLeod, ‘Provincial Book Trade Inspectors in Eighteenth-Century France’, French 
History, 12 (1998), 127-48. 
6 Thierry Rigogne, Between State and Market: Printing and Bookselling in Eighteenth-Century France, 




papal enclave of Avignon, Britain, the Netherlands, the Swiss regions and the German 
states.  Although local instruments of censorship existed in these territories, they were 
generally more lenient than those which operated inside France.   
Scholars working in the 1960s were amongst the first to shed light on the 
participation of foreign traders in the French book trade.  In his 1964 work Pierre 
Rousseau and the philosophes of Bouillon, Raymond Birn explored how his protagonist’s 
publishing house catered to the French market from the duchy of Bouillon.7  It was at a 
similar time that Robert Darnton first showcased the records of the Société typographique 
de Neuchâtel (hereafter abbreviated to STN).  The STN was a Swiss publishing house 
which sent both licit and illicit texts into France.  Across his career, Darnton has 
continued to draw upon the STN archive as a means of exploring the role of extra-
territorial book dealers in the French print trade.8  Later, Elizabeth Eisenstein’s work 
broadened focus by stressing the ultimate significance of foreign involvement in French 
print.9  She contended that the relative autonomy of extra-territorial firms afforded 
these businesses the opportunity to make a considerable contribution to the 
development of French literary culture.  For instance, the major tracts of the most 
celebrated philosophes were first published by Francophone printers positioned outside 
France.10  Darnton has even suggested the possibility that the majority of French books 
in the later eighteenth century were produced outside France.11  The total size of the 
                                                          
7 Raymond F. Birn, Pierre Rousseau and the Philosophes of Bouillon, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth 
Century, 212 (Geneva: Institut et Musée Voltaire, 1964). 
8 Robert Darnton, The Business of Enlightenment: A Publishing History of the ‘Encyclopédie’, 1775-1800 
(London: Belknap Press, 1979); Robert Darnton, The Literary Underground of the Old Regime 
(London: Harvard University Press, 1982); Robert Darnton, The Great Cat Massacre: And Other 
Episodes in French Cultural History (New York: Vintage Books, 1985); Robert Darnton, The Corpus 
of Clandestine Literature in France, 1769-1789 (New York: Norton, 1995); Robert Darnton, The 
Forbidden Best-Sellers of Pre-Revolutionary France (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996). 
9 Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, Grub Street Abroad: Aspects of the French Cosmopolitan Press from the Age of 
Louis XIV to the French Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992). 
10 Eisenstein, Grub Street Abroad, p. 1. 
11 Robert Darnton, ‘Le Livre prohibé aux frontières: Neuchâtel’, in Histoire de l’édition française. 




extra-territorial network can only be estimated but it is nevertheless clear that books, 
pamphlets and periodicals published beyond France were integral elements of the 
French print trade.    
 
Censorship under the Old Regime 
 
Since these extra-territorial book dealers operated outside the formal system of French 
censorship, they were especially involved in the production and distribution of illicit 
literature.  This thesis considers how the old regime authorities reacted to the 
publication of material outside the borders of the French realm.  By shining a light on 
illicit print, this thesis interacts with the rich historiography on censorship in ancien régime 
France.  Whilst existing overviews of the French censorship structure do acknowledge 
that the Bourbon government made attempts to regulate the literature coming into 
France from abroad, they tend to conclude that such efforts were futile.12  This 
conclusion partly stems from an assumption that censorship was simply too difficult in 
the eighteenth century.  It has been argued that with literacy rates and demand for 
reading material rising steadily across the century, controlling the printed word was 
simply an impossible task.13  The increasing prevalence of print, coupled with the 
determination of book traders to evade the law made censorship a real challenge.   
The notion that French censorship was somehow doomed to failure is also 
heavily influenced by the liberal conception of freedom of speech as a fundamental 
human right.  This is an idea grounded in modernity which would have seemed extreme 
                                                          
12 Belin, pp. 14-15, 41; William Hanley, ‘The Policing of Thought: Censorship in Eighteenth-
Century France’, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 183 (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 
1980), 265-95 (p. 295); Hermann-Mascard, p. 102; David T. Pottinger, The French Book Trade in 
the Ancien Régime (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 72; Daniel Roche ‘Censorship 
and the Publishing Industry’, in Revolution in Print: The Press in France, 1775-1800, ed. by Robert 
Darnton and Daniel Roche (London: University of California Press in Collaboration with the 
New York Public Library, 1989), pp. 3-25 (p. 25). 




to the inhabitants of eighteenth-century France.  The research of Charles Walton has 
emphasised a widespread belief in the necessity of policing print under the old regime.  
The cahiers de doléances collected prior to the meeting of the Estates-General do indicate a 
desire to abolish pre-publication censorship but the same lists of grievances also 
maintain that the state needed to regulate and restrict printed matter.14  Keeping the 
book trade under control was a difficult task in the later eighteenth century but this 
does not mean that it was an undesirable or unattainable goal.     
Yet the French government’s failure to adequately police the literature coming 
into France is also seen as a corollary of a censorship structure which was inefficient 
and ineffective.  Between 1700 and 1789 some 3000 decrees on the French print trade 
were issued by the Bourbon regime.15  Regulations often overlapped, cancelled each 
other out or were ambiguous and thus open to interpretation.  Aside from a general 
guideline that they were to condemn all works which seemed to challenge the Crown, 
the Church or the tenets of conventional morality, censors operated in the dark without 
formal directives.16  The instance where a royal censor sanctioned the Koran because it 
did not pose a threat to Christian principles has since become notorious.17  For a text to 
be printed legally it had to receive a royal privilège and the administration of these 
permissions became ever more complicated as the century progressed.  Privileges were 
originally designated for a specific time period but it became common practice for these 
authorisations to be continually renewed as a means of confirming the dominance of 
                                                          
14 Charles Walton, Policing Public Opinion in the French Revolution: The Culture of Calumny and the 
Problem of Free Speech (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 96.    
15 Robert L. Dawson, Confiscations at Customs: Banned Books and the French Booktrade during the Last 
Years of the Ancien Régime, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 2006:07 (Oxford: Voltaire 
Foundation, 2006), p. 21.   
16 Raymond F. Birn, ‘Book Censorship and Rousseau’s Response’, Studies on Voltaire and the 
Eighteenth Century, 2005:01 (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2005), 223-45 (pp. 223-24).  
17 Raymond F. Birn, ‘Malesherbes and the Call for a Free Press’ in Revolution in Print, ed. by 




the Parisian guild of printer-booksellers whom the crown could closely supervise.18 
Furthermore, during his time as directeur de la librairie Chrétien-Guillaume de Lamoignon 
de Malesherbes popularised the granting of permission tacites as a means of permitting a 
broader range of texts.19  The circulation of works which were deemed unsuitable for a 
royal stamp of approval but not outrageous enough to be formally condemned could be 
legitimised with a permission tacite.  Roger Chartier has suggested that in the later 
eighteenth century, almost as many books were printed with these kinds of informal 
permissions as were awarded the royal privilege.20   
Recent research by Robert Dawson and Thierry Rigogne has served to confirm 
this impression of the arbitrary nature of the royal administration of print.  Rigogne has 
contended that the French authorities were often unable to enforce their will on the 
provinces as book trade regulations were ambiguous and local officials enjoyed a high 
level of autonomy.21  Although Dawson rates the overall effectiveness of the 
management of the book trade more highly than Rigogne, he does echo the same point: 
that increasingly intricate regulations overwhelmed officials and inclined them towards 
leniency.22  Officials were frequently confused about which works needed to be 
suppressed.  There were also specific problems related to the inspection of imported 
books.  In 1723, it was decreed that books printed outside of France were only 
permitted to enter the kingdom via designated villes d’entrée which included Marseilles, 
Lyon and Strasbourg.  Incoming crates were inspected twice and any offensive material 
was to be immediately confiscated.  Yet this system was far from foolproof.  The 
                                                          
18 Jean-Dominique Mellot, ‘Counterfeit Printing as an Agent of Diffusion and Change: The 
French Book-Privilege System and its Contradictions (1487-1790)’, in Agent of Change: Print 
Culture Studies After Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, ed. by Sabrina Alcorn Baron, Eric N. Lindquist and 
Eleanor F. Shevlin (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2007), pp. 42-66 (p. 54). 
19 Roche, ‘Censorship’, p. 7. 
20 Roger Chartier, The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution (London: Duke University Press, 
1991), p. 51. 
21 Rigogne, Between State and Market, pp. 57-58.        




network of villes d’entrée was not comprehensive and books poured into France via other 
cities like Besançon, Grenoble or Sedan.23  The chaotic administration of the French 
print trade often meant that rules did not translate into reality. 
This view of censorship as arbitrary and ultimately ineffectual has, however, 
been revised by some recent scholarship.  McLeod’s research indicates that by the later 
eighteenth-century, the provincial network of book trade inspectors constituted a 
relatively effective structure of control.24  Gregory Brown has made it clear that many 
writers were more than willing to submit to censorship as a means of legitimising their 
literary output.25  Vivian Gruder has uncovered evidence that the authorities were able 
to prevent the dissemination of salacious pamphlets which vilified Marie-Antoinette 
until the very eve of the French Revolution.26  These examples of functioning 
censorship provide an empirical impetus to question the truism of its failure.    
With regards to the extra-territorial print trade, there are also strong indications 
that censorship could work.  A number of scholars have examined the techniques that 
the French government employed in its efforts to manage the content of the 
considerable number of French-language newspaper gazettes which were produced in 
the Netherlands.27  Their findings indicate that the French state was able to exert 
considerable pressure on Francophone journalists which ultimately meant that they 
                                                          
23 Rigogne, Between State and Market, p. 60.    
24 McLeod, ‘Provincial Book Trade Inspectors’, p. 148.     
25 Gregory S. Brown, ‘Reconsidering the Censorship of Writers in Eighteenth-Century France: 
Civility, State Power and the Public Theatre in the Enlightenment’, Journal of Modern History, 75 
(2003), 235-68.   
26 Vivian R. Gruder, ‘The Question of Marie-Antoinette: The Queen and Public Opinion before 
the Revolution’, French History, 16 (2002), 269-98.  
27 Eugène Hatin, Les Gazettes de Hollande et la presse clandestine aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (Paris: 
Pincebourde, 1865); Jeremy D. Popkin, ‘The Gazette de Leyde and French Politics under Louis 
XVI’, in Press and Politics in Pre-Revolutionary France, ed. by Jack R. Censer and Jeremy D. Popkin 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 75-132; Pierre Rétat, ‘Les Gazetiers de 
Hollande et les puissances politiques: une difficile collaboration’, Dix-huitième siècle, 25 (1993), 
319-35; Jeroom Vercruysse, ‘La Réception politique des journaux de Hollande, une lecture 
diplomatique’, in La Diffusion et la lecture des journaux de langue française sous l’ancien régime: actes du 
colloque international, Nimègue, 3-5 Juin 1987, ed. by Hans Bots (Amsterdam: APA-Holland 




were reluctant to publish any articles which might have offended the French authorities.  
Simon Burrows and Robert Darnton have both investigated how the French authorities 
tried to monitor and restrain the literary outpourings of an expatriate community of 
libellistes resident in London.28  Although these historians disagree on several issues, the 
evidence they present confirms that the Bourbon regime was able to regulate the flow 
of literature which passed into France.  This thesis synthesises these existing studies 
with fresh research.  It uses a broad source base to go beyond what has been presented 
by these scholars and contextualise the evidence that they have brought forward.  The 
wider European picture examined in this study confirms the findings of this existing 
work on the extra-territorial print trade: external policing was very focused and could be 
successful. 
There are three main ways in which this study will advance understanding of 
this issue.  First, it will move beyond a specific location to reflect upon how the 
Bourbon regime dealt with the authors, journalists and publishers who worked along 
France’s northern and eastern borders in the final two decades of the ancien régime.  
Secondly, this study will systematically investigate the rich variety of texts which 
troubled the French authorities.  Rather than concentrating on a single genre, this study 
will consider how and why newspapers, books and pamphlets provoked the 
consternation of French officials at certain times.  Finally, this thesis will dwell upon the 
role of the French foreign ministry.  The ultimate responsibility for monitoring, 
managing and manipulating the foreign book trade fell to the French foreign minister.  
The secrétaire d’état des affaires étrangères called upon his network of diplomat agents 
stationed in foreign centres of power to watch over local book dealers and do what they 
could to prevent objectionable works from reaching French readers.  They were also 
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responsible for scrutinising the extra-territorial periodical press.  This study will 
highlight the importance of foreign ministers and diplomats in extending the French 
sphere of influence abroad.  Censorship on an international scale was an enormous and 
daunting task.  This thesis will outline how the French ministry used its network of 
ambassadorial officials to bring the foreign print trade under effective surveillance.   
This study aims to give a more rounded picture of the French government’s 
attempts to make its mark on the foreign print trade.  Foreign merchants did not deal 
exclusively in illicit literature but they did pose a particular problem for the French 
government.  Not only did non-French traders operate outside of the confines of 
French censorship but they were often situated in states where the acts of publishing 
and bookselling were less rigorously controlled.  Historiography on the relationship 
between the French government and the Francophone periodical press has 
concentrated on Dutch newspapers whilst the in-depth studies of extra-territorial 
control undertaken by Burrows and Darnton focus on the print trade in London.  This 
thesis broadens the methodology of this research to reveal how the regime responded 
to the production of forbidden literature beyond France’s northern and eastern 
peripheries.  It encompasses the areas which were most closely connected with the 
French book market: Britain, the Netherlands, the Swiss states and the principalities 
which were part of the Holy Roman Empire or under Prussian rule.  This thesis is 
particularly distinctive for addressing French efforts to police print in the Swiss context, 
an area which has not yet been properly addressed in the historiography.  The illicit 
print trade was especially lively in Britain since publishers there enjoyed something 
resembling freedom of the press.  The printing industry had a long history in the 
German principalities and in the United Provinces.  Publishing was also on the rise in 
the Swiss states.  The geographical spread of this study, across a time period of twenty 




The efficacy of censorship was far from constant which means individual incidents can 
only reveal so much.  This thesis will explore the extent of French influence on 
different regions and illuminate the ways in which the government’s approach was 
adapted to local circumstances.  The broad geographical scope of this thesis can also 
provide information about the nature of the extra-territorial print network.  The 
research that Burrows and Darnton have undertaken demonstrates that London was 
clearly a centre of illicit production.  This thesis will suggest that London was in fact the 
main locale of authorship and publishing which the French government found to be 
distasteful.  The French government became involved in policing similar activities in 
mainland Europe but the continental network existed on a lesser scale. 
The second distinguishing point of this thesis rests on genre.  This study follows 
those texts which most concerned the French authorities.  As the work of Burrows and 
Darnton has made clear, the Bourbon regime was determined to prevent the 
dissemination of libelles, texts which slandered social and political elites or members of 
the royal family.29  This thesis encompasses libelles but also considers the extent to which 
other subject matter aroused official hostility.  This includes the three main formats of 
the printed word in eighteenth-century Europe: periodicals, books and pamphlets.  This 
thesis will consider how French officials assessed the threat posed by literature in the 
later eighteenth century.  Thanks to the research of Burrows and Darnton, we already 
have an idea of many of the titles which were pursued by the French government in the 
extra-territorial arena.  Although other instances of external policing went on across the 
continent, there was not an endless supply of illicit titles.  It was only a limited corpus of 
literature which disturbed the French authorities.  This study will seek to explain why 
the government objected vehemently to the publication of certain titles but was 
prepared to turn a blind eye to most of the works which were published abroad.  
                                                          




Recognition of the focused natured of extra-territorial policing will facilitate a closer 
appreciation its effectiveness.   
The final strand which will serve to unite this broad approach is the role of 
individual actors in controlling the flow of literature into France.  Research conducted 
by John Hardman, Munro Price and Julian Swann amongst others has underscored how 
the changing composition of the French government impacted upon ancien régime 
politics.30  This nuanced perspective needs to be applied more readily to the structures 
of the administration of the book trade.  Malesherbes’ period as directeur de la librairie has 
received particular attention but the parts played by other figures has not yet been fully 
examined.31  Individual decision makers were critical since the complex web of 
regulations and rulings could not take effect unless they were upheld by those in power.  
In order to comprehend the extent to which censorship could be effective, it is vital to 
appreciate how, when and where decisions were made.  The French foreign minister 
called upon his ambassadorial network to watch over local journalists and book traders.  
This study will consider how personnel shaped the tactics of extra-territorial policing.  It 
will illustrate that diplomats and foreign ministers forged an efficient working 
relationship in matters of censorship.  
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The Illicit Element in the Book Trade 
 
Foreign publishers and booksellers operated outside French law in two ways: in 
economic and in ideological terms.  From the time of the Ordinance de Moulins in 1566, 
no person was allowed to print a book without first being awarded a royal privilège, a 
permission which constituted the right to print a particular text.32  Manuscripts were 
submitted to specialist royal censors for judgement prior to publication.  Royal 
privileges were overwhelmingly bestowed to the 36 officially legitimated printer-
booksellers in Paris who were close to the French centre of power.33  It was the 
monopoly of the Parisian guild which compelled many provincial traders to become 
involved in the sale of forbidden books and they frequently turned to foreign publishers 
for this illicit stock.  Most of the works which were printed abroad and sent into France 
were thus counterfeit editions of texts which had already been awarded a privilege 
within the kingdom.  However, with the establishment of international copyright law 
still far in the future, privileges were difficult to enforce across national boundaries.  
What is more, piracy was considered a less serious matter than the publication of books 
with a subject matter which presented an explicit challenge to the French status quo.34  
Indeed, the very existence of a pirate edition meant that its content had already won the 
approval of the French censors.   
A portion of the major reforms of the book trade which were passed on 30 
August 1777 were designed to invigorate the provincial trade and went some way to 
legitimising their piracy.  These reforms instigated a period of reprieve during which 
                                                          
32 Robert Shackleton, Censure and Censorship: Impediments to Free Publication in the Age of 
Enlightenment (Austin: Humanities Research Centre, University of Texas, 1975), p. 11.  
33 Carla Hesse, Publishing and Cultural Politics in Revolutionary Paris, 1789-1810 (Oxford: University 
of California Press, 1991), pp. 69-70. 
34 Chartier, Cultural Origins, p. 73-74; Dawson, Confiscations at Customs, pp. 17-18; Adrian Johns, 
Piracy: The Intellectual Property Wars from Gutenberg to Gates (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 




French booksellers could sell off their counterfeit copies without fear of punishment.35  
Rigogne has even argued that French officials deliberately turned a blind eye to 
counterfeiting in the provinces in the hope that it would keep printers too busy to 
produce more subversive material.36  There has been some suggestion that French 
officials were more likely to object to pirate editions produced abroad.37  It is true that 
foreign counterfeiting was more problematic as it constituted an economic challenge.  
French officials had a responsibility to stimulate trade and competition from foreign 
businesses could undercut the profits of their French counterparts.  The government’s 
attitude to foreign publishing has yet to be systematically examined through an 
economic lens.  This study will make it clear that foreign piracy was not taken 
particularly seriously in the closing years of the ancien régime.  There were times when 
concerns were raised about counterfeit editions but these were pursued half-heartedly.  
Tolerance of piracy was the norm and officials in the French foreign ministry focused 
their energies elsewhere.     
Strictly speaking, an illegal book was one which had been examined and 
subsequently denounced by French censors.  Any work which was not submitted to the 
channels of the French censorship system was automatically unauthorised.  This was the 
case for many of the texts which were printed abroad in this period.  Texts could also 
be designated as illegal after being condemned by royal or parlementary edicts.  
Condemnations issued by the Church carried weight too but these were comparatively 
rare by the end of the eighteenth century.  In practice, the concept of forbidden 
literature was much broader than these formal structures indicate.  When it came to the 
works upon which French censors were able to pass judgement, outright 
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condemnations were unusual.  Censors instead preferred to suggest possible revisions.38  
Similarly, the French government also seems to have been disinclined to formally 
denounce printed works in this period.  Across the 1770s and 1780s, the Bourbon 
regime only issued an average of 4.5 condemnations each year.39  This reticence is 
probably explained by the fear that underlining the illegality of a book or pamphlet 
would only serve to increase its popularity with French readers.     
The existence of an international trade in Francophone literature brought 
further complications.  The most provocative books and pamphlets were usually 
published without first being submitted to the judgement of French censors.  Yet books 
could be printed abroad entirely legally by winning the approval of foreign censorship 
bodies.  Publication was even easier in places like Britain or the United Provinces where 
there was no system of pre-publication censorship.  Such texts were legitimate entities 
in their place of publication but could nevertheless be viewed with suspicion by the 
French authorities.  Acknowledging these complexities, this thesis will make use of the 
term ‘illicit’ to describe printed material which the French government objected to.  
This term conveys the sense of something which was unauthorised or disapproved of, if 
not formally condemned.   
There was no single list which detailed all the texts that the French government 
found unacceptable.  Illicit literature under the old regime was thus a construct rather 
than something which had a definite existence.  It was those within the French foreign 
ministry who decided which works were too offensive to be tolerated and the necessity 
of their suppression.  Official documents frequently underlined that books which 
circulated in France should present no challenge to the state, the Roman Catholic faith 
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or the tenets of conventional morality.40  Yet the reprehensibility of a particular text was 
open to a degree of interpretation.41  The definition of acceptability evolved over time in 
the context of wider developments in the politico-cultural landscape.  Thanks to a 
spiralling series of complicated rulings, the administration of the book trade lacked 
much sense of a top-down direction.  This meant that individual decision-makers could 
have a significant impact on the circulation of literature.   
This thesis dwells on the interplay between print and power by seeking to 
comprehend how and why French officials were prepared to tolerate some works but 
were determined to halt the production and dissemination of others.  Scholars now tend 
to agree that although French censorship was repressive in theory, it was in practice 
characterised by nuance and flexibility.  Political elites tend to be well-educated and 
well-informed well-educated and well-informed of the intellectual currents of the day.  
The work of Birn, Brown and Anne Goldgar makes it clear that censors were learned 
and often literary individuals who were generally sympathetic to the evolving intellectual 
climate of Enlightenment Europe.42  Censors sought to recommend works which 
propagated the respectable face of Enlightenment, namely a questioning attitude of 
mind which retained ultimate loyalty to the French crown.  It has been argued by 
Jonathan Israel that the increasing acceptance of Enlightenment innovation coupled 
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with an escalating demand for the printed word encouraged French officials to be 
tolerant and pragmatic in their attempts to control the dissemination of literature.43   
Yet it is important to keep in mind that the influence of Enlightenment did not 
permeate everywhere.  There were individuals within the French government who were 
staunchly opposed to it.  What is more, there were other more pragmatic reasons which 
inclined the French government towards tolerance.  As the localised studies of McLeod 
and Rigogne indicate, the sheer complexity of the censorship structure could 
overwhelm even the most conscientious of officials.  The Francophone print trade was 
transnational and therefore very difficult to manage.  As such, French officials 
concentrated on halting the spread of only what they felt to be the most dangerous texts 
in the extra-territorial arena.  The French government was prepared to tolerate much 
but remained vigilant against those texts which seemed to threaten the three pillars of 
the ancien régime: the state, the Church and the tenets of conventional morality.  These 
broad categories were obviously open to a degree of interpretation but the relatively 
homogenous nature of the governmental elite meant that officials tended to agree on 
which works posed the greatest threat.  Diplomats came to recognise which texts were 
beyond the pale and were prevented from pursuing others by the disapproval of the 
French foreign ministers.   
This appreciation of what was considered to be illicit literature can shed light on 
the French government’s goals in the realm of external censorship.  The specific 
objectives of French censorship were never collated in one place but they can be 
perceived by studying the actions of the foreign ministry.  Censorship existed in terms 
of what was possible and the practice of external policing was reactive.  It was only after 
French officials heard about a potentially offensive title or article that they were able to 
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do anything about it.  However, the French foreign ministry did take a strategic 
approach to the problem of policing print abroad.   
The foreign minister worked closely with the lieutenant général of the Paris police 
and received information from the police chief about works which were rumoured or 
confirmed to be circulating in the French capital.  In some cases, diplomats were able to 
acquire and study a copy of a controversial text in order to assess whether it seemed to 
present a serious threat.  This was what happened when the second edition of Le 
Gazetier cuirassé was published on the continent.  Sometimes, the immense popularity of 
certain works such as the Encyclopédie made their contents notorious.  Some authors 
tried to blackmail the French state by threatening that they would publish a provocative 
text unless they were paid off by the government.  In these instances, French officials 
were given a good idea of what the text in question would contain, although there was 
no guarantee that the threats which had been made would ever be realised.     
Journals, books and pamphlets were all produced outside French borders and 
the French government attempted to impose its will upon each of these mediums.  
Books and journals were commercial products, with the latter designed for repeat sale.  
Pamphlets were shorter, cheaper and quicker to produce and were often printed and 
distributed clandestinely from an unknown source.  It follows that it was easier for the 
state to police material which came from a fixed place of publication that they could put 
under surveillance.  By contrast, judgements about books and pamphlets were often 
made on the basis of a text’s author or title.  Any title which mentioned Marie-
Antoinette for example, was unlikely to be tolerated by the French state.  The difficulty 
of policing an international print trade and the necessity of suppressing offensive texts 
as quickly as possible helps to explain the resort to this kind of pragmatic decision-
making.  But it is nevertheless important to keep in mind that French officials were 




their entirety or reflected particularly deeply about their subversive potential.  It follows 
that they may have reacted excessively to some texts whilst accepting the publication of 
others which might have contained criticism of the French state buried deep within 
their pages.  Extra-territorial policing was all about keeping the print trade within certain 
boundaries as far as was possible but there were obvious limitations to the 
government’s strategy.   
The policing of books and newspapers overlapped but there were also clear 
differences which can be perceived.  Attempts to control journalism and literature were 
driven by similar basic concerns but the objectives and techniques used to manage these 
forms of print were slightly different.  When it came to the book trade, the defamatory 
texts known as libelles were deemed the most outrageous because they attacked political 
elites and members of the royal family and thus the very foundations of the old regime.  
Tactics varied according to the scale of the threat posed by an illicit text but diplomats 
usually pressured foreign powers to confiscate copies and punish the publishers 
involved.  In the most serious cases, the French government also pursued those 
responsible for authoring controversial books.  It did not spend time chasing 
booksellers and instead it concentrated on those who had been involved in the 
production of a text.  By contrast, the foreign ministry commonly appealed to writers 
involved with the foreign newspaper press.  Foreign ministers made attempts to manage 
the flow of information and diplomats put pressure on editors to retract offensive 
articles.  When controversial books and pamphlets appeared on the scene, the French 
state coerced outside authorities and publishers to bend to its will.  The official 
approach to the extra-territorial periodical press was more a question of negotiating 
with editors and journalists.   
There were some commonalities across the regulation of books, pamphlets and 




politics or political elites.  These kinds of works, whether they were covered in the press 
or in other literature, were not considered fit for public consumption.  The idea of 
exemplary punishment was also critical across all genres.  The French state utilised the 
threat and reality of prohibition from the French market as a tool to encourage extra-
territorial gazetteers to fall into line with French wishes.  The French authorities also 
spent a lot of time pursuing and trying to discipline errant publishers since it was hoped 
that imprisonment would act as a deterrent, a way of warning other extra-territorial 
printers of the consequences of producing contentious material. 
 
Policing Extra-Territorial Print  
 
This research is primarily based upon the diplomatic correspondence contained in the 
archives of the French foreign ministry.  These sources largely consist of letters back 
and forth between foreign ministers and the diplomatic team, along with 
correspondence with other figures involved.  Archival work was concentrated on papers 
concerning regions with strong ties to the French book market: the Netherlands, the 
Swiss states and the principalities belonging to Prussia and the Holy Roman Empire.  
When it came to material relating to Britain, Professor Simon Burrows kindly allowed 
me access to his transcriptions of sources from the French diplomatic archives.44  There 
may thus be more material to uncover when it comes to the policing of the 
Francophone print trade in Britain but this thesis gives details of a wealth of major 
affairs which occurred, both across the channel and within other states which traded 
from beyond French borders.  Further details of the material which has been consulted 
for this project can be found in the bibliography.  Research in the foreign ministry 
archives has been complemented with time spent consulting internal government 
                                                          




records in the Bibliothèque Nationale de France and documents relating to the arrest of 
writers, publishers and booksellers in the Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal.   
This study commences in January 1770 and terminates at the end of July 1789 
when the change of regime had become evident.  There are several ways in which a 
study of censorship centred on the years between 1770 and 1789 can broaden 
understanding of the old regime.  A twenty-year time frame illuminates how far the 
nature and effectiveness of censorship fluctuated over time.  This period also 
encompasses the full tenure of two foreign ministers who occupied the position for a 
considerable period of time.  The role of the comte de Vergennes as foreign minister is 
of particular significance since he held the post for an extended period of more than 13 
years.  In addition, a study of the two decades immediately prior to the French 
Revolution is critical for exploring the connections between old regime and revolution; 
a key concern for historians working on this period.   
This study is based on official records preserved by the French government in 
these years.  This concentration on government sources has allowed light to be shed on 
the actions taken by the French authorities, as well as the perspectives of individual 
officials who were involved in policing print beyond French borders.  Yet it is also 
important to recognise how far official documentation might conceal certain 
information from view.  It was the French state which collated the records upon which 
this study relies.  Official correspondence illustrates how the decision-making process 
unfolded but there is no certainty that all pertinent information has survived.  
Contemporary and subsequent officials might easily have pruned, destroyed or lost 
documents that were sensitive in nature.  It can be assumed that the necessity of 
keeping accurate records prevented officials from frequently engaging in any deliberate 
tampering but the extent to which government sources are shaped by the perspective of 




There is one further significant limitation which is imposed by this source base.  
In many cases, we are relying upon the French government’s version of the events that 
took place and officials within the foreign ministry were inclined to stress the efficacy of 
external censorship.  French diplomats wanted to impress their foreign minister and 
tried to do by underscoring their vigilance and hard work.  The foreign ministers 
themselves were also reluctant to admit to any weakness.  They tended to assert that 
they were satisfied with the manner in which the extra-territorial print trade was being 
policed, even in the face of challenging circumstances.  Yet the geographical distance 
between diplomats and foreign ministers also meant that officials on both sides were 
compelled to be candid about the issues they were confronting in order to work 
together to surmount them.   
As long as these limitations are appreciated, governmental sources can still be 
useful.  Official documentation does not tell the whole story and to an extent has biases 
towards presenting the government as an effective force.  Yet acknowledging, 
understanding and tackling the problem of the extra-territorial print trade was a crucial 
aspect of relations between French foreign ministers and the diplomatic team.  This 
thesis centres on the attitude and actions of the French government and official records 
represent one of the best ways of understanding these elements.   
My doctoral research also makes use of data from The French Book Trade in 
Enlightenment Europe Database, 1769-1794.45  This project used the records of the Swiss 
publishing house, the STN to create a vast database charting the dissemination of 
literature in late eighteenth-century Europe.  The example of the STN can offer an 
insight into how the French government related to a sizeable extra-territorial publisher.   
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This thesis covers a total of 193 instances when the French government made 
attempts to control, or seriously contemplated attempting to regulate, the extra-
territorial print trade across the period from 1770 to 1789.  For the most part, these 
instances largely constitute objections which were made to the appearance of seemingly 
offensive material.  The French government reacted to books, pamphlets and journals 
which were written and published outside France, as well to the threat of such 
publications.  The French state’s engagement with the foreign print trade also 
encompassed negotiations surrounding the right to circulate printed matter within 
France.  Particular titles are grouped together as one instance of regulation when the 
French government targeted them at the same time and for the same reasons.  This was 
the case when foreign journals all published a similar article or when a publisher was 
thought to be printing a selection of objectionable titles.    
Details of the 193 times when the French authorities engaged with the extra-
territorial print trade have been collated in the table presented in Appendix A.  This 
table covers all instances where the French government discussed objections to foreign 
print, even if no action was taken subsequently.  The table contains information relating 
to the dates, titles of texts, individuals responsible for their production and a summary 
of the French government’s involvement in their suppression or regulation.  It is 
preceded by explanatory notes relating to this data.     
The findings of this thesis are based on the results presented in this table.  This 
thesis will also consider some measures of internal censorship in order to give context 
to the French government’s attempts to bring the foreign print trade under control.  
These internal measures are not represented in this table. Whilst the literature which the 




case and there were six instances during this period when attention was centred on 
German or English-language newspapers (for evidence see Appendix A).   
The total of 193 cannot tell us everything.  The findings presented in Appendix 
A make it clear that the actions and reactions of the French government could be 
varied.  The fact that the Bourbon state discussed the possibility of taking measures in 
the extra-territorial arena on 193 occasions makes it clear that such protestations were 
taken seriously at an official level.  Yet this evidence also indicates that the French 
government recognised gradations of illegality in the print trade.  Foreign ministers and 
diplomats made judgements about texts which came to their attention and discussion in 
the diplomatic correspondence was the starting point for a range of possible responses.  
In some cases, complaints were acknowledged but then not investigated further on the 
grounds that the text in question was not deemed sufficiently subversive.  At other 
points, concerns were raised about a number of decidedly controversial titles and the 
foreign minister authorised rigorous measures in the hope of ensuring their suppression.   
This thesis uses the full spread of this extra-territorial policing to inform its 
conclusions about the successes of external censorship in the later eighteenth century.  
The marked differences in the intensity of governmental reaction suggest that French 
officials were actually prepared to tolerate the majority of the extra-territorial print 
trade.  Indeed, scholarly research has already uncovered many of the most protracted 
policing campaigns in this period.  We should thus be careful of assuming that the big 
stories uncovered by Burrows and Darnton were typical of the time.  Large-scale 
campaigns involving police agents and the suppression of several shocking titles were 
comparatively rare.  Such affairs were considered to be gravely problematic but there 
was a finite number of these severely distasteful works that the French government 




allows this thesis to demonstrate that attempts to police print abroad were focused on a 
limited sector of the print trade.  French officials did not implement harsh measures 
every time a possible transgression was noted in the foreign print trade.  Officials 
instead assessed potential threats and made decisions about the appropriate level of 
response.        
Fluctuations according to chronology are an important part of the story of 
external censorship.  Figure 1 outlines the chronological spread of the French 
government’s engagement with the extra-territorial print trade.  It marks all occasions 
when the French government objected to or made attempts to control the extra-
territorial print trade across the period from 1770 to 1789.  This number has been 
designated as a ‘response’ in the figures in this thesis as a way of underlining the number 
of occasions that the French government engaged with the foreign print trade.  If a 
particular affair lasted for more than one year, its position on the graph is designated at 
the moment that it started to concern the French state.  This graph indicates that were 
peaks of problems in 1771, in the mid to late 1770s and a sizeable spike in the early 
1780s.  Thereafter, the number of times that the French government became involved 
with regulating the extra-territorial print trade declines sharply, rises again from 1785 to 






Figure 1: Frequency of Official Responses to the Extra-Territorial Print Trade 
(Books, Pamphlets and Journals) by Year, 1770-1789  
 
 
The picture becomes a little clearer once the policing of books and journals are 
separated.  Figure 2 shows how often the French government engaged with the extra-
territorial print trade in reference to these two mediums and suggests that the two had 
somewhat different trajectories.  Firstly, it is clear that the French government became 
involved with regulating the periodical press on a much more frequent basis.  Issues 
relating to the management of books and pamphlets were raised 68 times across this 
period.  The number of instances of the French state regulating journals was nearly 
double this number and reached 125.  Managing the news was a continual process 
whereas the policing of books tended to be characterised by one-off events of major 
significance.  Secondly, the high points of policing books and newspapers were not 




later 1770s going into the early 1780s.  By contrast, the book trade seems to have 
become increasingly problematic in the early 1780s, after which point government 
involvement with the foreign print trade went into decline.  The year 1779 appears as a 
trough in both of these trajectories which can probably be explained by gaps in data in 
the foreign ministry archive for this year.  The number of times that the French 
government took action in 1779 was presumably higher than these figures thus suggest.  
Recognising these contrasts, this thesis will explore the policing of journals and books 
in separate chapters.  It will consider the rationale of managing the printed word in 




Figure 2: Frequency of Official Responses to the Extra-Territorial Print Trade 






There was one key moment when the government’s approach to these two 
media coincided.  In 1783, the French government renewed and strengthened its 
treatment of the extra-territorial print trade.  In June of this year the state put measures 
in place to bring the importation of foreign books under tighter control.  This move 
was accompanied by a strategic shift in attitude.  The French foreign ministry actively 
attempted to take the threat of seemingly offensive books less seriously, scorning works 
that they might once have chased.  This change of policy had a clear impact on the 
book market.  The French government was troubled by a smaller number of texts in the 
later 1780s.  The shift of 1783 made less of an impression on the newspaper press.  The 
number of press-related complaints fell in 1783 to 1784 but began to creep up again in 
the mid to late 1780s.  Chapters 4 and 5 will go into more detail about the impact of 
1783 on the policing of books and journals.  Suffice to say at this juncture that 1783 was 
a critical turning point when the efficacy of external policing was intensified.  This is 
one of the major outcomes of this thesis.  
There are also clear patterns to discern what it comes to the subject matter of 
the material which the French government became involved with in the extra-territorial 




















55 90 145 
Personal libel 
 
48 41 89 
Scandal 
 
26 1 27 
Foreign affairs 
 
8 19 27 
Military affairs  
 
2 13 15 
Economics 
 
5 5 10 
Religion 
 
3 6 9 
Legal reform 
 
5 2 7 
Literary studies 
 
1 2 3 
History 
 
2 0 2 
Pornography 1 0 1 
 
Figure 3: Frequency of Official Responses to the Extra-Territorial Print Trade 
(Books and Pamphlets, Journals) by Subject Matter, 1770-1789 
 
 
The subject matter of each title that the French government engaged with has 
been classified according to at least one keyword (further details of these classification 
for titles or collection of titles can be found in Appendix A).  Many texts covered more 
than one subject which this means that the sum of this table comes to more than the 
overall total of 193.  Some initial conclusions about how French officials judged the 




the French government was concerned to manage the discussion of French current 
affairs and politics, above all else.  The Bourbon state attempted to tightly restrict access 
to this kind of information within France and complemented this with a similar strategy 
in the extra-territorial arena.  The regulation of political news was particularly pressing 
in the case of the periodical press because this topic was the main selling-point of 
foreign Francophone gazettes.  These papers could provide the kind of insights into 
French current affairs which were not necessarily easily accessible within France.  The 
question of personal libel or slander could also cause consternation for French officials 
who sought to defend the reputations of political and social elites, whether they were 
attacked in the periodical press or in books or pamphlets.  The genre of libelle literature 
typically combined personal slander with information on French politics and this potent 





This study explores the most dramatic examples of policing print but it is also 
important to remember that other mechanisms of control and influence operated in the 
background too.  It is worth being reminded of Pierre Bourdieu’s distinction between 
structural and regulatory censorship: when the former (punishment, exclusion, 
prohibition) breaks down, regulation and surveillance become more common.46  It can 
be said that a similar process to this occurred in the extra-territorial arena in the 
eighteenth century.  With censorship structures within France often inefficient and 
ineffectual, the state developed a system designed to manage and suppress what it 
considered to be the worst kinds of material.  The foreign ministry was flexible in the 
                                                          




face of forbidden literature and this made the task of external censorship more 
manageable.  This idea supports other work on French censorship which has suggested 
that flexibility had clear benefits for the French state, whether it was promoting French 
trade or allowing the Church a voice.47  As the work of Cyndia Susan Clegg and Jason 
Peacey has made clear in the British context, the picture is rather more complex than 
censorship being simply a success or a failure; the shortcomings in the censorship 
structure were also matters of design.48  The French government had an international 
system for monitoring the publishing industry.  This surveillance enabled French 
officials to assess the threat posed by particular works and ensure that censorship was 
directed towards the most dangerous titles.  They devised ways of working around the 
fact that total control was impossible. 
This thesis will have significant implications for historiographical perceptions of 
the illicit book trade in ancien régime France.  Scholarly appreciation of this subject is 
largely based upon the work of Darnton.  His ground-breaking research has consistently 
revealed the intricacies of the way in which illicit texts were produced, marketed and 
disseminated in this period.  Darnton has consistently emphasised the subversive nature 
of illicit production, making frequent use of vocabulary such as ‘under the cloak’, 
‘smugglers’ and even ‘literary buccaneers’.49  He has also postulated that the illegal and 
licit book trades operated in essentially separate spheres.50  This notion connects with 
Darnton’s well-known ideas about Grub Street.  His clandestine publishers seem to be 
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working parallel to the resentful would-be philosophes who toiled in the Parisian gutter.51  
Darnton’s work has been very influential and made its mark on the historiography.52  
Darnton’s ideas about underground illegal publishing and bookselling are referenced as 
a matter of course by scholars working on the ancien régime.53 The implication of 
Darnton’s view seems to be that this print network was beyond the reach of the French 
authorities.  The evidence presented in this thesis challenges the idea that extra-
territorial book dealers were able to trade freely ‘under the cloak’.  Journalists and 
publishers outside France paid close attention to the French government and were 
prepared to acquiesce to its demands.  Darnton’s more recent works show him to be 
thinking along these lines too.  He has distanced himself from the idea that Grub Street 
writers were autonomous radicals.54  Moreover, he has provided a wealth of evidence to 
show the extent to which government officials became engaged with extra-territorial 
print.  They policed production but many also became complicit in elements of 
illegality.55  Darnton’s pioneering research has rightly had a huge impact but it is time to 
recognise that the distinction he once made between legal and clandestine traders no 
longer stands.  There were indeed ‘underground’ traders operating beyond France who 
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became involved with material which French officials found objectionable.  But the 
extent to which these traders remained at the mercy of the French government must 
also be appreciated.    
It is also important to think about the size and influence of the extra-territorial 
print trade in order to put the French state’s efforts in context.  First of all, it must be 
made clear that the French government was never able to totally eradicate the threat of 
forbidden literature.  Publishers and booksellers continued to send illicit books into 
France through clandestine channels throughout the final years of the old regime.  
However, the French foreign ministry did experience real successes in suppressing the 
most provocative texts.  This meant that there was a limited amount of these kinds of 
works reaching the French market in the later eighteenth century.  A first edition of a 
libelle published in London typically ran to around a thousand copies, many of which the 
French government was able to prevent from being disseminated within the kingdom.56  
The boldest elements of the illicit print trade were relatively small in number then and 
the French foreign ministry worked hard to make them even less significant.  It is vital 
to recognise that the French government did not put much effort into chasing second 
or subsequent editions save for in extreme cases such as with Le Gazetier cuirassé.57  The 
ambassadorial network kept the government up to date with where second editions 
were appearing but the highly focused strategy of external policing entailed 
concentrating attention on a text’s initial splash.  Although pursuing first editions was a 
conscious choice, the point remains that later versions of provocative texts still had the 
potential to challenge the old regime. This was probably the major failing of extra-
territorial policing.   
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Second editions did emerge but the French government was nevertheless able to 
impose some limits on the size of the book market.  This ultimately suggests that the 
impact of such texts on readers was lessened.  The audience for these works was already 
restricted to the literate populace of France, although we can assume that some details 
from illicit texts also spread via word of mouth.  Moreover, it is important to bear in 
mind that newspapers had a wide circulation of regular readers which is something that 
could not be said for most forbidden texts.  Scholars are in disagreement over the 
question of whether the populace of eighteenth-century France took subversive 
messages from the texts they read.  Darnton has contended that forbidden literature 
was potent enough to undermine the old regime whilst others like Burrows, Chartier, 
Censer and Popkin underline that such texts were not necessarily taken seriously by 
readers.58  The question of what impression these books made on readers is a vital one 
but the answer can never really be known for sure.  Close textual analysis can provide us 
with fascinating insights into the messages that may have been picked up by eighteenth-
century readers.  Yet perhaps what matters most, is whether books were able to actually 
reach readers in the first place. 
Even the most explosive book could only have had a limited impact if its 
audience was restricted.  The notion that the French government was relatively 
successful in policing the external book trade thus presents a challenge to one of the 
dominant strands of historiography on the connection between eighteenth-century 
France and the French Revolution.  After a long period of research focused on social 
explanations of the onset of revolution, in the 1980s historians began to turn to 
politico-cultural factors to account for the unprecedented upheaval of 1789.  Largely 
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due to the influential work of Jürgen Habermas, it has become an accepted view that 
across the second half of the eighteenth century in particular, the legitimacy of the 
French monarchy was progressively eroded by an expanding arena of printed and public 
discussion.  Habermas contended that as the economy expanded, education improved 
and literacy rose across the continent during the later eighteenth century, a public 
sphere of rational-critical discourse developed.  With information and ideas being 
exchanged in burgeoning arenas of printed and public discussion, the notion of public 
opinion as a rational force and a sovereign tribunal emerged and became established.59  
Historians have been reluctant to accept Habermas’ model unquestioningly but a 
version of his theory has nevertheless become central to our comprehension of the 
politico-cultural climate of ancien régime France.60  Scholars have acknowledged the 
difficulty of proving a concrete link between public sphere and revolution.   Despite 
these caveats, some have contended that the expansion of the public sphere was key in 
the formation of volatile public opinion in old regime France.61   
This thesis challenges the consensus on the public sphere by illustrating how far 
the French government was able to control the publication and the circulation of 
literature.  The public sphere can be understood in meaningful terms as a metaphorical 
and physical space for the critical discussion and exchange of information and ideas.  
The concept encompasses the intersection and potential amplification of information 
through a broad range of oral, written and visual avenues.  Printed matter was only one 
element of the public sphere but it was a tangible aspect which the French government 
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were able to police.  It needs to be stressed that the size of the illicit extra-territorial 
print trade was limited.  The production of works which the French government found 
completely repugnant was comparatively rare and when such texts did appear, they 
overwhelmingly emanated from London.  Moreover, the external print trade was 
continually monitored by the Bourbon regime.  This meant that when officials 
discovered works which were considered truly reprehensible, they were able do all they 
could to prevent their circulation within France.  These efforts could in turn discourage 
traders from becoming heavily involved with the exportation of illicit literature.  The 
French government’s ability to regulate the extra-territorial print trade does not mean 
that the public sphere was firmly under state control.  There were many other 
components of the public sphere aside from the foreign print trade.  It is also important 
to remember that the public sphere was constituted of discourses in favour of the 
French government as well as those which were more critical.  Yet this study does 
present evidence of how far the government sought and was able to place normative 
limits on the diffusion of print, limiting the material up for discussion in the French 
public sphere in the process.   
Although French readers looked to publishers and booksellers beyond France’s 
borders to provide them with ‘uncensored’ books, the activities of these bookmen were 
far from free.  Public debate undoubtedly played its part in destabilising the ancien régime 
but scholars have perhaps gone too far in conceptualising the flow of literature as 
something resembling a relentless torrent.  Books, pamphlets and journals which were 
sent into France circulated largely within confines set by the French government and as 
such, only a limited number of readers were able to get hold of subversive material.  
The public sphere was important but it was embedded in the realities of contemporary 
political culture.  This thesis argues for the importance of distinguishing how the 




The extra-territorial book trade remained a problem but should not be thought of as 
one which was getting steadily worse as 1789 drew near.  The picture was rather more 
complex.  It is also important to keep in mind that books, pamphlets and newspapers 
were not the only media that could impact upon the French populace.  Oral and more 
ephemeral elements also interacted with books, pamphlets and periodicals and their 
influence is much more difficult to determine.62   
This thesis can also tell us something about the political landscape of 
eighteenth-century France.  Historians were once accustomed to thinking of Louis XVI 
as a feeble and uninspiring leader who had little success working with a ministry which 
found itself unable to steer a clear way through a mounting political and economic 
crisis.  It has also been stressed that France’s record in foreign policy was decidedly 
unimpressive in the latter part of the eighteenth century.63  Such a line of thought can 
give the impression that the 1770s and 1780s were a period of decline which led to an 
inevitable collapse.  This view has been somewhat modified by the work of Hardman 
and Price who have cautioned against a fatalistic view of Louis XVI’s years in power.  
Their emphasis on the minutiae of ministerial politics in these decades makes it clear 
that the stability and success of the regime rose and fell.64  This idea about the high and 
low points of French power is important to this study.   
The question of the strength of the French government in its final years also ties 
into the issue of despotism.  Ministerial despotism was a major accusation which was 
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levelled at the French government in contemporary literature.65  A wave of pamphlets 
published in the early 1770s accused the French chancelier René Nicolas Charles Augustin 
de Maupeou of riding roughshod over the parlements whilst other works like Essai sur le 
despotisme by Honoré Gabriel Riqueti, comte de Mirabeau, lambasted the government 
more generally.66  Historians differ in their assessment of whether these pamphleteers 
had a point.  It has been argued that, when it came to the print trade at least, this 
discourse of despotism was out of step with reality.  For example, the number of people 
put in the Bastille for offences concerning writing, bookselling and publishing was 
falling in the 1780s.67  Burrows and Price have disputed this view by pointing to extreme 
repression in the extra-territorial arena.  The French government routinely planned to 
kidnap and perhaps even to assassinate unruly authors.68  These sorts of actions imbued 
the literary theme of despotism with an authenticity which arguably rendered it more 
convincing. 
This thesis goes some way to confirming the former line of reasoning by 
contending that the French government held back from being dictatorial.  This was 
largely because it recognised that it could not aspire to have complete control over the 
entirety of the print trade.  It is also feasible that officials were anxious not to provide 
too much ammunition to those offering up the narrative of ministerial despotism.  The 
French foreign ministry demanded that foreign powers submit to their wishes but it was 
rare for them to take this to extremes.  Similarly, kidnapping was a last resort for the 
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French government.  Punishments were usually measured and issued with at least some 
semblance of having gone through the proper legal channels.   
This study will demonstrate that the Bourbon monarchy remained quite 
successful at imposing its will in the arena of print through most of the 1770s and 
1780s.  The foreign ministry had a clear idea of the works it wanted to halt and was able 
to exert enough pressure within and outside of France to prevent or stem their 
dissemination.  Evidence that the French government could be forceful, if perhaps not 
despotic, in its final years indicates the need to rethink the connection between old 
regime politics and the French Revolution.  The regime was not necessarily crumbling 
throughout the 1770s and 1780s and it still retained considerable power.  Indeed, it may 
make more sense to place emphasis instead on the way in which social and economic 
problems precipitated the crisis of the old regime as has been suggested by one of the 




The chapters in this thesis illustrate how the policing of extra-territorial print was 
organised from 1770 to 1789.  Chapter 2 considers how personnel within the French 
foreign ministry affected external censorship.  It will argue that French diplomats 
worked well to monitor extra-territorial printing and were efficient in executing the 
orders of central government.  It will also stress the importance of the comte de 
Vergennes, French foreign minister from 1774 to 1787 and contend that he played a key 
role in orchestrating an effective system of control.  Chapter 3 focuses on one of the 
main obstacles facing the French government in its efforts to impose its will abroad.  
Foreign powers were often prepared to resist French demands in order to protect the 
                                                          




traders in their locality.  This obstructed and delayed programmes of policing but the 
determination of the French foreign ministry ultimately meant that such resistance 
could be overcome. Chapter 4 is centred on the extra-territorial newspaper press.  It will 
contend that the French foreign ministry had a range of techniques which it employed 
to keep articles within acceptable limits.  A combination of these methods allowed the 
state to prevent widespread discussion of news information about the French state.  
Chapter 5 will explore the French government’s approach to potentially subversive 
texts.  The variety of evidence in relation to this topic means that this chapter is the 
longest portion of the thesis.  The policing of books also had a very strong 
chronological narrative revolving around the year 1783, which will be emphasised here.  
An expansion of foreign book dealing in the 1780s put the French foreign ministry 
under pressure.  Struggling to cope, it revolutionised its approach in 1783 and was able 
to bring the print network back under control.  This chapter is key to the overarching 
argument of this thesis: that the French government experienced particular success in 
policing print beyond France’s borders.  These five chapters illustrate the normal system 
of extra-territorial policing under the old regime and take into consideration how 




This research will follow the lead of Eisenstein in emphasising the critical significance 
of presses which operated from beyond France but in doing so will contest the post-
revisionist consensus relating to the inexorable rise of print and the related expansion of 
the public sphere.  Literature published outside of France made up a substantial 
proportion of that which circulated within the kingdom but the government’s 




the historiography.  Burrows and Darnton have explored official attitudes to libelles 
produced in London and others have focused on Dutch gazettes but the geographical 
and ideological confines of these studies present an opportunity for further research.  
The inefficacy of the administrators of the book trade has become something of a 
truism but there is a need for an increased appreciation of the motivations driving royal 
officials and a subsequent re-evaluation of the extent to which they were able to enforce 
their will.  Current conceptualisations of the French public sphere can be limited by 
their simplicity and there needs to be more consideration of issues which affected the 
manner of the administration of the book trade.  These include the role of individual 
actors, the impact of ideological, political and economic pressures and the differences 
between various genres and media.  The French government found it difficult to 
regulate the print trade but it never gave up trying to set the limits of this aspect of the 
public sphere.  Success may not have always been immediately obvious but in many 
cases the French authorities were able to deter authors, journalists and publishers from 






Chapter 2 - Diplomats and Foreign Ministers 
 
The diplomatic correspondence of the French government reveals how attempts to 
extend control abroad were conceived of and materialised in practice.  Officials working 
at the French embassies were the key agents in the government’s strategy of external 
censorship.  They received instructions from and liaised with the French foreign 
minister and some of his ministerial colleagues.  Diplomats watched over the activities 
of local book traders and acted quickly in efforts to stem the flow of any seemingly 
subversive literature.  Historical discussion of the role of the French censors has 
emphasised the significance of individual agents in the process of censorship.  Studying 
relations between the diplomats and those working at the heart of the French state can 
present a new perspective on the workings of the system of literary control.  Censorship 
was a broader phenomenon which touched areas of government outside of the direction 
de la librairie and which was dependent upon the cooperation of agents within and 
outside France.  Diplomats were responsible for maintaining and promoting French 
influence abroad; external censorship was a key component of this role.  The reactive 
nature of external policing meant that diplomats helped to perceive and suppress 
literature which might be dangerous.  It was the French foreign ministers, however, 
who ultimately guided extra-territorial censorship and made the final decision about 
which texts could simply not be tolerated.  With additional assistance from the Paris 






Who were the Diplomats? 
 
It makes sense to begin with a consideration of who exactly was serving the French 
state abroad at the end of the eighteenth century.  Diplomatic personnel were stationed 
in each European capital and a consular team was also positioned in merchant towns.1  
It was largely ennobled men who occupied the primary positions in the French 
embassies, either as ambassadeurs or ministres plénipotentiaires.2  These officials were 
supported by less powerful agents who were usually drawn from the bourgeoisie to act 
as résidents, chargés d’affaires and secrétaires.3  A chargé d’affaires would take over temporarily if 
an ambassador went on leave or was recalled.4   
Many of these officials were diplomatic professionals who spent their lifetime 
representing the French state abroad but there were others who were propelled into the 
role thanks to family links, political manoeuvring or their own specialist experience.5  
Diplomats tended to hold between four and six postings in the course of their career 
and usually represented France in a single state for a period of one to three years.6  
However, those diplomats who displayed a particular expertise in and understanding of 
a particular region could expect to enjoy a longer residency.  This was the case for Pierre 
de Buisson, chevalier de Beauteville, who represented France in Swiss Solothurn for 
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more than 10 years.  Thus, the most powerful members of the diplomatic corps came 
from the same elite milieu as the French ministry and so there was a certain unity in 
culture and outlook.   
As this chapter will highlight, French diplomats working abroad had a clear idea 
of the kind of texts which were not to be tolerated.  However, it is important to 
recognise that the practice of rotating the diplomatic team meant that some officials 
were less familiar with the characteristics of a particular region.  Although it is difficult 
to judge whether newly-arrived diplomats failed to notice or halt illicit printing and 
bookselling, it is evident that those with a longer residency were especially attuned to 
local activities.  Two examples of diplomats who were remarkably effective at policing 
the print trade were Pierre Michel Hennin who was French résident in Geneva from 1765 
to 1777 and Etienne Gastebois, the abbé Desnoyers, who occupied the position of 
chargé d’affaires in The Hague from 1772 to 1776.  Hennin was praised in communication 
from the foreign ministry for his simple tastes, good management skills and 
intelligence.7  The men who occupied the lower position of résident were not usually so 
highly thought of.  Desnoyers became chargé d’affaires after tutoring Noailles, who was 
French ambassadeur in The Hague from 1770 to 1776.  The abbé was proactive in his 
role, compiling a kind of gazette of local news which he forwarded to the foreign 
ministry.8  These duties arguably gave Desnoyers confidence in the task of policing the 
print trade.  He was very vocal in alerting the foreign ministry to potential threats and 
then zealous in pursuing the culprits.   
Hennin and Desnoyers approached the extra-territorial print trade with 
assurance but there were others who were less confident working on their own 
                                                          
7 Georges Livet, ed., Recueil des instructions aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France des traités de 
Westphalie jusqu’à la révolution française XXX Suisse, tome second, Genève, les Grisons, Neuchâtel et 
Valangin, l’évêché de Bale, le Valais (Paris: Alcan, 1983), pp. 599-602.   
8 For copies of these reports, see Paris, AMAE, Série mémoires et documents (hereafter SMD) 




initiative.  Problems could also arise when the French government called upon résidents 
or chargés d’affaires to become involved in external censorship since they were not 
authorised to act in the same way as the ambassadeurs.  Even though Hennin was adept at 
uncovering details of the book trade in Geneva, he still worried that his position as 
résident prevented him from putting sufficient pressure on the local authorities to punish 
wayward book dealers.9  Thus, the French government had access to a large team of 
ambassadors who were stationed in the major cities across the continent.  The foreign 
ministry could also call upon other secretarial and support staff to chase books if an 
ambassador had taken leave or was overloaded with other duties.  However, it is 
important to remember that the extent of expertise, local knowledge and power varied 
across the diplomatic team.  This chapter will demonstrate how the actions and 
influence of individual diplomats impacted upon the efficacy of French external 
censorship.   
 
Diplomats and their Role in Censorship 
 
French diplomats were charged with a number of responsibilities as part of their role of 
representing the interests of France abroad.  These included building commercial links, 
negotiating with foreign governments and conducting ceremonial duties.10  Monitoring 
the activities of local publishers and booksellers was a relatively minor portion of the 
job but it was a responsibility which was taken seriously by both the foreign minister 
and the ambassadors themselves.  Indeed, at certain points of crisis entire dispatches 
were taken up with discussing the circulation of literature.  This occurred in January 
1772 when the French government became alarmed that a second edition of Le Gazetier 
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cuirassé might be being published in Geneva.  Prior to his initial arrival in a European 
capital, a diplomat would receive a memorandum of instructions from the foreign 
ministry entitled Mémoire pour servir d’instruction.  This document was intended to offer 
guidance in representing France abroad and provide some details on the peculiarities of 
the region that the diplomat had been sent to.  Some of these memoranda contained a 
passage which underlined duties in relation to external censorship: 
 
Il ne sera pas moins intéressant pour la Religion et pour le Gouvernement d’apporter 
tous les obstacles praticables à l’impression des ouvrages licencieux ou hardis dans leur 
morale et dans leurs principes.11 
 
This document could also offer more specific advice tailored to local 
circumstances.  Identical instructions were issued to Hennin and Jean-Baptiste Gedeon 
de Malescombes de Curières, baron de Castelnau, French résident in Geneva when they 
started work in Geneva in 1765 and 1781 respectively which made it clear that they 
would find it difficult to work with the Genevan authorities in matters relating to the 
book trade; 
 
On sent très bien à la vérité que les magistrats de cette République ne sauraient imposer 
sur ce sujet des lois aussi rigoureuses que celles d’un Etat monarchique, et que cette 
liberté même est un objet de commerce que l’on prétendrait difficilement ôter aux 
Genevois.  Mais il est des ouvrages de telle nature que les magistrats, ne pouvant pas 
douter du mécontentement que leur débit dans le royaume donnerait à Sa Majesté, 
doivent naturellement se porter à des actes de déférence en les arrêtant.12 
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The foreign ministry asked its representatives in Geneva to secretly procure 
their own information on the local literary scene.  The idea was that the diplomats could 
use the intelligence they personally had gathered to put pressure on local officials who 
might be reluctant to punish publishers who had been producing illicit texts.  The 
reasons why foreign powers might have resisted French efforts to police print will be 
explored further in Chapter 3.  At the start of a diplomat’s posting it was outlined that 
they were expected to keep watch over the local book trade.  The inclusion of this 
responsibility in the memorandum of instructions illustrates that the foreign ministry 
saw external censorship as a vital part of the diplomatic mission to cement the stability 
and strength of the French state.  
Once the diplomats left France, their relationship with the foreign ministry 
became an epistolary one.  Diplomats regularly sent back dispatches which were filled 
with information on the latest political, social and economic developments in their 
region.  Once these dispatches had been considered by the foreign ministry, they were 
presented for discussion in the Conseil d’état du Roi where the King met with his most 
powerful ministers.  Ambassadorial dispatches were thus discussed at the highest level 
of the French government.  However, this did not mean that diplomats could always 
expect an immediate or full reply to be forthcoming.  Given the high volume of 
correspondence that he received from diplomats across Europe, it was not unusual for 
the foreign minister to send rather pithy replies back to the diplomats.  Sometimes 
diplomats would complain repeatedly across several dispatches before they received a 
response from the foreign minister which confirmed whether they were indeed right to 




gazette.13  Communication between the foreign minister and his diplomatic team was 
also complicated by the relatively slow pace of the posts in the eighteenth century.14  
This meant that dispatches were often outdated or even irrelevant by the time they 
reached the other party, putting the two sides at cross purposes in their attempts to 
police the external production and dissemination of literature.  Diplomats worked at a 
distance from the French foreign ministry and the imperfections in their means of 
communication empowered and even forced them to act upon their own initiative in 
policing the trade.  Evidence of diplomats acting independently will be examined later in 
the chapter.   
This research has found that the initial information about potentially threatening 
texts could come from several avenues.  The foreign minister particularly relied upon 
details provided by the lieutenant général de police de Paris when deciding which texts to 
pursue.  The lieutenant général had responsibility for policing the print trade in Paris, the 
largest centre of illicit bookselling in France.15  One of his main duties in this regard was 
the seizure of offensive books, whether they had been stopped at customs, at the 
chambre syndicale or book trade guild in Paris or uncovered through raids on book shops.  
The foreign minister also received information from the garde des sceaux and the directeur 
de la librairie, other officials with responsibility for overseeing the book trade within 
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France.16  Occasionally there is evidence that other ministers alerted the foreign minister 
to questionable literature.17  It is important to note that we have most information about 
the foreign minister’s communication with the lieutenant général because this official only 
came to Versailles once a week.  Other ministers were able to communicate in person 
with the foreign minister and so information about their deliberations may not have left 
traces in the archives.  However, it was also the case that the lieutenant général was the 
official best placed to know what was going on in the illicit print trade.  Thanks to his 
network of spies and police inspectors, the lieutenant général was able to inform his 
ministerial colleague of the latest potentially controversial books which making their 
way onto the market.   
The lieutenant général also got involved in the policing of foreign print.  He sent 
his police inspectors on missions beyond French borders to chase those implicated in 
the production of literature which French officials found to be deplorable.  These 
missions were especially important in the early 1780s when there was a concerted effort 
to curb the illicit activities of writers and publishers working abroad.  However, there 
were sometimes tensions in relations between the police and the foreign ministry.  
Police inspectors from Paris were only sent abroad in what was considered to be the 
gravest situations.  They were sent on missions with express instructions to prevent the 
appearance or dissemination of texts which were thought to be potentially subversive.  
The singular nature of their assignment meant that they were expected to take charge of 
proceedings once they reached their destination.  Indeed, Vergennes advised his 
diplomats that they would be receiving orders directly from the police officers 
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themselves.18  Once police officials arrived on location, French diplomats were 
compelled to withdraw into a secondary role.  They were sometimes instructed to make 
themselves useful by putting police inspectors in touch with local officials; they became 
facilitators rather than leaders.  Diplomats were the individuals who were in possession 
of local power and connections.  They were also accustomed to leading negotiations 
when it came to the suppression of illicit literature.  As such, some officials bristled 
when the Parisian police arrived and took control.19   
In this period it was usually Jean-François Des Brugnières or François-Hubert 
Receveur who were sent on foreign missions to suppress texts and this meant that these 
two police officers gained a lot of experience when it came to the matter of working 
with the diplomats.  As such, there were many instances when the police inspectors 
were able to coordinate their actions meaningfully with the diplomatic team and this 
became especially important in the early 1780s when the French foreign ministry was 
threatened by a barrage of literature from abroad.  The police inspectors themselves 
seemed to have worked quite effectively, regardless of whether they could count upon 
the backing of the diplomatic corps.  They chased culprits across borders but it often 
took time for them to find the accused and drag them back to the Bastille. 
Private individuals outside the French government also passed on warnings 
about literature that they themselves objected to.20  This was usually in relation to 
supposedly defamatory articles which had been published in the extra-territorial 
periodical press.  This aspect of external policing will be considered in Chapter 4.  
Writers themselves contacted the French government to complain about counterfeit 
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editions of their texts, although this was rare.21  More often, authors got in touch with 
French officials with the idea of blackmailing the state to suppress a provocative work 
that they were on the verge of publishing.22   
Finally and crucially, it was part of the diplomats’ job to keep a close eye on 
local journalists, publishers and booksellers and pinpoint any untoward activity.  The 
diplomats alerted the foreign ministry to potentially subversive material in around a 
third of cases (see Appendix A for details of these instances).  The Mémoire pour servir 
d’instruction issued to diplomats at the start of their posting did not outline exactly what 
constituted an illicit book.  These instructions only indicated that the diplomats should 
pursue texts which were ‘licencieux ou hardis dans leur morale et dans leurs principes’.23  
However, there was evidently a general understanding about which kinds of literature 
could not be tolerated.  Internally, French censors concentrated their attention on texts 
which might threaten the Crown, the Church or standards of morality.  These categories 
were also referenced in the diplomatic correspondence.  Although these terms could be 
construed differently by individual officials, their consistent use meant that the 
diplomats were able to appreciate which texts were likely to present a problem.  These 
were pamphlets and books which mentioned French politics or foreign policy, which 
slandered French notables (the royal family especially), which attacked the Roman 
Catholic faith or which were considered scandalous or sexually licentious.  Similar 
themes were policed in the Francophone news media but the emphasis was different.  
The foreign ministry spent most time regulating coverage of matters relating to the 
French state since this information was not freely available within France.   
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Appreciation of these subjects meant that the diplomats were able to spot 
potentially threatening works in their own locality.  The diplomats were heavily involved 
in managing the extra-territorial newspaper press.  French envoys were very well 
attuned to Francophone periodicals since they were easily accessible.  Well-respected 
French-language newspapers produced in Holland such as the Gazette d’Amsterdam and 
the Nouvelles extraordinaires de divers endroits (known everywhere as the Gazette de Leyde) 
were also considered to be required reading for government agents in eighteenth-
century France.24  It was more difficult for ambassadors to keep track of the publication 
and dissemination of illicit books and pamphlets which traders would usually try to keep 
under wraps.  Ultimately, it was the foreign minister who made the decision about 
which texts threatened the French state.  However, the diplomats remained vital to the 
process of external censorship.  They took primary responsibility for keeping gazettes in 
line and also carried out instructions to target specific books for repressive measures. 
  Once the foreign ministry was alerted to a dangerous book or article, the course 
of action generally followed a consistent pattern.  The diplomats who represented the 
French state in the eighteenth century were much more than just the passive recipients 
of commands; their perspectives and activities influenced the process of policing the 
extra-territorial book network.  They were given a good deal of freedom to make their 
own decisions.  There is also evidence that many of these diplomats had their own 
vision of the forbidden book trade which affected the way in which they tried to abide 
by or interpret the will of the foreign minister.  Previously scholars have recognised the 
diplomats’ role in external censorship but the extent to which the French government 
used its ambassadorial network to pursue divergent approaches in the management of 
books and newspaper gazettes has not yet been fully acknowledged.  In the case of an 
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objectionable book or pamphlet, diplomats involved foreign authorities in 41 out of 68 
instances of regulation, a figure which amounts to around 60% of cases (see Appendix 
A for details of these instances).  Diplomats tried to enlist their help to find the source 
of the work in question and sought punishment for either its author or the publisher 
who had printed it.   
When it came to an impertinent article which had been printed in a foreign 
gazette, diplomats tended to negotiate directly with the editor of the journal in question 
in order to persuade him to print a retraction.25  The local authorities were called upon 
in only 36 out of 125 (or 29% of) instances relating to the regulation of the foreign 
newspaper press (see Appendix A for details).  Foreign ministers would sometimes 
offer exact instructions to the diplomats, whether it be demanding that an article be 
retracted or requesting that the local authorities formally admonish a certain publisher.  
However, diplomats were trusted to use their own initiative to ensure that coverage in 
the extra-territorial press was favourable to France.  Moreover, since illicit books and 
pamphlets needed to be suppressed as quickly as possible, there was not always time to 
wait for a response from the foreign ministry.  In many cases, foreign ministers simply 
instructed the diplomats to monitor the situation and do everything in their power to 
curb the spread of the title in question.26   
The regularity of these generalised instructions indicates that the foreign 
minister was confident that his diplomats knew exactly what was expected of them.  If a 
newspaper was found at fault, the diplomats were supposed to complain to the editor 
and compel him to print a retraction.  It was hoped that this kind of admonishment 
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would dissuade editors from including articles of a similar nature in the future.  If the 
French government suspected that an illicit book had been published locally, diplomats 
were to uncover the identity of its author or publisher.  It was the foreign minister who 
made the decision about whether writers or printers were to be pursued in a particular 
case.  Agents of the French police were sometimes sent abroad to arrest authors but it 
was generally the diplomats’ responsibility to ensure that publishers were punished by 
the local authorities.  This punishment was designed to curb the activities of this one 
publisher but was also envisaged as a way of warning other traders to stay away from 
illicit texts.   
The position of trust enjoyed by French diplomats was hinted at in the course 
of 1772 when the foreign minister, the duc d’Aiguillon was unhappy with articles on 
French politics which were appearing in the Gazette intéressante, a journal published in 
Düsseldorf from 1772 to 1773.27  D’Aiguillon appealed to Jacques-Bernard, comte 
O’Dunne, an Irish refugee who was French ambassadeur in the Palatinate-Zweibrücken 
but the foreign minister’s letters on this subject went unanswered from the beginning of 
March until the start of August 1772.28  On 31 August 1772, d’Aiguillon protested 
against the Gazette intéressante once more but at the same time underlined his faith in 
O’Dunne; ‘Quoique je sois, depuis deux mois, dans l’attente de cette réponse, je n’en 
suis pas moins persuadé que vous aurez donné à cette affaire l’attention qu’elle exige’.29  
As it turned out an illness had prevented O’Dunne from carrying out his duties on this 
occasion and in September his secretary took charge of reprimanding the gazette’s 
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editor.30  This incident provides clear evidence of how far the diplomats were trusted to 
carry out the job of policing print.  On this occasion d’Aiguillon was exasperated by 
O’Dunne’s silence but this did not change the fact that he depended upon his 
ambassadorial team to carry out his instructions.    
Some diplomats were more confident than others when it came to acting on 
their own initiative.  Indeed, several men displayed an aptitude for the kind of detective 
work which was necessary in order to police print abroad.  For example, in January 
1780 Castelnau, French résident in Geneva warned the comte de Vergennes, the French 
foreign minister, that much of the distasteful literature coming into France from 
Geneva was actually being printed in the Swiss town of Moudon.31  It was perhaps 
during the pursuit of the second edition of Le Gazetier cuirassé that diplomatic fact-
finding was at its most determined.  Hennin, the French résident in Geneva, shrewdly 
attempted to analyse the condition of the paper and the kind of typesetting which had 
been used in the edition.  After further investigation, however, he received information 
which convinced him that the text had in fact come from Marc-Michel Rey in 
Amsterdam.32  D’Aiguillon appreciated Hennin’s resourcefulness and declared that this 
affair had satisfied him that Genevan publishers would never dare to print books as 
bold as Le Gazetier cuirassé.33   
The information provided by the diplomats was vital, then, but it was not always 
completely accurate.  As we have seen, Hennin changed his mind about where exactly 
Le Gazetier cuirassé had been printed, initially laying blame with the Genevan publisher 
Téron and then settling upon Rey as the culprit.  In October 1781 the STN was 
reprimanded by the French government after it published a libelle entitled, Extrait du 
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journal d’un officier de la marine de l’escadre de M. le comte d’Estaing.34  This pamphlet assailed 
Jean-Baptise Charles Henri Hector, comte d’Estaing, a French admiral who led French 
naval forces in the American War of Independence.  Following this, the foreign minister 
requested that Théobald Bâcher, chargé d’affaires in Solothurn, keep the STN under 
surveillance.  A year later, when Mirabeau came to Neuchâtel to have three 
controversial pamphlets printed, the STN was immediately suspected of involvement.  
In reality, it was another publishing company in Neuchâtel who had brought the books 
to market.35 
Discovering who was involved in the production of illicit material was one of 
the most vital components of the diplomats’ role in external censorship.  However, the 
extent to which these men were able to uncover the most pertinent details varied.  
Some, like Hennin, made a special effort to pursue wayward printers, but even the most 
determined still struggled with the task.  Such publishing was clandestine by its very 
nature and book dealers who were engaging in illicit activities usually endeavoured to 
conceal their conduct.   As will be discussed in Chapter 3, it was also common for 
foreign authorities to make attempts to protect traders working in their own locality and 
this entailed obstructing the diplomats’ project of external policing.  The French foreign 
ministers in this period were conscious of the difficulty of the diplomatic mission in the 
realm of literature and so did not expect too much.  They were inclined to trust the 
information they received from the diplomats as they were in the best position to offer 
localised news.  Moreover, the information from the diplomats was sometimes all that 
the foreign ministers had to go on.  The diplomats themselves sought to justify their 
actions by stressing the complications that they faced.  They confessed when they were 
taking an educated guess and did not claim to have complete knowledge of the print 
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trade.  It seems fair to say that the French diplomats generally coped well with these 
problems in this period.  In all of the most serious cases, they were able to pinpoint the 
guilty authors or printers.  The French foreign ministry relied upon the information they 
provided to keep journalists in check, punish publishers and suppression the circulation 
of any unwelcome material. 
Diplomats who were especially engaged with the task of external censorship also 
expressed their own ideas on the best methods of controlling extra-territorial literature.  
These views were influenced by their professional experience of chasing texts or 
harassing foreign journalists.  One of the most common frustrations, and one which is 
discussed frequently in the diplomatic dispatches, was the laxity of any regional 
censorship structure.36  Chapter 3 will shed further light on how successfully the 
diplomats were able cooperate with foreign authorities who were generally less 
concerned with the policing of print.  Diplomats occasionally recommended that the 
French foreign minister utilise particular manoeuvres.  For example, in June 1784, Marie 
Louise Henry, marquis d’Escorches de Sainte-Croix, ministre plénipotentiaire in Liège, 
offered up a quiet critique of the more forceful approach that the foreign ministry had 
initiated in 1783.37  Sainte-Croix claimed that he merely desired to inform Vergennes of 
how difficult booksellers in Liège were finding it to send their texts into France.  The 
marquis stressed that the French government was right to police the kind of books 
which were coming into the kingdom but at the same time he suggested that the state 
should be promoting any transactions which might benefit the French economy. 
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The abbé Desnoyers was one diplomat who relished employing his own 
initiative in this arena.  For example, Desnoyers voiced his doubts about the efficacy of 
scolding editors who published offensive articles in the extra-territorial press.  Instead, 
he advocated banning the Dutch gazettes from France as a means of bringing them into 
line.38  Jean Balthazar, comte d’Adhémar, the French ambassador in London, was 
another official who had his own perspective on external censorship.  He represented 
France in Brussels from 1778 to 1783 and then in London from 1783 to 1787 which 
meant that he was placed twice in cities notorious for offensive texts.  His experience in 
London was especially important in forming his views because he was stationed in the 
British capital at a time when a string of libellistes were trying to compel the crown to pay 
to suppress the scandalous tales that they had produced.  D’Adhémar was disturbed and 
irritated by these authors and became convinced that spurning their demands and 
threats was the best course of action.  He even contemplated bypassing Vergennes to 
inform Louis XVI of his proposal.39  After receiving a warning from Vergennes, 
d’Adhémar was persuaded to confine the matter to the foreign ministry.40  One of the 
libelles in question proclaimed that Marie-Antoinette had been unfaithful to the King; 
Vergennes stressed to d’Adhémar that it would be both inappropriate and unpleasant to 
raise this subject with Louis XVI.   
Although Vergennes was not prepared to ignore works which slandered the 
French King and Queen, the influence of d’Adhémar’s perspective can nevertheless by 
perceived in government policy from 1783 onwards.  From this year until at least 1786 
the French state was resolved to pay as little attention to illicit books as possible. In 
June 1783, a new system of centralised inspection for imported foreign books was also 
put into place by Vergennes in the hope of cementing French control.  This change in 
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stance will be explored in further detail in Chapter 5.  Clearly d’Adhémar’s 
understanding of the forbidden book trade was appreciated by Vergennes.  Diplomats 
who put forward strong views were generally taken seriously by the foreign ministers 
who valued their experience and knowledge.  Even if the foreign minister ended up 
following a different course, he relied upon advice from the diplomats to make his 
decision.  We see this in the case of d’Adhémar and Vergennes; the latter initially 
disagreed with the idea that all libelles should be scorned but ended up taking 
d’Adhémar’s views on board.  
 The important job of assessing which texts needed to be stopped was again 
dependent on the conviction of the individual diplomats.  Some men had the 
confidence to commence proceedings themselves if they felt that a title merited 
immediate action.  They would take action to discover more about the title in question, 
admonish those involved in its publication and then seek the approval of the foreign 
minister in the aftermath.  In April 1777, Nicolas-Germain Léonard, the chargé d’affaires 
in Liège, pressured the regional authorities to scold the French publisher Jean Louis de 
Boubers who was doing business from the region.41  Boubers was suspected of printing 
Mémoires de M. le comte de Saint-Germain, a text which purported to contain genuine 
observations from behind the scenes at Versailles collected by Claude Louis, comte de 
Saint-Germain, who was the French minister of war from October 1775 to September 
1777.42  Vergennes expressed his satisfaction after Léonard relayed to him that Boubers 
had been summoned before the Privy Council in Liège and formally rebuked.43  This 
edition of the Mémoires de M. le comte de Saint-Germain was halted.  It seems that the work 
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did not reach the market until late in 1779 when its connection to contemporary politics 
was less immediate.44 
In the case of Le Gazetier cuirassé, Hennin, the résident in Geneva, knew that the 
first edition had caused a huge stir when it was published in London.  The French 
government had issued very firm orders to suppress the text when it first emerged in 
the summer of 1771.  As a result, he did not wait for orders to begin trying to uncover 
the source of a new version which was being sold in Geneva.45  However, it is important 
to recognise that even the most proactive diplomats still needed the foreign minister to 
legitimise their actions.  Hennin found that Le Gazetier cuirassé was being sold by the 
bookseller Téron but chose to wait for further instruction before asking the Genevan 
authorities to arrest him.  Hennin was not certain if the French government would want 
to chase Le Gazetier cuirassé in Geneva when such a move might publicise the work still 
further.46  The diplomat soon received authorisation from d’Aiguillon and was able to 
conduct a full investigation into the work.  The diplomats were responsible for watching 
over the print trade in their locality and alerting the foreign minister to the publication 
of any potentially subversive books.  These officials were confident enough to indicate 
possible threats but were generally reluctant to do much more without official approval.   
When it came to the newspaper press, the diplomatic corps displayed much 
more self-assurance in identifying and attempting to block inappropriate articles.  The 
baron de Bon, ministre plénipotentiaire in Brussels, took it upon himself to enter into 
negotiations with the authorities there in the hope of curbing the licence of the Gazette 
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des Pays-Bas.47  He referred to the newspaper as a libelle and was able to convince officials 
in Brussels to reprimand its editor.48  When he continued to find inappropriate articles 
printed in the Gazette des Pays-Bas he even made the decision to threaten the editor with 
exclusion from the French market.  All this Bon did without explicitly seeking prior or 
subsequent approval from d’Aiguillon.  Diplomats were more confident acting on their 
own initiative in the case of the extra-territorial press but they also did their best to alert 
the government to the publication of reprehensible literature.     
It is important to note here that French diplomats were also sensitive to 
personal smears which found their way into print outside France.  Louis Cachet, comte 
de Montezan, ministre plénipotentiaire in Cologne, and Falciola, chargé d’affaires in Berlin, 
both protested to the foreign minister when they felt they had been misquoted in the 
Prussian gazette, the Courier du Bas-Rhin in 1778 and 1787 respectively.49  They both 
underlined that their commitment to their ambassadorial role precluded them from 
making any indiscreet statements, despite what the paper might have printed.  During 
his time as ambassador in London, Noailles was very anxious over the possibility that 
the notorious publicist Simon-Nicolas-Henri Linguet would attack him in a libelle which 
he was threatening to bring to market for much of 1777.50  When the comte de 
Mirabeau published his Histoire secrète de la cour de Berlin early in 1789, the French ministre 
plénipotentiaire Antoine-Joseph-Philippe, comte d’Esterno, was troubled that the author 
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had made false claims about him.51  Yet it must be remembered that these 
apprehensions constituted something more than self-interest.  Diplomats were the 
official representatives of France abroad and this meant that calumny targeted towards 
them was also considered a slight on the French state.52  Just as they were on guard to 
protect French elites and members of the royal family from defamation, the French 
diplomats were also watching out for any slurs against their own person.  However, 
there were only a handful of cases where such concerns were raised.  Moreover, when 
diplomats did complain about personal attacks, it was usually merely to assure the 
foreign minister that they had been misrepresented.  Diplomats concentrated on the job 
at hand rather than attempt to use the structures of extra-territorial control to defend 
themselves. 
Several scholars have highlighted the role of ambassadors in the process of 
cultural transfer, albeit in earlier time periods.53  Joanna Craigwood describes how 
envoys moved books across Europe as their diplomatic postings changed whilst Martin 
Lowry has pointed out the diplomats actively encouraged local printers.  French 
diplomats working abroad in the final years of the old regime also played an important 
role beyond mere suppression.  In 1761 the Gazette de France became an official 
mouthpiece of the French government and was formally attached to the French foreign 
ministry.  The diplomatic corps were called upon to fill the pages of the journal by 
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sending back bulletins of regional news.54  The idea was that by keeping the Gazette de 
France fresh, the appeal of foreign Francophone gazettes (which were more difficult to 
control) would be lessened.  Diplomats were also instructed to request that their 
secretaries compile a digest of newspapers printed regionally and indicate which news 
should be suppressed. 55  This report was designed to help with the compilation of the 
Gazette de France but it shows that even the secretarial team in the French embassies 
became involved in monitoring and making judgements on the printed word.  The 
diplomatic corps were thus employed in both subtle and repressive capacities to manage 
the extra-territorial print trade.  
 
Clashes between Diplomats and Foreign Ministers 
 
As we have seen, the French diplomats had a good idea of what was expected of them 
when it came to the extra-territorial print trade.  Yet in spite of their best efforts, they 
could not always anticipate the will of the foreign minister with complete precision.  
Diplomats relayed their fears back to central government but were commanded to cease 
their protestations if the foreign minister disagreed about the offensiveness of a book or 
article.56  In the course of 1777, Paul-François de Quelen, duc de La Vauguyon, ministre 
plénipotentiaire in The Hague, became uncomfortable about articles in the Gazette de La 
Haye.57  Vergennes rejected his concerns, dismissing one of the articles in question as 
‘un bavardage qui ne mérite aucune attention de notre part’.58  When the Gazette de 
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Schaffhouse printed an article describing France’s unsuccessful attempt to capture 
Gibraltar from the British during the American War of Independence, Bâcher, the chargé 
d’affaires in Solothurn, was determined to punish the journal’s editor.59  The diplomat 
appealed to officials in Schaffhausen but told Vergennes that he was disappointed with 
their response.  Vergennes attempted to pacify Bâcher by suggesting that tolerance on 
this occasion would put the French state in a better position to demand a severe 
punishment if the gazetteer reoffended; 
 
Quoique la réprimande faite au Gazetier de Schaffhouse ne soit pas une satisfaction 
aussi éclatante que nous aurions pu le désirer il ne paraît pas qu’il y ait d’inconvénient à 
laisser tomber cette affaire.  Notre indulgence dans cette circonstance deviendrait même 
un titre pour exiger une punition plus sévère à la première occasion que nous aurions de 
nous plaindre.60   
 
Yet there were other times when diplomats were able to bring the French 
foreign minister round to their way of thinking.  Across much of 1774, the abbé 
Desnoyers grumbled continually about reports on French affairs of state which were 
published in Dutch French-language gazettes.61  Upon taking office as foreign minister, 
Vergennes initially saw little reason for complaint.  He pointed out that whilst the 
offending articles may have been false, they did not contain anything critical of the 
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French court or government.62 As such, Vergennes felt, there was no need to scold the 
editors who had included them in their papers.  This reaction did not satisfy Desnoyers 
and he continued to complain about the Dutch gazettes, pointing out that it was in fact 
his duty to make Vergennes aware of what was being printed in the extra-territorial 
press.63  Persistent pressure from Desnoyers wore Vergennes down and he was 
persuaded to threaten the gazetteers in question with prohibition from the French 
market.64   
Desnoyers was able to change Vergennes’ mind once again in 1775.  In October 
of this year Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, baron de l’Aulne, contrôleur général des finances, 
confessed to Vergennes that he was worried that a book which criticised his financial 
policies had been published in Holland.  This text was entitled L’Anti-Monopoleur.  
Vergennes called upon Desnoyers to uncover who had printed this work.  Desnoyers 
pointed out the book was not making great waves in Holland and stressed that it 
actually contained many tributes to the French state.65  In spite of his own reservations, 
Desnoyers agreed to try to discover the source of this work.  However, it seems that 
Vergennes was convinced by the abbé’s assessment of the situation since he declined to 
issue any further orders relating to the punishment of the printers involved.  It is also 
important to remember that action against this text had been triggered by the personal 
complaints of Turgot.  As Desnoyers pointed out, it was not considered to be a 
particularly distasteful work which was not fit to be tolerated.   
Desnoyers was clearly one of the most influential diplomats who represented 
the French state abroad in this period.  However, there were instances when other 
officials were able to persuade the foreign minister to follow a particular course of 
action.  This happened most frequently in relation to the extra-territorial newspaper 
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press.  Many diplomats came to sympathise with foreign journalists and sought to 
prevent harsh measures being executed against them by the French state.  The close 
relationship between diplomats and newspaper editors will be explored in more detail in 
Chapter 4.  Jean Luzac, the Dutch lawyer and journalist who edited the Gazette de Leyde 
from 1772 to 1798, was especially adept at forging bonds with the French diplomatic 
corps.66  During the 1770s and 1780s Luzac was able to persuade a number of officials 
to make representations to the French foreign minister on his behalf.67  French 
diplomats showed their support to other gazetteers too such as the editor of the Gazette 
des Pays-Bas or the Gazette des Deux-Ponts.68  In September 1783 Laurent Bérenger tried to 
refute suggestions that Pierre-Frédéric Gosse, a printer-bookseller in The Hague, had 
published Linguet’s controversial Mémoires sur la Bastille.69  However, this was one of the 
few occasions where a French diplomat tried to defend a foreign printer in this period. 
Empathy between newspaper editors and French officials was much more common.  
Gosse was also the publisher of the Gazette de La Haye which perhaps may explain why 
Bérenger offered support to him.  Desnoyers raised many objections to the Dutch 
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gazettes in the course of 1774 but, like Bérenger, also claimed that Gosse was less 
deserving of punishment.70   
This mutual respect could be advantageous for the French state since such an 
understanding facilitated its attempts to coerce the gazetteers to comply with French 
wishes.  However, these bonds could also be said to undermine external censorship 
because they inclined the diplomats to try to protect journalists even if they had printed 
articles which the state might consider to be dangerous.  Either way, close relations 
between diplomats and editors confirm that French officials working abroad could play 
a major role in interpreting and executing orders from the foreign minister.   
As will be discussed in Chapter 5, the French state re-evaluated and adjusted its 
approach to the extra-territorial book trade in 1783 after becoming exasperated with the 
pursuit of foreign books in the early 1780s.  In June 1783 it was decreed that all books 
coming into France were to be inspected centrally in Paris and French officials also 
decided to try to scorn the threat of illicit literature as much as possible.  Vergennes, 
who was foreign minister at the time, also narrowed his censorship strategy.  He was 
now only prepared to issue orders against works which he considered to be truly 
beyond the pale.  This new approach shook the stability of the diplomats’ 
understanding of their role in policing illicit texts.  These officials became unsure of 
exactly which works still constituted a significant enough threat to the French state, its 
religion and its moral code.  Diplomats continued to be on alert against and report the 
same kinds of printing but now they found that their accounts were generally met with 
indifference from Vergennes.  They had lost some of their power to influence the 
foreign minister.  In September 1783, Bérenger the chargé d’affaires in The Hague, 
reported his suspicions that two printers named Benet and Hack were publishing an 
edition of La Gazette noire par un homme qui n’est pas blanc; ou œuvres posthumes du gazetier 
                                                          




cuirassé in Rotterdam.71  The author was probably Anne-Gédéon Lafitte, marquis de 
Pelleport, a rival of Morande who had tried to link his work with the latter’s notorious 
work, Le Gazetier cuirassé.72  In early 1772 the government had hunted down those who 
had published and sold Le Gazetier cuirassé in Geneva and Amsterdam but the same 
treatment was not extended to those involved with La Gazette noire.  Bérenger 
denounced Benet and Hack to officials in Holland but he did not receive any 
instructions from Vergennes to continue with the matter.73  Diplomats continued to 
play an important role in external censorship until the fall of the ancien régime despite the 
change in perspective which occurred in 1783.  There was now less scope for the 
diplomats to act on their own initiative or bring the foreign minister around to their 
point of view.  However, the French government continued to rely upon the 
surveillance skills of the diplomatic corps and value the information they were able to 
provide.  This information meant that the government could still implement measures 
against what it considered to be the most dangerousworst works from 1783 onwards.   
  
Having considered how far French diplomats were able to exercise independent 
judgement as they attempted to control the extra-territorial print trade, it is time to 
assess their effectiveness.  Since they were situated far away from the French centre of 
power, the diplomats did their best to emphasise their loyalty and usefulness.  They 
used the dispatches to recount their actions in great detail and frequently underscored 
just how speedily they had reacted to the foreign minister’s commands.  During 1776 
Desnoyers went to great lengths to demonstrate his responsiveness.74  He sent 
Vergennes copies of the warning letter he had written to the editors of the main 
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Francophone gazettes in Holland.  To emphasise that the editors had been sufficiently 
cowed, Desnoyers also included an apologetic reply from Pierre-Frédéric Gosse, the 
publisher of the Gazette de La Haye.75  Yet this deliberate projection of efficacy masked a 
number of issues.  Firstly, the matter of external censorship was discussed in the 
diplomatic correspondence only occasionally.  Although there is an entire volume of the 
Correspondance politique Angleterre relating to the London libellistes, concerns about the print 
trade were raised much less frequently in other locations.  This raises the question of 
whether undesirable literature seldom appeared or whether French diplomats were 
sometimes unaware of all that was going on.  It seems fair to say that French envoys 
knew a lot about the Francophone periodical press since this was easily available to 
them.  It was more difficult for ambassadors to keep track of the publication and 
dissemination of illicit books and pamphlets which traders often tried to keep quiet.  
Yet, it is important to keep in mind that publishers had to advertise the works in their 
catalogues somehow.  The nature of the print trade meant that it could never be 
completely clandestine.   
It was always the foreign minister who made the final call as to whether a 
certain title should be pursued.  However, the diplomats did have local knowledge 
which gave them an advantage in pursuing extra-territorial traders.  What is more, both 
the diplomats and the French foreign minister recognised the magnitude of the task of 
external censorship and so only targeted the gravest offences for repressive measures.  
This explains why the issue of external censorship was only discussed rarely in the 
diplomatic documents.  There was an understanding that the French government would 
only chase the very worst kinds of books.  Secondly, in around a third of cases, it was 
the diplomats themselves who were the first to perceive a potential threat to the French 
state.  This shows that they had a realistic vision of what was expected of them and that 
                                                          




they were indeed able to interpret and anticipate the demands of the foreign minister.  
The French foreign ministers frequently expressed their satisfaction with the course of 
action that the diplomats had pursued as in June 1775 when Vergennes told the 
chevalier de Gaussen, chargé d’affaires in Berlin; ‘La voie que vous avez prise était la plus 
courte et la plus efficace’.76  French envoys never disputed the instructions they received 
from the foreign minister overtly.  When they disagreed, diplomats continued to 
highlight transgressions in the hope that the foreign minister would be convinced that 
such disobedience merited punishment.  They stressed that their repeated complaints in 
the face of official indifference actually offered evidence of their commitment to their 
duty of defending the French state.77   
Some members of the diplomatic corps were concerned to protect their own 
reputations but they were mainly sensitive to works which maligned other notable 
individuals or texts which attacked French government and society more generally.  
Pierre Rétat has suggested that the constant recurrence of diplomatic complaints about 
the extra-territorial newspaper press indicates that the French government was less than 
effective in its strategy of censorship.78  Yet external censorship was a reactive process 
by its very nature.  The French foreign ministry relied on its network of diplomats to 
take action after contentious material had been published abroad.  These responsibilities 
remained crucial even after the foreign ministry began to take a more detached 
approach in 1783.  It was the diplomats’ role in continual surveillance and monitoring 
which provided much information about the extra-territorial trade.  They continued to 
help the French government decided whether works should be chased or ignored. 
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Foreign Ministers: D’Aiguillon and Vergennes 
 
Any assessment of the workings of external censorship must also take the position of 
French foreign minister into account.  In the final two decades of the ancien régime, the 
post of secrétaire des affaires étrangères was occupied by six different men.  These were the 
duc de Choiseul (April 1766-December 1770), the duc de La Vrillière (December 1770 
to June 1771), the duc d’Aiguillon (June 1771 to June 1774), Bertin (June to July 1774), 
the comte de Vergennes (July 1774 to February 1787) and the comte de Montmorin 
(February 1787 to November 1791).  These individuals had ultimate responsibility for 
policing the extra-territorial print trade and it was they who issued commands to the 
diplomats working in Europe.  The foreign minister had a lot of influence in the French 
government in a broader sense because his position afforded him constant access to the 
King, who viewed diplomacy as his most vital function.79  John Hardman’s work on 
high politics has made it clear that the French government was torn in many different 
directions by shifting ministerial rivalries.80  As a result, it makes sense to dwell upon the 
stance of the different foreign ministers and their interaction with their colleagues.  
There has been some suggestion that minsters were out of touch and overwhelmed by 
the final years of the old regime.  Price has studied court and ministerial politics in detail 
and concludes that the training and worldview of the governing class left them ill-
equipped to cope with the tumultuous landscape of late eighteenth-century France.81  
The foreign ministers of the 1770s and 1780s certainly found the extra-territorial book 
trade exasperating but they used their diplomatic network to understand and manipulate 
it.   
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The work of Burrows and Darnton on the London libellistes has incorporated 
some discussion of the attitudes of the ministers in power in this period.82  It was 
d’Aiguillon and Vergennes who occupied the post of foreign minister for the longest 
time across the period covered by this study.  An exploration of their attitudes and 
action will illuminate the impact that they were able to have on the French 
government’s strategy of external censorship.   
Emmanuel-Armand de Vignerot du Plessis de Richelieu, duc d’Aiguillon began 
his career as a soldier.  In 1753 he was made commandant en chef in Brittany where he 
quickly became unpopular for perceived attempts to ride roughshod over the privileges 
of the province.  In November 1765, Louis-René de Caradeuc de la Chalotais, the 
procureur général of the parlement in Brittany, was arrested on suspicion of writing 
threatening letters to Louis III Phélypeaux, comte de Saint-Florentin, duc de La 
Vrillière, who at that time was secrétaire d’état de la maison du roi. Divisions between 
d’Aiguillon and the Bretons intensified as the former seemed to be attempting to 
manipulate the trial process.83  In March 1770 the parlement of Rennes opened criminal 
proceedings against d’Aiguillon.  The trial was moved to Paris on d’Aiguillon’s request 
but eventually collapsed in June 1770 without a verdict being reached.  The public 
nature of the trial did much to dent d’Aiguillon’s reputation but he survived.  
D’Aiguillon became secrétaire des affaires étrangères in June 1771 as part of a ministerial 
reshuffle designed to suppress resistance to governmental reforms.  In January 1771, the 
French chancellor Maupeou forcefully and radically remodelled the French parlements, 
exiling any magistrates who stood in his way.84  This attempt at subjugation came after 
the parlements had consistently obstructed governmental reform plans.  D’Aiguillon 
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became part of an unlikable triumvirate along with Maupeou and Joseph Marie, abbé 
Terray as contrôleur-général des finances.  Their time in power lasted until just after the death 
of Louis XV in May 1774.  Although they were referred to by contemporaries as the 
triumvirate, these three ministers did not coordinate policy as a matter of course and 
often pulled in different directions.85  Nevertheless, the three remained associated with 
the fall-out from Maupeou’s unpopular decision to restructure the parlements.   
One of d’Aiguillon’s most pressing concerns was preventing reports which 
might fan the flames of the Maupeou controversy from appearing in the Francophone 
periodical press.  Under d’Aiguillon’s aegis French diplomats admonished the editors of 
gazettes in Mannheim, Schaffhausen and Düsseldorf but it was the French-language 
gazettes in the Netherlands which presented the biggest problem.  These journals had a 
large readership within France and they were also repeatedly printing details of the 
continuing opposition to the Maupeou coup.  During this period d’Aiguillon enlisted his 
diplomats to reprimand journalists and issued orders for certain gazettes to be 
temporarily excluded from the French market.86  Censer and Popkin have shown how 
coverage of the after-effects of the Maupeou coup was rescinded in the wake of these 
moves.87  However, the Bourbon state was never able to exercise total control over the 
periodical press and this tension will be examined in detail in Chapter 4.  When it came 
to the international gazettes, management skills were employed more often than 
bullying tactics.  Diplomats were required to keep watch for any inappropriate coverage 
and they would then negotiate to ensure that the articles in question were retracted.  
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The reactive nature of policing the periodical press meant that d’Aiguillon was never 
able to bring these journals completely under his control.   
As well as being concerned to stop coverage of the Maupeou coup, d’Aiguillon 
was also engaged in efforts to halt the spread of works which slandered French elites.  
D’Aiguillon himself outlined his policy that no material which was offensive to notable 
individuals was to be tolerated.88  It has been argued by Burrows that d’Aiguillon’s 
political background served to make him especially sensitive to personal insults.89  In the 
mid 1760s the duc had endured the painful experience of being vilified in the pamphlet 
press for his role in the Brittany affair.  D’Aiguillon was also vulnerable to calumny 
because he had ascended to his post as foreign secretary thanks to the influence of 
Louis XV’s mistress, Madame du Barry, who was a divisive force at court.  D’Aiguillon 
was probably du Barry’s sole ministerial ally and remained a friend for life.  We can see 
evidence of d’Aiguillon’s concern with protecting reputations in his approach to 
policing the printed word beyond France’s borders.  He authorised his diplomats to 
seek the retraction of newspaper articles which seemed to disparage elite figures and 
when it came to books, d’Aiguillon concentrated his attention on libelles.  He was 
incensed to be personally targeted in Le Gazetier cuirassé and also sanctioned serious 
measures against other texts which slandered his ally Madame du Barry such as 
Morande’s Mémoires secrets d’une femme publique depuis son berceau jusqu’au lit d’honneur.90   
D’Aiguillon even tried to restrict discussion of his person after he left office.  In 
July 1774 he forwarded a supplement of the Gazette d’Utrecht to Vergennes, the new 
foreign minister.  This supplement discussed d’Aiguillon’s role in the Guînes affair.  
Adrien-Louis de Bonnières, comte de Guînes was the French ambassador in London 
and in 1771 he accused his secretary, Barthélemy Tort de la Sonde, of trying to use the 
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Guînes name to speculate with public money.91  D’Aiguillon had sided with Tort but did 
so against the powerful alliance of Marie-Antoinette and the duc de Choiseul who 
decided to back Guînes.  This was a contentious affair which dragged on for years and 
which eventually resulted in Guînes being narrowly acquitted by a commission of 
conseillers d’état in June 1775.  This controversy left d’Aiguillon without much support 
and it was his exclusion from favour which was partly to blame for his fall from power 
in June 1774.  Marie-Antoinette already disliked the duc due to his friendship with 
Madame du Barry and the Guînes affair only made her more ill-disposed towards him.  
In his letter to Vergennes in July 1774 d’Aiguillon claimed that whilst he would usually 
pour scorn on any articles which referenced him in unfavourable terms, he felt 
compelled to protect his reputation under the present circumstances.   
The real problem here was that Tort and Guînes both needed to cite 
correspondence from d’Aiguillon to establish their causes in the case.  D’Aiguillon was 
to be exposed publicly in the course of this affair.  He asked Vergennes to instruct 
Noailles, the ambassadeur in The Hague, to negotiate with the Dutch States-General in 
the hope of compelling Claude-Isaac Peuch, the editor of the Gazette d’Utrecht, to retract 
his article on the Guînes affair.92  D’Aiguillon also advised that measures should be 
taken both against the gazette itself and its correspondents in Paris.93  The duc tried to 
persuade Vergennes to act by underlining that he had the approval of the naval minister 
Antoine Raymond Jean Gualbert Gabriel de Sartine.  Not only had Sartine recently 
departed the office of the directeur de la librairie but he was also an ally of Vergennes.  
Vergennes assented to d’Aiguillon’s request and instructed Desnoyers to seek a 
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retraction from the Gazette d’Utrecht, as well as from the Gazette de Leyde and the Gazette 
de La Haye which had also printed versions of the same article.94   
D’Aiguillon was involved in managing international coverage of the Maupeou 
coup and also sought to shield those at the top of French society from criticism.  
However, he did not expend too much energy on trying to police the extra-territorial 
print trade in a wider sense.  Indeed, there were times when the diplomats seemed more 
proactive than the duc.  In May 1774 Desnoyers tried to rouse d’Aiguillon, informing 
him; ‘je viens de renouveler les démarches qui m’ont paru nécessaires auprès des 
Gazetiers et des autres, tant écrivains qu’imprimeurs de ce Pays-ci’.95  However, it was 
not until Vergennes took over the post of foreign secretary that Desnoyers was really 
listened to.  Shortly after he took office Vergennes asked Desnoyers for more 
information about the booksellers working in The Hague and the offensive literature 
they were stocking.96   
In the task of external censorship d’Aiguillon focused his attention on personal 
slurs.  In some cases, the works he condemned also appeared to constitute a wider 
attack on the French state.  This was certainly the case for Le Gazetier cuirassé.  However, 
when we compare d’Aiguillon’s actions with those his successor Vergennes we see that 
the duc’s involvement in policing the print trade was actually minimal.  This was not 
because d’Aiguillon was a tolerant individual. Indeed, his desperation to control the way 
in which he was discussed in extra-territorial print demonstrates a belief that authors 
and publishers operating outside France should be policed.  However, he did not have 
the power or the competence to involve himself in the processes of external censorship 
to the same extent as Vergennes.   
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There have been several studies of Vergennes’ foreign policy decisions and 
more recently Price, Hardman and Jean-François Labourdette have shed light on 
Vergennes’ role in shaping domestic politics.97  Although we already know that 
Vergennes was engaged in efforts to control the extra-territorial print trade, this will be 
the first time that his activities have been examined in a systematic manner.  Charles 
Gravier, comte de Vergennes ascended to the post of secrétaire des affaires étrangères after a 
diplomatic career which began in Constantinople in 1755. He was recalled to France in 
1768 after a disagreement with the duc de Choiseul.98  Thanks to the backing of 
Maupeou, Vergennes was appointed French ambassador in Stockholm in 1771.  
Vergennes became foreign minister in July 1774 and was able to hang onto power until 
his death in February 1787.  As foreign minister, Vergennes was something of an 
outsider in social terms compared to his ministerial and diplomatic colleagues.  His 
family had been ennobled relatively recently and were part of the robe nobility.99  
Vergennes had originally intended upon a career in law.    However, he did bring his 
own ambassadorial experience to the role which gave him a keen understanding of the 
diplomats’ position.  Vergennes was thus in charge of external censorship for most of 
the period covered by this study.  Vergennes understood the importance of monitoring 
and manipulating the printed word and did not shy away from imposing draconian 
measures in an attempt to do so.100   
Vergennes also had much greater reserves of political support than d’Aiguillon 
and was able to consolidate his authority over a longer period.  Vergennes was one of 
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the only ministers who had a genuine connection with Louis XVI.  The two men were 
both committed dévot Catholics.101  They were also devoted to their wives and never 
took mistresses.  Such uxoriousness was rare amongst eighteenth-century French 
leaders.  When Vergennes died on 13 February 1787, Louis XVI is reported to have 
broken down in tears and said, ‘je perds le seul ami sur lequel je pouvais compter, le seul 
ministre qui ne me trompa jamais’.102  The pamphleteer Linguet witheringly described 
Vergennes as ‘un des plus vertueux, et par conséquent des plus inutiles Ministres, qui ait 
existé.’103  Vergennes benefited from the friendship and trust of Louis XVI and he was 
also allied with other influential ministers including Jean Frédéric Phélypeaux, comte de 
Maurepas, who was the King’s first minister.104  Vergennes’ political clout rose sharply 
after Maurepas died in November 1781.  The foreign minister’s power reached its 
zenith in February 1783 when Louis XVI conferred the title of chef du conseil royal des 
finances upon him.105  This title had previously belonged to Maurepas and in bestowing it 
on Vergennes, Louis signalled that he had taken over as his most powerful and trusted 
minister.  It also allowed Vergennes to extend his authority into the domestic sphere 
and in the course of 1783 he was occupied with plans to arrange a cross-departmental 
ministerial budget via a committee.   
Vergennes’ power took a knock in November 1783.  His comité fell apart and he 
was discredited in the eyes of Louis XVI after the contrôleur-général Henri François de 
Paule Lefèvre d’Ormesson accused him of trying to sell rights on lands in Alsace and 
Lorraine to the crown at an inflated price.  However, Vergennes’ biographer Price has 
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suggested that the foreign minister’s authority was on the rise again from 1785 until his 
death in 1787.106  This position of influence helps to explain why Vergennes’ strategy of 
external censorship was more dynamic and effective than that of d’Aiguillon.  However, 
as the following discussion will highlight, it was also the case that Vergennes was simply 
more engaged with and adept at policing the print trade.  
Vergennes took his censorship responsibilities seriously and thought deeply 
about the best manner to bring the extra-territorial print trade under control. The comte 
placed greater emphasis on his role in overseeing foreign print and so arrived at a better 
understanding of the complexities of censorship.  Vergennes was a conservative and a 
devout catholic who appreciated that literature which attacked elements of the old 
regime could endanger the status quo within France.  However, he also recognised that 
he would not be able to completely dominate the international book trade.  In 1774 
Vergennes told Louis XVI that public opinion was queen of the world, signalling his 
belief that the French government should aim to influence and regulate the material 
available to the public rather than simply dictate terms.107   
At the same time, there were clear limits to Vergennes’ acceptance of the 
circulation of literature.  For example, in October 1777 Jean Luzac, the editor of the 
Gazette de Leyde, contacted the French government after two French men imprisoned in 
Aix-en-Provence wrote to him asking him to publish a plea for their release in his 
newspaper.108  Vergennes decided that Luzac should not print the plea, contending that 
such a piece would set a dangerous precedent.  The foreign minister considered French 
readers to be ‘crédule et superstitieux’ and was wary of allowing a wider audience to 
form on opinion on the guilt of these prisoners.109  Vergennes’ experience of working as 
a diplomat also meant that he appreciated the options which were open to his team 
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when it came to policing literature abroad.  Vergennes thus approached the task of 
external censorship with a considered strategy, in contrast to d’Aiguillon’s more reactive 
tactics.  In general terms, Vergennes’ approach was tolerant and flexible.   The comte 
was prepared to stomach most examples of illicit writing and printing which went on in 
the extra-territorial sphere and only authorised measures against material which he saw 
as especially controversial or subversive.   
Vergennes’ dedication to his duties is most evident in the decree he enacted on 
12 June 1783.  It was on this date that Vergennes attempted to restrict the passage of 
books coming into France from abroad by declaring that all foreign books were to be 
inspected in Paris.  This was an unprecedented act of centralisation which also had a 
huge impact upon the book trade within France.  The level of Vergennes’ engagement 
with the policing of print must be emphasised.  This is especially worthy of note 
because the efficacy of censorship was shaken in the aftermath of Vergennes’ death in 
February 1787.  Vergennes’ death was only one factor in the crumbling of censorship at 
the end of the ancien régime but it seems fair to say that the government might have 
retained control for longer had he lived.  In contrast to d’Aiguillon, Vergennes did not 
restrict himself to condemning and chasing certain titles.  His approach to the extra-
territorial book trade was thought through and strategic rather than merely reactive. 
Yet like d’Aiguillon, Vergennes was worried about literature which might attack 
him personally.  Although Vergennes was one of Louis XVI’s most influential ministers, 
he never allowed himself to accept that his position was completely secure and fretted 
continually about losing power to a minister patronised by Marie-Antoinette and the 
duc de Choiseul.110  Marie-Antoinette simply disliked Vergennes and during the early 
1780s she was occupied with manoeuvres to enhance her influence by bringing more of 
                                                          




her protégés into the ministry.111  Vergennes’ private correspondence with Louis XVI 
demonstrates that the foreign minister was also apprehensive about the production and 
circulation of literature which discussed his personal life.  Vergennes did express 
concerns about texts relating to his person in private correspondence but only in a few 
cases did he demand that his subordinates prevent their dissemination.  For example, 
Vergennes grumbled to Louis XVI about a pamphlet entitled Nouvelles considérations sur 
l’ouverture de l’Escaut in which Linguet discussed the comte’s foreign policy in disparaging 
terms.112  Although Vergennes told Laurent de Villedeuil, the directeur de la librairie, that 
the text should not be permitted, the foreign minister never instructed his diplomats to 
suppress this work.  Vergennes also showed disdain when Linguet published his 
calumnious Lettre de M. Linguet à M. le comte de Vergennes, ministre des affaires étrangères en 
France in January 1777 and he refused to be blackmailed into paying a large sum to 
prevent the publication of Les Amours et aventures du vizir Vergennes, a libelle which 
threatened to expose his supposed love affairs.113   
It is possible that Vergennes’ comparatively humble origins may have served to 
make him less sensitive to personal criticism.  Vergennes focused his energies on 
managing the extra-territorial print trade as he saw fit rather than leaping to defend 
himself at all times.  However, it is important to recognise that Vergennes was not 
completely disinterested when it came to managing the print trade.  For example, in 
September 1786 Vergennes heard talk of the possible publication of correspondence 
between Frederick the Great of Prussia and the French philosophe d’Alembert.114  The 
foreign minister worried that this work might criticise his foreign policy and so he 
decided to destroy existing copies of the letters. 
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Although he tried to situate himself above personal attacks, Vergennes was 
often willing to protect the reputation of other members of the French elite and 
sanctioned measures abroad to do so.  Vergennes stressed the necessity of defending 
reputations, even if the person attacked in the work was not taking it particularly 
seriously.115  There were times when Vergennes sought to prevent written criticism of 
elite figures and like d’Aiguillon he was concerned about protecting his own reputation.  
But he also showed remarkable readiness to tolerate slander.  The idea that it was better 
to scorn contentious literature comes up time and time again in Vergennes’ 
correspondence.  In November 1782, Vergennes reminded d’Esterno, ministre 
plénipotentiaire in Berlin, that the state was in the habit of showing contempt for 
gazetteers, but added that on this occasion, the journalist in question had gone too far 
and needed to be reprimanded.116  When the writer Morande was planning to bring a 
libel case against Pelleport, his fellow libelliste, Vergennes warned d’Adhémar not to get 
involved since the crown had not been attacked.117  By contrast, some of the most 
successful examples of external censorship were set in motion in the hope of curbing 
the spread of material which slandered members of the royal family.  These works were 
primarily published in London where the foreign ministry enacted prolonged and 
remarkably successful campaigns to prevent the appearance of works which discussed 
Marie-Antoinette.118  Stopping these kinds of texts was one of Vergennes’ primary 
concerns because they were seen to constitute a challenge to the absolute authority of 
the French King.  Vergennes was prepared to tolerate much in the way of distasteful 
material but drew the line when it came to works which assaulted the royals.  
Vergennes’ role in the policing of libelles will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 5.   
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Vergennes spent a long period in office which allows us to consider how power 
shifts and political pressures influenced the way in which he approached the challenges 
of external censorship.  This link between politics and censorship is most apparent in 
the early 1780s when Vergennes’ political authority was at its apogee.  It was during this 
period that he made a concerted attempt to bring the extra-territorial print network 
under his control.  Evidence from the diplomatic correspondence indicates that 
Vergennes’ conception of his own role in censorship was enlarged at this time.  In 
November 1783, Vergennes wrote to Laurent Basset de Châteaubourg, the lieutenant 
général de police de Lyon, after the latter individual had given his approval to a tragedy 
entitled Barnevelt by the playwright Antoine-Marin Lemierre.119  Since this play discussed 
the relationship between France and the United Provinces, Vergennes requested that 
the manuscript be sent to him for review.  The foreign minister also suggested that; ‘il 
conviendrait de la soumettre à l’examen d’un censeur de Paris plus au fait des 
convenances en pareilles que ne le peuvent être les censeurs des villes de Provinces’.120  
After receiving a letter of objection from an ally of Lemierre which pointed out that the 
tragedy was based on a story which was centuries old, Vergennes eventually consented 
for the play to be put on in Lyon.121  It was not particularly unusual for Vergennes to be 
consulted by the directeur de la librairie when censors were judging works which touched 
upon matters of foreign policy.  But Vergennes’ decision in November 1783 to 
intervene in the minutiae of local censorship was somewhat unprecedented. 
Vergennes’ engagement with the extra-territorial book trade is also indicated by 
the extent to which he coordinated his actions with other ministers.  The foreign 
minister cooperated well with his close ally Armand Thomas Hue, marquis de 
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Miromesnil, who occupied the post of garde des sceaux from 1774 to 1787.122  Vergennes 
was also allied with and relied upon Jean-Charles-Pierre Lenoir, the lieutenant général de 
police de Paris from August 1774 to May 1775 and then again from June 1776 until 
August 1785.  Vergennes asked Lenoir to send him regular police bulletins to inform 
him of cultural shifts in Paris.  Lenoir was instrumental in helping Vergennes to 
understand the book trade and fed him information about the key players and titles.  
Vergennes also worked with the directeur de la librairie to offer guidance when the censors 
were judging works on foreign affairs.123  For example, in February 1780 Vergennes 
advised François-Claude Le Camus de Néville, the current directeur de la librairie, that 
certain pamphlets which attacked Britain should not be tolerated.  Vergennes 
maintained that the French state should conduct itself with honest and decency, despite 
hostilities between the two countries.124  Néville and Lenoir both consulted Vergennes 
regularly in the early 1780s when texts relating to the political troubles in Geneva 
poured onto the market.125  In addition, Vergennes sought advice from Maurepas, Louis 
XVI’s first minister and principal advisor.  Maurepas had actually been disgraced in 
1749 for his role in the creation of verses which slandered Madame du Pompadour and 
he continued to collect songs and epigrams after his return to his power.126  As such, 
Maurepas arguably took libelles less seriously than Vergennes, even if slurs were targeted 
towards him.  However, Maurepas’ influence should not be overstated.   
As we have seen, Vergennes was largely able to direct external censorship 
according to his own views and his position of authority was boosted following 
Maurepas’ death in November 1781.  What is more, the memoirs of Lenoir, the 
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lieutenant général, indicate that Maurepas concurred with Vergennes on the seriousness of 
works which maligned members of the royal family.127  There is less evidence, in terms 
of volume of correspondence, that d’Aiguillon collaborated closely with other officials 
within France.  This lends more weight to the argument that Vergennes took his 
censorship duties very seriously, effectively calling upon colleagues whom he could rely 
upon for information and support.  Compared to d’Aiguillon, Vergennes showed a 
keener appreciation for the manner in which he could manipulate the print trade in 
France’s interests.     
Vergennes’ political influence was diminished late in 1783 and only began to 
revive in 1785.  Price has contended that as the 1780s progressed, Vergennes became 
increasingly concerned with political rivalries rather than administrative duties.128  
However, evidence relating to external censorship suggests that Vergennes’ vulnerability 
in this period has perhaps been overstated.  Vergennes continued to be able to impose 
his will on the extra-territorial print trade until his death in 1787.  There is considerable 
evidence that the edict which Vergennes issued on 12 June 1783 relating to the 
inspection of imported books was upheld until at least 1786.  The effects of this decree 
will be examined in more detail in Chapter 5.  It is certainly fair to say that Vergennes 
was less involved in the policing of literature from mid-1783 onwards.  But this was the 
result of a conscious policy decision on his part to scorn the threat posed by libellistes 
and other controversial writers as far as possible.  When the diplomats brought 
contentious texts to his attention, Vergennes largely clung to the belief that ignoring 
illicit literature was the best course of action.  Vergennes’ political position was shaken 
late in 1783 but the foreign minister was able to retain enough authority to ensure that 
the extra-territorial print network remained under his control.   
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Yet there are signs that Vergennes’ once perceptive appreciation of the book 
trade was beginning to wane in the months before his death in February 1787.  In 
September 1786, Vergennes complained to Miromesnil, the garde des sceaux, about 
inaccuracies in the article on Geneva in the Encyclopédie méthodique, an enlarged and 
revised edition of the Encyclopédie which was printed in Paris by the publisher and 
entrepreneur Charles-Joseph Panckoucke.129  Vergennes had received protests from the 
Petit Conseil in Geneva about this article and he agreed that the piece needed to be 
revised.  The foreign minister expressed surprise that details of the King’s power in 
Geneva had not been properly outlined and he also wished it to be made clear that 
‘Genève n’a jamais été plus heureuse ni plus prospére que depuis la pacification’.130  
Since this edition of the Encyclopédie méthodique had already been published and 
disseminated Miromesnil could only suggest that the French government formally 
condemn the article whilst he arranged for a new version to be inserted into a 
forthcoming edition.131  On this occasion the article on Geneva in Panckoucke’s 
Encyclopédie Méthodique had already been sent out to subscribers at least two years 
previously.132  It was too late to prevent the text from having any impact on French 
readers.   
In November 1786 Vergennes’ assurance seems to have faltered slightly once 
more.  He declared that measures were to be taken against a pamphlet entitled, Essai sur 
quelques changements qu’on pourrait faire dès à présent dans les loix criminelles de France, par un 
honnête homme qui, depuis qu’il connoît ces loix, n’est pas bien sûr de n’être pas pendu un jour.133  
This work has been attributed to Trophimé-Gérard, marquis de Lally-Tollendal but 
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government documents suggest that it was written by Louis-Pierre Manuel.134  Manuel 
himself seems to corroborate this in his treatise on the Paris police.135 
A search in Berne uncovered 200 copies of the work at the shop of a bookseller 
in Lausanne.  The authorities in Berne asked the bookseller in question (whom they did 
not name) to justify his decision to market the work; 
 
Ce libraire surpris de l’imputation qu’on lui a faite d’avoir vendu un libelle, croit non 
seulement n’avoir commis aucune faute à ce sujet, mais encore il espère être à l’abri de 
tous dommages puisque cette brochure, selon lui, n’est en aucune façon un libelle, ne 
contenant que des observations sur la législation criminelle de France, qui ne sont pas 
plus fortes que ce que l’on trouve dans d’autres écrits imprimés et publiquement vendus 
en France.136   
 
Miromesnil concurred with the assessment made by the authorities in Berne: 
 
Ces 200 exemplaires ne peuvent pas former un objet de grande conséquence.  Vous 
aurez remarqué de plus que la Brochure dont il s’agit, n’est point du nombre de celles 
qui présentent des injures concertées dans le dessein de nuire à la France ou à des 
particuliers, et qui forment par cette raison la première classe des véritables libelles.137 
 
Although he disagreed with Vergennes, Miromesnil was prepared to defer to the 
foreign minister’s ultimate authority in the extra-territorial sphere.  However, 
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Miromesnil’s doubts were enough to persuade Vergennes that the pamphlet was not 
worth chasing.  In March 1787, he advised Dominique Gabard de Vaux, the chargé 
d’affaires in Solothurn, that the matter should now be dropped.138  Vergennes’ initial 
worries were understandable.  Manuel’s writings had landed him in the Bastille twice 
already in 1783 and earlier in 1786.139  In December 1786, Vergennes feared that Manuel 
had brought another intolerable text to market.  This affair shows that even the most 
confident officials could have difficulties deciding which texts merited suppressive 
measures.   
Vergennes was most in control of the extra-territorial print trade during the 
early 1780s.  He showed concern to defend elite figures against slanderous commentary 
but he also understood how other kinds of books and articles might harm the ancien 
régime.  Even though his political position was weakened from late 1783 onwards, he 
retained enough authority to continue to hold sway over foreign print.  Although there 
are some signals that his judgement was sometimes clouded, the fact remains that he 




This chapter has made it clear that individual decision-makers played a key role in 
external censorship.  Surveillance was probably the diplomats’ most important duty.  
Certainly there were some diplomats who were more confident in this role than others.  
Desnoyers, chargé d’affaires in The Hague, was one notable example of a diplomat who 
zealously patrolled the print industry.  As a corps, the diplomats were trusted and given 
scope to interpret whether or not literature was sufficiently offensive to warrant 
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repressive measures.  The ambassadorial team were most engaged with the 
Francophone periodical press but they also had access to important information about 
illicit bookselling and publishing.  By passing word back to France, they helped the 
foreign minister to assess the severity of the threat posed by certain titles.  The stance of 
the foreign ministers was undoubtedly central to extra-territorial control.  Vergennes 
arguably took his responsibilities in the extra-territorial arena more seriously than 
d’Aiguillon.  Vergennes used his considerable power effectively in order to shape the 
kind of literature which was able to make its way into France.  His assertiveness helps to 
explain a lot of the successes of external censorship in this period.  Yet the foreign 
ministers could not operate alone.  The structures of extra-territorial policing rested on 
cooperation between diplomats and foreign ministers because it was a process which 
was continual and reactive.  This process allowed individual agents to have a discernible 




Chapter 3 - Working with Foreign Powers 
 
It was the French diplomatic corps who played the key role in watching over and 
regulating the extra-territorial print trade.  Yet the realisation of their efforts was often 
dependent upon the compliance and cooperation of foreign powers.  This chapter will 
explore how the French state coerced, negotiated and clashed with foreign authorities in 
the hope of exercising some control over the kind of works which were being imported 
into France.  The French state was a great power but its dominance abroad was not 
guaranteed.  French diplomats had to spend a lot of time appealing to and trying to 
compel foreign officials to enact measures against writers and publishers who were 
involved in the production and dissemination of controversial material.  The French 
government’s relationship with foreign authorities was most significant when it came to 
the policing of books and pamphlets.  As explained in Chapter 2, diplomats tended to 
appeal directly to editors and journalists when articles which were deemed inappropriate 
were published in the foreign newspaper press.  This chapter will explore and emphasise 
the tensions in relations between the French diplomatic corps and foreign authorities 
when it came to the question of policing print.  It will contend that foreign powers were 
a major hindrance to external censorship.  The Bourbon regime tried to encourage 
foreign governments to watch over the print trade carefully but they could not depend 
on them to prevent the appearance of contentious texts.  What is more, foreign officials 
were generally reluctant to punish local men who had incurred the wrath of the French 
government and they had a number of techniques which they employed to avoid 
following French demands.  However, through continued pressure the foreign ministry 
was able to convince and coerce foreign powers to discipline those implicated in the 




extra-territorial print trade but the diplomats did their best to impose the government’s 
will abroad. 
 
France and the Extra-Territorial Print Trade 
 
In many ways, the states which surrounded France were ideally positioned to cater to a 
French literary market which was censored and constricted.  French was the 
international language of Europe and Francophone texts were traded all over the 
continent.  Geographically, book dealers in the areas bordering France were close 
enough to send texts across the frontier with a minimum of cost and effort.  Regions 
like Geneva, Britain, Holland and the German state states all had long traditions of 
publishing and bookselling.1  By the later eighteenth-century the Francophone print 
industry was also flourishing in other areas.  Between 1700 and 1800, the number of 
print-shops in the Swiss states nearly doubled.2  Although structures of censorship 
existed in most of the states adjacent to France, the policing of the printed word tended 
to be lax.  Moreover, many of the smaller states which surrounded France, such as the 
Swiss cantons or the territories of the Holy Roman Empire, enjoyed a good deal of 
political independence.  This could work to the benefit of indigenous authors, 
booksellers and publishers who were sheltered by sympathetic agents of local 
government.  The extra-territorial print trade was strong and vibrant by the later 
eighteenth century which meant that it was a challenge for the French government to 
keep it under surveillance and control.    
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In the 1770s and 1780s, France was one of only a number of great powers on 
the continent and its authority was challenged primarily by Austria, Britain and Prussia.  
France’s vulnerability was painfully underlined by the severe defeats it suffered in the 
course of the Seven Years War between 1756 and 1763.  Nevertheless, the French 
nation still had huge reserves of political and economic might in comparison with many 
of the smaller states which surrounded it.  France also had commercial influence since 
many of the states along its borders were dependent upon foreign trade with their 
powerful neighbour.  French diplomats were thus at an advantage in their relations with 
foreign authorities since they were in the prestigious position of representing the great 
power of France.3   
An appreciation of regional difference is critical to understanding the impact 
that the French government could have in foreign territories.  Figure 4 shows the 
geographical spread of extra-territorial policing for books and pamphlets, and for 
journals.  It also provides details of which cities have been included in each regional 
area.  This table covers all the occasions when the French government attempted to 
engage with the print trade in a particular location and categorises these instances 
according to region.  If a campaign of suppression was spread across two locations, 
both locations have been counted on this chart.  The total number of official responses 
by location is thus greater than the number of times that the French government made 
efforts to respond to the extra-territorial print trade.      
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15 38 53 
British London 23 15 38 
Swiss Berne, Geneva, 
Lausanne, Neuchâtel, 
Schaffhausen 
15 13 28 
Prussian Berlin, Cleves 5 14 19 
 
Figure 4: Frequency of Official Responses to the Extra-Territorial Print Trade 
(Books and Pamphlets, Journals) by Region, 1770-1789 
 
 
As Figure 4 indicates, instances of external censorship relating to books and 
pamphlets were concentrated in Britain and then spread relatively evenly across the 
Swiss states, the regions of the Holy Roman Empire and also, the United Provinces.  
Britain was undoubtedly the area which was most difficult to manage.  There, the 
Francophone print trade was centred in London and publishers routinely engaged in the 
production of provocative texts.  By contrast, illicit publishing in the rest of Europe 




and Liège in the Holy Roman Empire and the Helvetic towns of Geneva, Lausanne and 
Neuchâtel.4 
When it came to the management of the newspaper press, Figure 4 illustrates 
that the French government was overwhelmingly involved with the regulation of Dutch 
journals.  This chart also indicates that papers which were published in the states of the 
Holy Roman Empire were surprisingly troublesome.5  British newspapers did come 
under fire but the industry of Francophone journalism was not as strong there as it was 
on the continent. The Courier de l’Europe was the most successful Francophone journal 
published in Britain and the French government had considerable influence over this 
title.6  
These geographical differences in external policing were related to French 
spheres of influence abroad.  French authority was probably at its lowest level in 
Britain, a state which had long been a diplomatic enemy.  Relations between the two 
governments were especially strained from 1778 to 1783 when the countries were in 
direct combat in the American War of Independence.  The influence of the French 
diplomatic corps was lessened still further during the war as France stationed only a 
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chargé d’affaires in London at this time.7  Chapter 5 will shed more light on the difficulty 
the French government had in imposing its will on the print trade within Britain.   
By contrast, most of the states allied to or part of the Old Swiss Confederacy 
had long been clients of France and saw close relations with their most powerful 
neighbour as the natural state of affairs.  Bâcher, the chargé d’affaires in Solothurn, 
certainly thought this, stating that the people of Schaffhausen ‘sont trop intéressés à se 
maintenir dans les bonnes grâces de Sa Majesté, avec laquelle ils ont l’honneur d’être 
allié’.8  The strong relationship between France and the Old Swiss Confederacy was 
cemented in July 1777 when the pair renewed their political alliance.9  Switzerland was 
important to France in strategic terms. The idea was that by keeping the Swiss states 
close, the French government could stop them allying with the rival power of Austria.   
But the extent of France’s influence varied across the Helvetic region.  The 
volatile nature of Genevan politics enabled the French government to play a direct role 
there but it also meant that working with the local authorities could be difficult.  Across 
the course of the eighteenth century, the independent republic of Geneva was 
repeatedly rocked by conflicts over the question of who should be able to exercise 
political rights.  In 1738 France agreed to act as a guarantor of Geneva’s political 
stability and repeatedly sent troops into the region to calm any agitation.  In April 1782 
a reformist movement of représentants rebelled against the oligarchic nature of the 
Genevan government. France invaded Geneva to re-establish stability after this political 
revolt and managed to force the expulsion of the rebels.10  From this point onwards 
Geneva essentially became a French protectorate.   
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This situation meant that officials in Geneva laboured with the threat of French 
military intervention and political interference looming over them.  Yet, the small 
republic of Geneva also had a very strong sense of independence.  For the Genevans, 
their ability to remain autonomous despite being surrounded by the major powers of 
Europe was providence and a proof of God’s faith in their state.11  Fears about Geneva 
becoming dominated by France were partly responsible for the 1782 revolution.  
Staying close to France was a priority for the small executive councils which governed 
Geneva but this aim was not supported by the représentants, nor by the wider populace 
who saw a conflict between French Catholicism and Genevan Protestantism.  This 
tension shines through in French policing of the extra-territorial print trade.  The 
Genevan authorities were careful to repeatedly stress their loyalty to France but, as we 
shall see, they also resisted French demands when it came to the matter of controlling 
the book trade.   
French influence in Holland and in the Holy Roman Empire was strong since 
France was allied with both the United Provinces and Austria.  Officials in these regions 
were generally more accommodating than their counterparts in Britain or the Swiss 
states.  The great power status of France also meant it had enough might to intimidate 
smaller states within the Holy Roman Empire.  One small territory which was firmly 
within the French sphere of influence was the principality of Palatinate-Zweibrücken 
whose duc Christian IV had close connections with Paris and Versailles.12  French 
influence was less certain in Neuchâtel and Cleves because these territories were under 
the protection of Prussia, a powerful rival power.  In 1756 the Bourbon state reversed 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Louis Binz, Brève histoire de Genève (Geneva: Chancellerie d’Etat, 1985), pp. 42-45; Richard 
Whatmore, Against War and Empire: Geneva, Britain, and France in the Eighteenth Century (London: 
Yale University Press, 2012).  
11 Whatmore, pp. 3-20. 




its traditional allegiances; a strategic alliance was formed with Austria which posted 
Prussia as a new enemy.    
The French foreign minister and the diplomats working abroad appreciated how 
far French influence fluctuated across Europe.  It was explained in the diplomatic 
correspondence that particular pressure would need to be applied when working with 
the local authorities in places like Britain and Geneva.  The instructions supplied to 
Hennin when he became résident in Geneva in 1765 outlined some of the difficulties in 
ensuring officials there followed French orders; 
 
Nous avons sur ce sujet plus d’un exemple d’occasions où nous avons eu à nous louer 
du Gouvernement de Genève.  Mais le Sr Hennin fera très bien de tacher de se procurer 
des intelligences secrètes dans la librairie, qui le mettent à portée de réclamer à temps le 
secours de l’autorité des Magistrats, et de leur ôter le prétexte d’ignorance dont ils 
useraient peut-être pour masquer leur connivence.13   
 
Although officials in Geneva could be hard to manage, the extent to which they 
constituted a serious problem for France should not be overstated.  In this period, 
French police officers were never sent on mission to the Swiss states to arrest authors 
or publishers.  They were sent to the Netherlands and to Britain on several occasions.  
One implication of this is that the French government felt it had sufficient clout in the 
Swiss states.  Even if officials protested, the foreign ministry ultimately felt it could 
depend on them to adhere to French demands.  Another reason for this discrepancy is 
the nature of the print trades in the different regions of Europe.  London was a major 
centre of international news and had close links with other significant book centres in 
                                                          




Paris and Amsterdam.  The Swiss print trade was more parochial in comparison and did 
not have the same international reputation.    
 
Shortcomings of Foreign Censorship 
    
The states which neighboured France did have their own mechanisms in place for 
controlling the printed word, whether this was a formal structure of censorship or other 
methods of regulating which kind of works were in circulation.  However, these foreign 
authorities were generally more tolerant than their French counterparts when it came to 
the print trade.  The following discussion will explore the reasons for this tendency 
towards clemency.  It makes sense to begin with a brief outline of censorship in some 
of the regions surrounding France where the Francophone print industry was strong.   
Following the lapse of the Licensing Act at the end of the seventeenth century, 
Britain had something resembling a free press.  Other states had firmer structures 
designed to manage publication and circulation.  In the Swiss state of Neuchâtel there 
was a system of pre-publication censorship in place.  Printers had to send their works to 
censors at state and city level for approval and local pastors also played a role in 
censorship by condemning texts that they disagreed with.14  In Geneva, booksellers and 
printers needed government approbation to operate but pre-publication censorship did 
not exist.  It was a similar story in the United Provinces.  Publishers did not have to 
submit works to censors and control was exercised instead through official 
condemnations of provocative material.15  Censorship was fragmented across much of 
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the Holy Roman Empire, even after Joseph II established a centralised censorship 
commission in Vienna in July 1781.16  The exception to this pattern was probably 
Prussia, where attempts were made to intensify censorship during this period.  Frederick 
the Great tried to impose his will on the print trade by passing forty-three laws on 
censorship which his successor Frederick William II then sought to strengthen.17     
Comprehensive examinations of censorship in these regions have yet to be 
undertaken but the extant studies create the impression that regulations were often 
ineffective.  The main problem was the lack of a centralised power strong enough to 
control the book trade across the various principalities to the east of France.  Different 
rules applied in different jurisdictions and this allowed individuals to move copies of a 
condemned book from one location to another in order to avoid incurring any form of 
punishment.  The shortcomings of foreign censorship put the onus for controlling 
extra-territorial print firmly onto the French government.  Censorship was obviously 
not completely absent from the states around France and more detailed scholarship will 
be able to uncover the extent to which these powers succeeded and failed in their 
endeavours to manage printed matter.  Yet, even if foreign censorship could work, it 
remains the case that the French government was always going to be somewhat 
dissatisfied with it.  The foreign ministry spent most time chasing and trying to suppress 
those texts which seemed to undermine the French state or attack members of its 
political and social elite or the royal family.  Foreign censorship was not targeted 
towards these sorts of texts.    
Aside from this difference in emphasis, there were a number of other reasons 
why the states surrounding France had difficulty imposing their will on the print trade.  
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The most important explanation relates to the nature of government in these regions.  
There was no one centralised authority with responsibility for censorship.  For instance, 
neither the Dutch States-General nor its leader the Grand pensionnaire had much power 
over newspapers since gazettes came under the jurisdiction of local officials.18  Local 
laws on the book trade often contradicted each other which meant that traders could 
often escape punishment simply by moving to another town.  The personnel tasked 
with censorship could also be inadequate.  In Neuchâtel, there was one censor for the 
entire principality but it was impossible for this individual to examine all manuscripts 
which were ready for publication.19  Printers could also simply decide not to submit 
potentially provocative works to local censors.  This thesis aims to make it clear that 
censorship presented a real challenge for the French government.  It was even more 
difficult for the smaller states surrounding France where authority was much less 
centralised.   
The feeble nature of foreign censorship was problematic and this weakness was 
compounded by the extent to which local officials were generally inclined to protect the 
booksellers and publishers working in their region.20  This was one of the French 
government’s biggest frustrations in its attempts to police the extra-territorial trade.  A 
number of factors interacted to ensure that book dealers could retain the support of 
local officials even whilst being condemned by the French state.  Of these, pragmatic 
considerations were probably the most significant.  A booming publishing company 
made use of local resources, employed local traders and created profits which could be 
fed back into the region.  The economic worth of the book trade inclined local officials 
to turn a blind eye to the publication of potentially controversial texts, especially if they 
were destined for export.  Indeed, Eisenstein has argued that the Dutch authorities were 
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tolerant because officials simply assumed that all Francophone texts were going to be 
sent abroad.21  Relations could also be reciprocal.  In the United Provinces, the owners 
of gazettes had to pay an annual tax for the right to publish which gave local officials a 
financial incentive to protect these newspapers.22  Manzon published his Courier du Bas-
Rhin from the Prussian duchy of Cleves.  He was able to secure the protection of the 
Prussian authorities by promising to promote their interests in his paper.23     
There were other dynamics which inclined officials towards tolerance.  In 
Neuchâtel and Geneva, the political elite were generally in accord with the moderate 
Swiss version of the Enlightenment.24  It thus seems fair to say they valued the cultural 
currency that publishers brought to their locality.  The printing ventures of the STN, 
one of the primary publishers in Neuchâtel, enabled the local elite to rub shoulders with 
a number of notable literary figures including Jacques Mallet Du Pan, the comte de 
Mirabeau and Jacques-Pierre Brissot.  The Palatinate-Zweibrücken was ruled over by 
Christian IV, an Enlightenment enthusiast.  He supported the Gazette des Deux-Ponts 
which was a journal which existed in both a literary and political incarnation.25  Christian 
IV liked the idea of patronising periodicals which would promote his own interests and 
ideas.  Publishers also provided politicians with the means to fulfil their own literary 
ambitions.  Neuchatel’s censor Jérome-Emmanuel Boyve enlisted the STN to print 
copies of his own work on Swiss politics, Recherches sur l'indigénat helvétique de la principauté 
de Neuchâtel et Vallangin.26 
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What is more, social and political similarities seem to have been important in 
fostering links between publishers and government agents.  Many extra-territorial firms 
were situated in small principalities where it was relatively easy to cultivate links with 
influential officials.  This was especially the case for the STN since its directors were an 
integral part of the local fabric.  Frédéric-Samuel Ostervald had a long political career 
before becoming the town’s banneret in 1762 whilst his son-in-law, Jean-Elie Bertrand, 
was a pastor and professor at the Collège de Neuchâtel.27  Such connections brought the 
STN’s directors into regular contact with local figures of political authority.  For 
instance, Ostervald was close friends with Samuel de Petitpierre, the town mayor and 
censor of the principality.28  Comparable ties also existed in Geneva.  The Cramer 
brothers established a business there and became Voltaire’s publishers of choice.  In 
1767 Philibert Cramer became a member of the Petit Conseil in Geneva.29  As Hennin, 
the French résident in Geneva, pointed out, Cramer was, ‘dans le Conseil et passe pour y 
avoir la plus grande influence, plusieurs autres Conseillers sont intéressés dans la 
librairie soit par eux-mêmes soit par leurs Parents’.30  Hennin also reported that the 
authorities in Lausanne were unlikely to police the book trade with much vigour since 
many of those in power also had a vested interest in the printing industry.31  Publishers 
could be respectable members of the community.  More than that, many actually held 
local positions of power which allowed them to secure some form of protection for 
their business.   
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The French government appealed directly to foreign powers when titles which it 
objected to appeared on the scene.  Diplomats were instructed to meet with foreign 
officials and push for the suppression of texts and the punishment of offenders.  The 
French government’s investigations into the Cramers’ publication of an edition of the 
Encyclopédie in Geneva shed light on the way in which these economic, cultural, social 
and political influences worked together to undermine French efforts to regulate the 
extra-territorial trade.  In August 1771, d’Aiguillon asked Hennin to make moves to 
suppress this new edition.  Hennin, however, doubted that he would be able to 
persuade ‘les Genevois à renoncer à une entreprise qu’ils regardent comme infiniment 
avantageuse’.’32  Firstly, the Cramers were well respected in Geneva.  One of the 
brothers sat in the Petit Conseil and several other officials had ties to the book trade, 
either themselves or through members of their family.  Secondly, the publishing of the 
Encyclopédie was good for the local economy, with more than twenty presses working on 
the edition every day.  Lastly, Hennin suggested that the people had been emboldened 
by their recent political troubles: they were unlikely to stop the publication of a work 
simply because it was a counterfeit edition of a French text.  Hennin was ready to put 
pressure on the Petit Conseil to act, but his reservations were enough to convince 
d’Aiguillon that it was futile to try to get further involved.33   
In this case, the French government capitulated in the face of Genevan 
resistance, which highlights the extent to which the French authorities were willing to 
pick their battles carefully.  It was twenty years since the first volumes of the Encyclopédie 
appeared on the scene and by 1771, a foreign edition of the work constituted an 
economic rather than an ideological problem.  As Hennin put it, ‘J’étais fâché de voir 
des Libraires étrangers faire une entreprise de plusieurs millions dont la France aurait pu 
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profiter’.34  By printing the Encyclopédie, Genevan publishers were undercutting French 
traders but this was considered a less serious matter than works which seemed to 
explicitly challenge the French status quo.  So, commercial, intellectual, social and 
political affinities inclined foreign authorities to defend the trade of local book dealers.  
This climate of tolerance gave publishers and booksellers an acute sense of just how far 
they could bend the rules and still retain local support.  The alliance between local 
traders and government officials thus made it difficult for France to realise its objectives 
of external censorship.  The French ministry put a lot more effort into overcoming this 
resistance when it came to other titles which were considered to be much more 
dangerous.   
 
Foreign Powers: Defiance and Compliance 
 
When working with French diplomats, foreign authorities adopted a posture of total 
compliance.  Firstly, officials underlined their disappointment and anger at the offences 
that had been committed in their territory.  According to a diplomatic dispatch, Charles 
Léopold von Heydes de Belderbusch, a minister in Cologne, appeared to be ‘courroucé 
contre des anonymes qui commettent des délits de cette nature que l’on doit regarder 
comme une peste publique dont le châtiment exemplaire peut seul arrêter les progrès 
contagieux’.35  Secondly, officials stressed that they had acted quickly, conducted 
thorough investigations and issued severe punishments.36  Foreign officials would often 
write detailed accounts of the exact measures that they had undertaken and then 
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forward these to French diplomats or foreign ministers.37  Officials also asked the 
diplomats to provide further details about the affair at hand.38  This was a way to 
demonstrate a willingness to do the bidding of the French state.  It was also a means of 
compensating for any delays in acting upon French orders.  Foreign powers claimed 
that they needed more information before they would be able to uncover any culprits.  
Thirdly, governments outside France made it clear that they would endeavour to be 
more vigilant in the future when it came to the print trade.39  This attempt to reassure 
the French state was made repeatedly by the same officials, demonstrating the limited 
effectiveness of such a declaration.  If we are to believe the testimony of officials 
outside France, they did everything in their power to assist the French government.  
The following discussion will make it clear that this was far from the case. 
The dispatches of the diplomats illustrate the extent to which foreign officials 
endeavoured to resist French demands.  One of the main ways they obstructed extra-
territorial policing was by stressing the need to follow local legal procedures closely at 
all times.  The foreign minister and his diplomats recognised that it would be best to 
present proofs of provocative printing in order to compel foreign authorities to respond 
accordingly.40  There were many occasions when the French government had cause to 
arrange a raid on the residence or business of an individual involved in the illicit print 
trade.  Foreign officials frequently refused to conduct such searches until they had 
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received proper authorisation from their own government.41  This led to delays in 
searching and sealing properties and the possibility that important evidence might be 
lost or even deliberately concealed or destroyed.   
Such delays even occurred when the French state was chasing French authors 
abroad.  Publishers and journalists did not have to be local men to make a contribution 
to the regional economy.  In the course of the War of American Independence, the 
French writer Linguet moved from London to Brussels.  In the context of opposition 
between France and Britain Linguet hoped that his journal, Annales, civiles, politiques et 
littéraires du dix-huitième siècle, would find its way into France with greater ease from 
Brussels.42  The Annales was arguably the most successful French-language journal of 
the century, which helps to explain why officials in Brussels leapt to the defence of their 
guest.  In September 1780 Linguet was arrested in Paris and sent to the Bastille where 
he spent the following two years behind bars.  He was supposedly arrested for a printed 
assault on the académician Emmanuel-Félicité de Durfort, duc de Duras, but the French 
government also had other reasons for wanting to restrict his freedom.  In the 
immediate aftermath of this arrest, the French foreign ministry concentrated its efforts 
on Brussels in the hope of getting hold of Linguet’s personal papers.  By 1780 Linguet 
had already carved out a reputation as a notorious pamphleteer.  In January 1777 he 
published an acerbic attack on Vergennes and for the rest of the year bargained fiercely 
for better treatment for his Annales journal by threatening to publish similarly spiteful 
texts targeted towards other members of the Bourbon ministry.43  When Linguet was 
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arrested in 1780, Vergennes and Lenoir feared that papers stored at his former 
residence in Brussels might contain incriminating information about powerful figures in 
the French government.44  Vergennes arranged for the police inspector Brugnières to 
travel to Brussels at the end of September 1780.  Once in Brussels, Brugnières clashed 
with officials who were reluctant to give him access to Linguet’s residence or his 
belongings.  An official in Brussels stressed that Linguet had always been a responsible 
resident.  As such, it was imperative that laws were followed to the letter when it came 
to the matter of searching and seizing his property.45      
Foreign powers did deliberately prevaricate when faced with the wrath of the 
French government but the legitimacy of their protestations also needs to be 
acknowledged.  They had their own laws that they hoped to be able to uphold.  The 
frustration expressed by the diplomats when they encountered any resistance from 
foreign officials tells us something about what the French state expected from these 
individuals.  The French government was determined to extend its authority abroad, 
overriding local structures and systems.  It also sent its own police agents to arrest 
offenders.  The foreign ministry encouraged governments outside France to act 
arbitrarily.  This line of thinking was demonstrated when French diplomats explicitly 
requested that foreign officials take clandestine measures against particular books, 
publishers or authors.46   
Historians working on this period have emphasised that allegations of 
ministerial despotism were raised repeatedly in French pamphlet literature in the latter 
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half of the eighteenth century.47  These complaints were especially forceful in the early 
1770s after Maupeou advanced his aggressive programme of reform for the French 
parlements and exiled any magistrates who stood their ground against him.  Hans-Jürgen 
Lüsebrink and Rolf Reichardt have suggested in their work on the Bastille that such 
accusations were exaggerated.  For these scholars, the horrors of the Bastille were a 
symbolic image rather than something which existed in reality at the end of the ancien 
régime.48  However, it is important to stress that worries about the extraordinary 
authority of French ministers were not without foundation.  The French government 
was determined to get foreign officials to bend to its will and had little patience with any 
attempts to obstruct this objective.  Yet at the same time, the French government was 
never overtly aggressive in the extra-territorial sphere.  Its demands were always 
couched in a conciliatory tone.  Desnoyers, French diplomat in The Hague, felt that 
perhaps the French state could take a stronger line in Holland but contended that this 
would upset the Dutch authorities unnecessarily and make officials think twice about 
the extent to which France was interfering in their affairs.49  Price has even suggested 
that the foreign minister Vergennes’ actions in the extra-territorial arena were limited by 
fears that contemporary pamphleteers would depict him as guilty of ministerial 
despotism.50  Within certain boundaries, then, French officials expected foreign powers 
to comply as quickly as possible, even if this meant arbitrary action outside the 
boundaries of the law.  It did not resort to violent coercion and instead relied upon 
pressure and negotiation to convince foreign governments to disregard local 
regulations.  Even if the French state was not going to complete extremes, the extent to 
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which it was able to compel foreign powers to submit to its wishes goes some way to 
suggesting its strength in this period.    
By showing willing and insisting on the necessity of following local laws, foreign 
officials were able to resist the French government without becoming drawn into an 
outright confrontation.  They also tried to achieve this balance by claiming to be 
ignorant of any transgressions which might have been committed locally.  Shifting 
blame was another tactic.  In 1772, Lullin, the secrétaire d’état of the Petit Conseil in 
Geneva, tried to accuse the Genevan police force of negligence: ‘les officiers de Police 
ont lu ce livre, et oublié que leur devoir les obligeait à en empêcher la distribution’.51  
There were also instances when officials outside France were brave enough to defend 
local traders more explicitly.  Even if it could not be denied that a book dealer was 
connected with a particular text, the local authorities attempted to convince France that 
his involvement had been minimal.52  In January 1772, the Petit Conseil in Geneva clung 
to the somewhat dubious claim that the bookseller Téron had received copies of Le 
Gazetier cuirassé from Rey in Amsterdam without requesting them.53  The Conseil 
admitted that Téron had sent a few copies of the text to other Swiss booksellers but 
refused to accept that he had transported any volumes to France.  This way of standing 
up for local traders was mirrored in the extra-territorial newspaper press.  When a 
gazette printed an article which angered the French authorities, there was no way of 
denying it.  In these cases, foreign officials defended newspaper editors by arguing that 
they had merely copied the offensive article from another gazette.54  This was, of course, 
standard reporting practice at this time.   
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It was rare for foreign governments to overtly challenge French attempts to 
control extra-territorial print but it was not unknown.  As an example, in December 
1786, officials in Berne protested that they were not willing to punish the bookseller 
who marketed copies of the Essai sur quelques changements since they did not accept that 
this text deserved condemnation.55  However, this kind of defiance should not be 
overstated.  Even though the government in Berne was not convinced by the French 
state’s interpretation of this text, they nevertheless agreed to ban the sale of the work 
and confiscate any copies which they found.56  Officials from beyond the borders of 
France generally tried to couch any resistance in the language of compliance.  They 
wanted to show loyalty to one of the great powers of Europe but were still intent on 
defending and protecting traders in their locality.  
The way in which foreign officials blocked French attempts to police print 
understandably irritated the diplomatic corps.  Local authorities were a major 
stumbling-block to the successful completion of their mission.  Diplomats often 
grumbled to the French foreign minister when officials abroad demonstrated reluctance 
to follow their orders.57  There was also a lack of faith in the effectiveness of local police 
forces with diplomats doubting that they could find controversial books or even feeling 
that they routinely hid evidence.58  In January 1772 Hennin, the résident in Geneva, 
complained that the Petit Conseil had known all along about the sale of Le Gazetier cuirassé 
and that the police too were negligent and reluctant to punish literary offences for fear 
of upsetting the local populace.59  Desnoyers, the diplomat working in The Hague, also 
experienced acute frustration.  He believed that officials from The Hague disturbed 
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investigations by warning local booksellers which texts the French government was 
looking for.  He told d’Aiguillon that the authorities in Holland had claimed that their 
constitution and laws prevented them from fulfilling his wishes exactingly.  Desnoyers 
thought this was a disingenuous tactic to divert him from his task, an ‘objection frivole 
dont on amuse quelquefois l’inexpérience des Ministres étrangers’.60  This kind of 
mistrust was common.  The foreign ministry often suspected that local officials had 
deliberately concealed or destroyed incriminating evidence.  In 1780, Vergennes alleged 
that the negligence of local officials had probably allowed Linguet’s money to be 
squirreled away and his papers to be burnt.61   
These specific complaints were part of a wider pessimism about the possibility 
of foreign authorities being able to police the print trade in line with the standards of 
the French state.  Diplomats repeatedly emphasised that foreign cultures of press 
freedom made it extremely difficult to bring the book trade under control.62  For 
Bérenger, the chargé d’affaires in The Hague, ‘La liberté de la presse est si essentiellement 
liée à celle de la constitution de ce Pays’.63  Members of the diplomatic team also 
endeavoured to make it clear that any blame for delays or difficulties lay firmly with the 
foreign authorities.  French diplomats stressed that they had done their best to uncover 
and punish offending traders in spite of the local resistance which they faced.  The 
French diplomatic corps saw through the smokescreen of loyalty which was utilised by 
officials outside France.  They expressed their frustration with foreign powers but also 
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portrayed themselves as resolute in their efforts to overcome the obstacles which they 
felt had been deliberately placed in their way. 
One important way in which the French government attempted to prevail over 
obstreperous officials was to appeal directly to the highest authority possible.64  Winning 
such support put the French state in a better position to put pressure on regional 
officials who had been less than supportive.  In February 1780 Vergennes became 
concerned about a pamphlet advocating rights for Jews, entitled Un Juif seul contre tout le 
parlement de Paris.65  Léonard, the chargé d’affaires in Liège, made his enquiries and found 
that the work had indeed been printed there the previous year.66  Armed with this 
knowledge, Léonard asked François Charles de Velbrück, the Prince-Bishop of Liège, to 
stop the spread of this work.  With the Prince-Bishop now involved, the mayor of Liège 
acted much more energetically and ended up confiscating more than one hundred 
copies of the text.    
The foreign ministry also involved diplomats from other countries in its 
methods of external policing in particular cases.  Late in 1782 the French government 
was applying pressure in Neuchâtel in order to discover who exactly had printed three 
controversial pamphlets by the comte de Mirabeau.  These were Des Lettres de cachet et des 
prisons d’état, Le Libertin de qualité; ou, ma conversion and L’Espion dévalisé.  The French 
government took issue with these texts in relation to their politically scandalous and 
erotic content.  Regional officials were not as helpful as the French state would have 
liked but the idea of troubling Frederick the Great with matters relating to the print 
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trade was out of the question.  Instead, Vergennes involved the baron von der Goltz, 
Prussian ambassador to France, in this campaign since Neuchâtel was a Prussian 
principality at this juncture.  Goltz was selected for this task partly because he was a 
prominent figure from within the corridors of power at Versailles who could be easily 
instructed.  However, the French ministry did not trust Goltz entirely.  He was 
considered to be a gossipmonger and a gambler and French officials worried about 
what kind of information he was passing back to Frederick the Great.67  Yet, when it 
came to the Mirabeau affair Vergennes hoped that Goltz would at least be able to 
persuade his subordinates in Neuchâtel to act efficiently.  Vergennes’ expectations were 
realised in this case.  Goltz wrote directly to Frederick and even travelled to Neuchâtel 
himself to apply pressure in person.68  The baron was able to report back to Vergennes 
that the Conseil d’état in Neuchâtel had uncovered and punished the printers responsible 
for at least one of the pamphlets.  This example shows how the French government 
strove to impose its will abroad and the effectiveness of its tactic of appealing higher up 
the chain of command when faced with regional opposition.69     
It is also important to recognise that foreign officials did not always obstruct the 
French government in its efforts to regulate the kind of literature which made its way 
into France.  When it came to the extra-territorial newspaper press, the French foreign 
ministry only appealed to foreign powers in a minority of serious cases.  As such, 
officials abroad appreciated when the French state was seriously disturbed by a 
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particular article and were usually ready to reprimand journalists.70  One notable 
example of local responsiveness took place in November 1778.  Mathieu de Basquiat, 
baron de la Houze, the French ministre plénipotentiaire in Hamburg, took issue with an 
article about Philippe d’Orléans, duc de Chartres which was printed in the Le Journaliste 
de Hambourg, a literary and political periodical.71  La Houze petitioned the Senate in 
Hamburg to rescind the privilege of this gazette.  His appeal was successful and by the 
end of 1778 publication of Le Journaliste de Hambourg had ceased.72  In most cases, 
officials acknowledged that the newspaper editor had made a mistake in writing the 
article in question and compelled him to print a retraction.   
Foreign powers were more likely to be compliant when policing was focused on 
gazettes.  This was because complaints relating to journals were relatively easy to 
resolve.  Editors were usually dependent on the right to publish in a particular state and 
so were receptive to official requests to print retractions.  Reprimanding a journalist was 
an easy way for powers outside France to demonstrate that they supported the concerns 
of the French government.  Policing the publication and dissemination of books was 
much more complicated as authors and publishers were much harder to control.  
Transgressions in the book trade also had more serious implications.  The foreign 
ministry targeted only the most provocative works which it suspected were being 
published abroad.  Foreign authorities probably feared that they would only be in more 
trouble with France if they admitted that they had allowed such printing to go on in 
their locality.  There were also gradations of severity when it came to the book trade.  
The French government was more likely to be satisfied by the actions of foreign powers 
if they had been asked to chase a text other than a defamatory libelle.  The French 
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ministry took libelles very seriously and had high hopes for their immediate suppression.  
Foreign powers routinely hindered the realisation of this objective. 
There were also occasions when authorities outside France would take the 
initiative when it came to the policing of print.73   In February 1785 the French writer, 
Théophile-Imarigeon, the abbé Duvernet was arrested in Brussels, accused of authoring 
manuscripts which slandered members of the Dutch government.74  These manuscripts 
were so offensive that the Dutch authorities considered putting Duvernet to death.  
Knowing that Duvernet had previously spent time in the Bastille for illicit writings, 
Dutch officials appealed to France for further information which might help to convict 
him.75  In November of the same year, the French government was concerned that the 
Courier du Bas-Rhin was covering French politics in too much detail.76  In this instance, 
Prussian officials agreed with such an assessment and revealed that they had already 
admonished the gazetteer several times for the disrespectful tone of his paper.  
Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that officials outside France were prompt and 
proactive primarily when it came to texts which they personally found disturbing.  This 
goes to show the extent to which foreign obstructionism was deliberate.  Authorities 
beyond French borders were willing and able to take measures which might curtail the 
publication and circulation of certain titles but they were not prepared simply to cave in 
to French demands.   
It is also interesting to note that French government did sometimes work with 
foreign authorities with regards to literature which did not directly concern the French 
state.  The diplomats kept the foreign ministry up to date on works published locally 
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which attacked foreign powers, whether it was the Dutch stadtholder, the King of 
Prussia or the Elector Palatine.77  On occasion, the French government was prepared to 
get directly involved.  In November 1782, Vergennes received a plea on behalf of a 
young Frenchmen who had been thrown into prison in Liège for writing verses in 
praise of the French man of letters Guillaume Thomas, the abbé Raynal.  This tribute 
went by the title of La Nymphe de Spa à l’abbé Raynal.78  Vergennes was concerned that 
this French subject might be put to death in Liège and asked the diplomat there, 
Honoré Auguste Sabatier de Cabre, to find out more about the case.79 Sabatier reported 
that a crime had been committed and that it might not be wise to overrule the decision 
made by the authorities in Liège.  This was enough to convince Vergennes to end any 
thoughts of getting involved in this affair.80  In January 1788, Jean Gravier, the marquis 
de Vergennes, who was the French diplomat in Solothurn (and also the brother of the 
former foreign minister, the comte de Vergennes) sent Montmorin, then the foreign 
minister, a letter from the canton of Berne which asked the government to make moves 
to prevent a pamphlet which insulted the judiciary in Berne from circulating within 
France.81  In consultation with the garde des sceaux, Montmorin issued orders for 
inspectors in Lyon to confiscate any copies.  He considered this to be a small favour 
which could be granted without too much trouble.82  The French system of diplomatic 
surveillance meant that the foreign ministry was aware of much of the literature which 
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was published abroad.  However, the French foreign minister held back from becoming 
too involved in affairs where the French interests were not immediately at stake.  The 
government’s strategy of external policing was highly focused and broadening this 




It might be assumed that many of the small states which surrounded France were 
cowed before one of the great powers of Europe but this was not exactly the case.  
Some states were more responsive than others.  In the Swiss region for example, the 
authorities in Berne were quick to respond whilst those in Geneva routinely expressed 
objections to French attempts to keep the print trade in check.  Such defiance was 
never overt but it nevertheless worked to hamper the French system of extra-territorial 
policing.  Foreign officials hid behind procedure and protected local traders whilst all 
the time stressing their loyalty to the French state.  This was a very effective and non-
threatening means of resisting French demands.  The diplomatic corps became familiar 
with these techniques and they expected bureaucrats outside France to be slow, 
obstructive and misleading.83  Indeed, it can be argued that this was simply the way 
things worked under the old regime.  With political centralisation incomplete or 
completely lacking, getting anything done required a careful blend of conciliation and 
coercion.  It was the diplomats’ responsibility to overcome a façade of flattery and force 
foreign authorities to comply with French wishes.  Despite such efforts, the resistance 
of the local authorities meant it took longer than strictly necessary to arrest offenders.  .   
How successful the French government’s attempts to coordinate external 
censorship with local authorities were is difficult to ascertain.  After especially serious 
                                                          




affairs like the pursuit of Le Gazetier cuirassé in Geneva and Amsterdam, the diplomats 
tried to make it clear that local officials needed be more vigilant to the threat of similar 
works in the future.84  This request for increased vigilance was repeated time and again.  
French diplomats and foreign ministers also declared the belief that officials outside 
would indeed be more alert in the future.85  Despite this, illicit publishing and 
bookselling continued and agents of local government carried on obstructing French 
efforts to track down and punish those involved.   
Yet, the French foreign ministers often expressed satisfaction with the way that 
that foreign powers had acted in the course of these affairs.86  Obviously, the ministry 
did not want to admit to any weakness in the extra-territorial arena or draw attention to 
its failings.  But it is also vital to remember that the French state had limited and highly 
focused objectives when it came to the external policing of literature.  When working 
with foreign powers, the French ministry aimed to apprehend and or punish at least one 
individual who had been involved in the production of illicit material.  It was hoped that 
this punishment would act as an example and a warning to other authors and traders of 
the consequences of publishing this kind of literature.  The French state was able to 
achieve its objectives in the majority of the cases which it deemed the most serious.  
Outside London in particular, the regime was able to convince foreign powers to do its 
bidding by either reproaching or punishing those who produced provocative texts.   
Perhaps it is most important to emphasise that French diplomats worked hard to 
overcome the obstacles placed in their way by regional powers and that the foreign 
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ministers were usually pleased with the course of action taken, even if it had taken 
longer than they might have hoped.  External censorship was a responsive process by 
its very nature; the French government could only react to an offensive text after it had 




Chapter 4 -  Making the News: The French Government and 
the Extra- Territorial Press 
 
The French government was determined to control the kind of printed matter which 
made its way into France.  This chapter will consider how the ambassadorial corps 
negotiated with editors and local authorities to make sure newspaper coverage was 
acceptable to France.  In reflection of the French government’s focus, attention will be 
centred on the Francophone periodical press.  The Bourbon regime only attempted to 
engage with or control non-Francophone journals on six occasions across the period 
covered by this study and these attempts were related to British and German-language 
periodicals (This occurred twice in 1775 and in 1780, 1782, 1784 and 1787.  For further 
details see Appendix A).  This chapter will consider how and why the discussion of 
certain topics worried the French authorities.  Minimising discussion of French politics 
was the most pressing concern; the diplomatic team took issue most often with articles 
relating to the French state.  After all, providing political commentary on France was 
the raison d’être of the extra-territorial press since the French government made sure that 
this topic was largely excluded from newspapers which were printed within the French 
kingdom.  Indeed, part of the reason that so much attention was given to the extra-
territorial press was that it was easier to control than the book trade.  The policing of 
books and newspapers operated in two overlapping spheres with different rationales.  
The reason for controlling coverage in gazettes was primarily related to news 
information management whilst issues of reputation were of greater importance in the 
book trade.  For the most part, the Bourbon regime had enough influence over extra-
territorial journalists to avoid involving local governments in this area of external 




to put pressure on editors to retract or change their coverage in the vast majority of 
cases.  The French government had quite a strong hold over the extra-territorial 
periodical press and it was very successful in keeping these journalists within certain 
restrictions.  Editors recognised what sort of coverage was acceptable to France and 
self-censored their gazettes to prevent angering the French authorities on too many 
occasions. 
 
News Within and Outside France 
 
There was a range of periodical publications available in eighteenth-century France.  
Readers pored over journals which publicised the latest literary releases, showcased 
philosophical thinking or advertised regional wares and trades.  This chapter will focus 
however, on journals which reported news information, especially in relation to 
international politics.  These were mainly newspaper gazettes.  Foreign newspapers 
published outside the French kingdom had an appeal for French readers because 
coverage of internal politics was restricted inside France.  Under the absolutist system 
of the ancien régime, the details of French politics were considered to be the business of 
the King and his ministers rather than a subject which was fit for public consumption.  
As such only four French newspapers were expressly permitted to print political news.87  
The Gazette de France held the primary privilege for political news and three other 
journals, the Mercure de France, the Journal général de France and the Journal de Paris were 
allowed to reprint its political content at a fee.88  The French authorities kept close tabs 
                                                          
87 Christopher Todd, Political Bias, Censorship and the Dissolution of the ‘Official’ Press in Eighteenth-
Century France (Lewiston, N.Y.: Mellen, 1991), p. 13. 
88 Hannah Barker and Simon Burrows, ‘Introduction’, in Press, Politics and the Public Sphere in 
Europe and North America, 1760-1820, ed. by Hannah Barker and Simon Burrows (Cambridge: 




on these publications to ensure that discussion of French politics was kept to a 
minimum and that it was not accompanied by any critical commentary.   
These structural restrictions did not apply to gazettes written and printed 
outside France.89  Readers who wanted to keep up to date with developments in French 
politics thus had an external source of information available to them.  The two major 
titles for French readers were the Dutch Gazette de Leyde and the Courier du Bas-Rhin 
which was printed in the Prussian enclave of Cleves.90  Sales figures for foreign 
newspaper gazettes are uncertain but Gilles Feyel has made an estimate for the year 
1781.  Feyel postulates that around 14,000 copies of foreign gazettes circulated within 
France during this year.91  This is in comparison with an annual circulation of around 
30,000 for domestic French newspapers.  The number of readers was even greater than 
this since several people probably read each copy of a periodical in the eighteenth 
century.  The Dutch gazettes were the most well-informed and hence the most popular 
within France but French readers also subscribed to periodical publications emanating 
from other areas of Europe.   
These gazettes did not circulate freely within France, however.  Editors who 
wished to market their newspapers were obliged to coordinate an agreement with the 
chief of the Gazette de France who owned the privilege for the printing of political news 
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about France.  Once a compromise had been found, the foreign journalist paid a fee to 
both the editor of the Gazette de France and the French foreign ministry.92  In return, his 
gazette was officially permitted to circulate through the French postal system.  It was 
the bureau général des gazettes étrangères which authorised the entry of these gazettes and 
organised their distribution through the posts.  This body was established as part of the 
foreign ministry in 1767.93  By 1785, a total of 16 foreign gazettes were officially 
permitted to circulate in this way.94  As with most aspects of the administration of the 
print trade, the situation was more complex in practice.  During the later part of the 
eighteenth century the French government tacitly tolerated the diffusion of most titles 
but utilised condemnations and sanctions to punish editors for any perceived 
transgressions.  This chapter will consider the nature and efficacy of this system of 
control.   
A good deal of scholarship has centred on the role of the French government in 
regulating the Francophone newspaper press.  Those historians such as Censer, Popkin, 
Rétat and Jeroom Vercruysse who have surveyed the techniques employed in managing 
the news have managed to illustrate some of the successes of external censorship.95  
These scholars have centred their attention on the Francophone papers based in the 
United Provinces.  This is understandable since the French government was also 
focused on these gazettes.  The French ministry was keen to manage coverage in the 
Dutch newspapers because they attracted the broadest readership, both within France 
                                                          
92 René Moulinas, ‘Du Rôle de la poste royale comme moyen de contrôle financier sur la 
diffusion des gazettes en France au XVIIIe siècle’, in Modèles et moyens de la réflexion politique au 
XVIIIe siècle: actes du colloque organisé par l’Université lilloise des lettres, sciences humaines et arts, du 16 au 
19 octobre 1973, vol 1, ed. by Roger Mercier (Villeneuve-d’Ascq: Université de Lille III, 1977-79), 
pp. 383-96 (pp. 389-90). 
93 François Moureau, La Plume et le plomb: espaces de l’imprimé et du manuscrit au siècle des Lumières 
(Paris: Presses de l’Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2006), p. 416.    
94 Censer, French Press, p. 8.   
95 Censer, French Press, pp. 15-53; Popkin, ‘The Gazette de Leyde and French Politics’, pp. 75-132; 
Rétat, ‘Les Gazetiers de Hollande’, pp. 319-35; Vercruysse, ‘La Réception politique des journaux 




and internationally.  This thesis aims to build upon and supplement this concentration 
on the Dutch press.  By considering extra-territorial periodicals both within and outside 
Holland, this study will shed more light on the motives and effectiveness of the French 
government’s methods of external policing.   
It is important to recognise how one important element restricted the French 
government’s ability to control news which was printed abroad.  As the demand for 
news swelled across the eighteenth century, so did the influence enjoyed by the press.  
The French government was forced to engage increasingly with the media as the 
century wore on.  Public opinion was becoming important in international politics and 
for gaining financial credit.  It was no longer realistic to expect French subjects to live 
without news about affairs of state.96  Although this situation was never explicitly 
acknowledged by the French foreign ministry, it seems fair to argue that individual 
agents appreciated the importance of the press in this period.  The French government 
was keen to grasp the opportunity to utilise the press as a means of promoting its own 
agenda abroad.  For this kind of propaganda to have any real impact, foreign 
newspapers needed to retain at least a semblance of independence.97  This relationship 
worked both ways.  Foreign editors knew that French readers craved their impartial 
coverage of French politics and so were sometimes reluctant to completely acquiesce to 
the demands of the Bourbon state.   
This thesis will build upon these theories about the restrictions of press 
management.  It will stress that there was also an important practical issue which was 
just as important as this idea about the desirability of some element of press freedom.  
Controlling the extra-territorial press in its entirety was a huge task which was simply 
beyond the reaches of the eighteenth-century French state.  Realising that total control 
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over the media was both undesirable and impossible to achieve, the Bourbon ministry 
approached the extra-territorial press with measured pragmatism, seeking to manipulate 
rather than completely prescribe all news.  As was the case with books, tolerance was 
the norm largely because it was the easiest option.  French diplomats were then 
responsible for fine-tuning coverage in the extra-territorial newspapers.   
Part of the reason why this detached strategy worked so well was that that the 
French government recognised that it had a great deal of influence over foreign editors.  
French was the lingua franca of eighteenth-century Europe.  Francophone gazettes thus 
had an international readership which meant that they were not totally reliant upon the 
French market.  Yet, the sheer size of France meant that newspapers were less likely to 
enjoy financial stability and success if they were not able to reach French readers.  The 
Bourbon ministry recognised the extent to which foreign editors were dependent upon 
gaining access to French readers.  As such, officials judged correctly that journalists 
would be ready to negotiate for fear of losing their foothold in France.  When the 
foreign ministry noticed inappropriate articles in the extra-territorial press, editors were 
very responsive to the request for a retraction to be printed.  Dealing directly with 
editors also had the advantage of circumventing foreign authorities who could be 
frustrating and time-consuming to work with.   
On balance, the French government decided that it was better to skilfully 
manage non-French periodicals rather than provoke uproar with authoritative measures 
that it could not necessarily enforce.  As was the case with the book trade, the French 
state would only react to the newspaper press in certain circumstances.  Decisions to 
completely exclude a particular gazette from the French market were rare but officials 
did believe that the sparing use of such punishments would act as an example to other 




coverage gave gazetteers a good idea of the limits of acceptability and they self-censored 
to ensure their periodical would not run into trouble with the French authorities.  
The French government’s attempts to manage the extra-territorial press were 
largely directed towards Francophone periodicals because these were the titles which 
were most likely to reach readers within France.  However, there were six instances in 
this period when the French government became engaged with German or English-
language newspapers.  This was partly an acknowledgement of the practice of editors 
copying news from one another.  If a distasteful article appeared in a foreign-language 
periodical, it could easily be translated into France and reprinted in a Francophone 
journal.  It also suggests that the perspective of French officials extended somewhat 
beyond material which was destined for French readers, if only to a small extent.  But 
again it is important to stress that the official censorship strategy was focused and as a 
result, it was comparatively rare for French officials to take measures against material 
which was targeted towards a more localised market.  The whole rationale behind the 
system of extra-territorial policing was to attempt to control the material that was 
making its way into France. 
It must be appreciated that some gazettes were more troublesome than others.  
The amount of complaints brought against particular journals can be seen in Figure 5.  
This chart includes data for all titles which attracted more than one objection from the 
French foreign ministry in this period.  It clearly illustrates that Dutch gazettes were the 
French government’s largest problem.  It must be added here that the foreign ministry 
also protested generally about the Dutch gazettes without pinpointing specific titles.98  
This happened on at least seven occasions in this period.   
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Figure 5: Frequency of Official Responses to the Extra-Territorial Print Trade 
(Journals) by Journal Title, 1770-1789 
 
 
The Gazette de Leyde clearly stands out as the paper which was most difficult to 
manage whilst the Dutch Gazette d’Amsterdam attracted fewer complaints.  There were 
several reasons why the French government took particular issue with the Gazette de 
Leyde.  As Popkin has outlined, this newspaper was the most well-informed of the 
Francophone press and, as a result, was especially popular with readers.99  The 
implications of this were threefold.  Firstly, a broad international audience meant that 
the editors of the Gazette de Leyde were not completely dependent upon French 
subscribers.  They were thus less susceptible to the threat that their newspaper could be 
                                                          




cut off from the French market.100  Secondly, the popularity of the Gazette de Leyde 
amongst French readers made the Bourbon ministry particularly sensitive about its 
possible influence.  French officials were also suspicious of the Gazette de Leyde because 
they knew that Jean Luzac, the periodical’s editor from 1772 onwards, took a broadly 
anti-absolutist stance.101  Finally, the Gazette de Leyde was considered the eighteenth-
century newspaper of record and was read by most French officials.  Government 
agents were thus most likely to find cause for complaint in the periodical they read most 
closely and frequently.   
By contrast, journals in Swiss states rarely incurred the wrath of the French 
government.102  These papers could not compete with Dutch gazettes like the Gazette de 
Leyde which presented the freshest news and as such, were not especially popular within 
France.  Keen to keep hold of the French readers that they did have and without a 
broad international audience to fall back on, the editors of these gazettes were also 
more concerned to keep on the right side of the French authorities.  The government’s 
strategy of external control was thus centred on managing the Dutch gazettes since 
these papers constituted a dangerous mixture of popularity and forthrightness.  It 
regulated other gazettes too and generally found these quite easy to control.  
 
Chronology of Control 
 
French efforts to manage the periodical press were subject to certain limitations but 
such efforts were far from futile.  It is important to appreciate that the effectiveness of 
external censorship fluctuated over time and according to circumstance.  This has been 
observed by Jack Censer who has proposed a chronology detailing the high and low 
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points of French management of extra-territorial newspapers.  Censer claims that 
control of the external press was successful from 1771 to 1774, more relaxed from 1774 
to 1776, tightened again from 1776 to 1784 and lessened in the final years of the ancien 
régime.103  This research confirms the first part of Censer’s chronology but can add some 
nuances to his assessment of press control in the rest of this time period.  Across these 
twenty years there were at least 125 occasions when the French government became 
engaged with the extra-territorial periodical press.  This chronology of policing has been 




Figure 6: Frequency of Official Responses to the Extra-Territorial Print Trade 
(Journals) by Year, 1770-1789 
 
 
                                                          




The French government does seem to have been successful in bringing gazettes 
into line in the early 1770s.  A spike of complaints in 1771 and 1772 was followed by a 
sharp decline in the following year.  This data indicates that policing continued steadily 
from the moment when power passed from Louis XV to XVI in 1774 and then reached 
a peak in the later 1770s and early 1780s.  Censer is right to highlight that control was 
relaxed in 1784 but the data suggests that policing intensified once again (although not 
to its original height) and then only began to tail off in the last two years of the ancien 
régime.  This chronology is explicitly related to the current events that these journals 
were trying to cover.  The government’s attempts to control the periodical press were 
largely concerned with news information management.  Peaks in the early 1770s and the 
late 1770s to the early 1780s relate to Maupeou’s coup and the American War of 
Independence, two events which stimulated French interest in the news.  The French 
foreign ministry thus became more determined to manage the information which was 
being presented to the French public in the context of these wider events.  It is 
important to remember that after reaching a low point in 1784, policing did increase 
once again from 1785 to 1787.  The French foreign ministry recognised that it could use 
its diplomatic team to target the periodical press with relative ease and continued to do 
so across the mid-to-late 1780s.  
The work of Censer and Popkin has made it clear that diplomatic control of the 
Dutch Francophone press escalated in the early 1770s in the context of the Maupeou 
coup.104  Maupeou’s reforms sparked opposition from the magistrates in parlement and 
were fiercely criticised in contemporary pamphlet literature as being signs of ministerial 
despotism.  Maupeou sought to crush resistance to his reforms on all fronts.  He exiled 
the opposing magistrates and replaced them with more compliant men.  He sponsored 
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propagandists to defend his reforms and pushed the police to arrest those who sold 
oppositional pamphlets to the public.105  These internal measures were coordinated with 
a campaign to prevent foreign gazettes from reporting on and so further advancing, 
opposition to these contentious reforms.  The extra-territorial press was able to cover 
Maupeou’s coup itself but journalists were then put under pressure to limit additional 
discussion of the affair.  These complaints were concentrated on the Dutch gazettes but 
the French foreign ministry did target other newspapers too.  Singling out certain 
gazetteers for admonishment as a warning to other gazettes worked to lessen 
international coverage of French politics.   
It was the Dutch newspaper press which was most popular with French readers.  
As a result, French officials put a lot of energy into controlling this sector of the print 
trade.  The Gazette de Leyde was singled out as a particularly outspoken newspaper.  At 
the end of January 1771, the French foreign minister, the duc de Vrillière, told the abbé 
Du Prat, chargé d’affaires working in The Hague, that articles on French politics included 
in the Gazette de Leyde had become too bold.  Vrillière asked Du Prat to warn the editor 
of this gazette that he was discussing the Maupeou reforms in too much detail.106  At 
this point it was Etienne Luzac, the uncle of the successive editor Jean Luzac, who 
directed the Gazette de Leyde.  Etienne Luzac underlined his deference to France but at 
the same time was brave enough to point out that his newspaper could not simply 
ignore events of universal and historical import.107  The editor vaguely promised to try 
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his best to adhere to French wishes but added that he would still be including editorial 
commentary on events in France.   
In spite of Luzac’s resistant attitude, the pressure applied in January 1771 seems 
to have had some effect.  This was because it was coupled with other efforts to keep the 
gazettes in Holland under control.  In May 1771 Noailles, French ambassadeur in The 
Hague, decided that it would be a good idea to talk to the Grand pensionnaire in the 
United Provinces about the matter of political reporting in the Dutch newspapers.108  A 
more extreme course of action was followed in September 1771.  The duc d’Aiguillon, 
who had taken over from Vrillière as foreign minister, issued orders for the Gazette 
d’Utrecht and the Gazette de La Haye to be prohibited from circulating through the 
French postal system.109  These prohibitions were brief but it was made plain that the 
decision to ban the titles was designed to warn other journalists against commenting too 
freely on French politics.110 
The French government thus took a three-pronged approach to the task of 
limiting discussion of the Maupeou affair.  Luzac was admonished, the authorities in 
Holland were involved and a couple of gazettes were excluded from the French market 
in the hope of encouraging other gazetteers to be more cautious.  Although the French 
government continued to find fault with the Gazette de Leyde, Popkin’s study of the 
journal does indicate that the content of this newspaper was modified in line with 
French demands.  For most of the early 1770s, the gazette confined itself to reprinting 
edicts issued by the government and the new parlements.111  The Gazette de Leyde largely 
followed the French government’s official line.  This idea of compliance is corroborated 
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by this thesis.  In 1773, there were only three instances when the French government 
felt the need to engage with the foreign press, compared to ten times in 1771 and a 
further ten times in 1772 (see Appendix A for details).  The clear implication of this fall 
in complaints is that the government had succeeded in bringing the gazettes into line 
across 1771 and 1772.  It provides evidence of the government’s strategy of 
encouraging self-censorship abroad.  Pressure placed upon certain titles clearly scared 
other editors into submission too.  
The French government did more than simply try to keep the Gazette de Leyde in 
line and hope that other newspapers would follow suit.  It negotiated with the 
authorities in Holland and even went as far as excluding gazettes to show journalists 
that indiscreet discussion of French politics would not be tolerated.  French officials 
also worked hard to impose their will on journals outside the United Provinces in the 
early 1770s.  In 1771, the Gazette de Mannheim, the Gazette de Francfort and the Gazette de 
Schaffhouse were reprimanded by French diplomats for their commentary on the 
Maupeou coup.  The editor of the latter journal was also formally scolded by the 
authorities in Schaffhausen.112  The French government was able to arrange for articles 
relating to France which were to be printed in the Gazette des Pays-Bas to undergo 
censorship prior to publication.113  In 1772 the Gazette intéressante of Düsseldorf was also 
challenged on a number of occasions for its coverage of French politics.  Charles 
Theodore, the Elector Palatine, was asked to compel the editor to be more respectful of 
France and refrain from discussing matters which only concerned the King.  Largely 
due to the illness of the relevant French ambassador, the disobedience of this editor was 
not dealt with effectively.  D’Aiguillon continued to find fault with the journal 
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throughout 1772 until the Elector Palatine agreed to try harder to bring the journal 
under control.114  The context of the Maupeou coup meant it was imperative for the 
French government to manage the coverage of French politics in the extra-territorial 
press in the early 1770s.  The coup and the resultant backlash was a major challenge for 
the French state but the government was able to take measures which restricted the 
flow of information about the crisis in the extra-territorial sphere.   
This raises questions about the long-term significance of the Maupeou coup.  
David Hudson’s study of contemporary pamphlets suggests that although opposition to 
the chancellor’s reforms was forceful at first, its intensity lessened over time.115  By the 
time Louis XV died in May 1774 the output of pamphleteers at least indicates that the 
effects of these reforms were starting to stabilise.  Looking to pamphlets and the press 
cannot give us a full appreciation of public opinion in the later eighteenth century.  
Nevertheless, the information about Maupeou’s reforms which circulated within France 
influenced the wider response.  It is vital to appreciate the extent to which the French 
government was determined to manage the availability of this information.    
When Louis XV died, his grandson ascended to the throne as Louis XVI.  After 
a period of deliberation Louis XVI decided to end Maupeou’s reforms and bring back 
the old parlements.  Popkin and Censer contend that the more moderate stance of the 
new regime was also extended to the extra-territorial arena.  According to these 
historians, from mid 1774 to 1776, the Bourbon state took a more tolerant approach to 
the extra-territorial newspaper press.116  Yet it must be stressed that this change was not 
immediate or complete.  The change of regime emboldened the Dutch gazettes but the 
French state still showed a determination to manage their content.   
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Desnoyers, French diplomat in The Hague, complained repeatedly to 
Vergennes, the new foreign minister, about articles printed in the Dutch press.  In 
September 1774, Vergennes authorised Desnoyers to threaten the newspapers with 
exclusion from the French market.117  Desnoyers was satisfied that this menace had 
worked to pacify the Dutch gazetteers.118  In January 1775 Noailles, ambassadeur in The 
Hague, was ordered to reprimand the editors of several Dutch newspapers for their 
coverage of religious issues within France.  These papers had reported ‘contre toute 
vérité’ Louis XVI’s response to the decision of the Archbishop of Paris to refuse the 
last rites to Jansenist parishioners.119  They had also printed coverage which claimed that 
the curé of the Church of Saint-Severin in Paris had been forcibly exiled from his post.  
Noailles stressed that these reports had angered the King himself ‘Sa Majesté dont 
l’attention ne laisse rien échapper, a vu avec étonnement de pareils mensonges 
répandues dans des feuilles Etrangères dont elle veut bien permettre l’entrée dans son 
Royaume.’120  The ambassador threatened the Gazette d’Utrecht, the Gazette de Leyde and 
the Gazette d’Amsterdam with prohibition from France if they did not retract the articles 
in question.   
In the two years following the accession of Louis XVI, the issue of the extra-
territorial press continued to be mentioned frequently in the diplomatic 
correspondence.  Despite the end of the Maupeou crisis, the French government 
remained determined to manage the news information which made its way into France.  
Yet, with the foreign press continuing to be disruptive, French officials sometimes 
struggled to impose their will abroad.  Desnoyers threatened to stop the Dutch gazettes 
from circulating within France in September 1774 but Noailles was forced to repeat the 
threat again in January 1775 when more inappropriate articles were published.  Indeed, 
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in May 1776 Vergennes decried the unruliness of the Dutch gazettes, declaring that they 
were impossible to silence on certain subjects.121  This underlines the extent to which 
any success in keeping editors subjugated was only ever short term.  The French 
government had to exercise continued and concerted effort if it wanted to keep the 
foreign press within acceptable limits.  
The French government became very concerned with regulating the periodical 
press during the American War of Independence.  France entered the conflict in 
February 1778 and during the length of this war, the foreign ministry was engaged in 
efforts to rein in any potential criticism of French military undertakings.  This was an 
especially pressing concern because the circulation of newspapers increased in wartime 
reflecting the customers’ desire to keep up to date with international news.  Censer has 
rightly pinpointed that press control was relaxed in 1784.122  The French government 
twice attempted to control British newspapers in this year.123  French officials also 
objected to an issue of the Courier du Bas-Rhin but subsequently took no action (see 
Appendix A for further details of this).124  There seems to have been no further policing 
of journals taking place on the continent.  When it came to the matter of explaining this 
change, Censer was less confident.  This thesis suggests that this partly was 
symptomatic of a wider shift in approach.  From 1783 onwards the French government 
adopted a different attitude when it came to the extra-territorial book trade, trying to 
ignore possible threats rather than repress them.  The dearth of policing in 1784 
certainly indicates that this attitude translated into the arena of the press.  Monitoring 
and managing the press did become more regular again in 1785 and then was at a low 
point once more towards the end of the old regime in 1788 and 1789.  The French 
foreign ministry was less involved with the extra-territorial press at the end of the 1780s 
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for several reasons.  This seems to partially have been a result of the more detached 
approach which the French government had started to take in 1783.  With the end of 
the American War of Independence, energy no longer had to be expended on the 
process of controlling information about France’s naval might.  Political events within 
France had also calmed down by this point.  In the later 1770s and early 1780s there 
were no major clashes with the parlements, episodes which had been a huge source of 
news during the Maupeou coup.  
Outside France, there was political turmoil in the United Provinces.  In the 
context of the Anglo-Dutch War (1780 to 1784), economic problems and social 
discontent, critics of stadtholder William V, Prince of Orange, formed a party of 
opposition called the Patriots.125  The influence of the Patriots swelled across the early 
1780s which undermined the stability of the Orangist regime (which incidentally was 
allied with Britain against France).  The revolting Patriots were ultimately repressed in 
1787 with the help of Prussian and British intervention. All this meant that French 
influence was lessened in the state where it had most difficulty with its surveillance of 
gazettes.  The main reason for the policing of the gazettes slowing down in 1788 and 
1789 is the pre-revolutionary crisis and onset of the French Revolution.  These huge 
events distracted the French state and also undermined the extra-territorial newspaper 
press.  Foreign newspapers could no longer keep pace with the speed of political change 
and their popularity within France was damaged.  As Figure 6 makes clear, there was a 
discernible chronology to the French government’s attempts to manage the newspaper 
press in the two final decades of the ancien régime.  The foreign ministry was determined 
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to manage the presentation of news information and this meant its chronology of 




The systematic nature of this study can shed light on the full range of material which 
French officials objected to during the 1770s and 1780s.  Rétat’s study of the 
complaints brought against the Dutch gazettes from 1755 to 1760 indicates that 
discussion of three topics in particular alarmed the French authorities.  These three 
topics were France’s internal politics, political figures or other elites and military 
setbacks in war.126  Vercruysse has also proposed that general calls for calm were 
common.127  This thesis extends the geographical and chronological scope of these two 
studies and is able to build upon their conclusions.  This thesis supports Rétat’s 
conclusion that French officials were more likely to take issue with specific articles; their 
manner of controlling the periodical press was reactive.  More generalised requests for 
subdued coverage were only made on 22 out of the 125 occasions when the French 
government became engaged with the foreign press (see Appendix A for details).  The 
Bourbon regime took most offence to articles which discussed matters relating to the 
French state.  French officials did put forward generalised objections to the foreign 
newspaper press in a wider sense but these complaints were often related to coverage of 
French state affairs too.  This was the topic which the French government was primarily 
concerned about as it was what differentiated foreign journals from the more reserved 
gazettes which were printed within France.  In addition to this desire to manage news 
information, officials also showed a particular concern to regulate the way in which elite 
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figures were portrayed in the extra-territorial press.  Finally, discussion related to foreign 
affairs or the French armed could also be problematic as it could represent a potential 
challenge to France’s status as one of the great powers of Europe.       
As detailed in Chapter 2, French diplomats were required to keep a close eye on 
what was printed in local newspapers.  These officials thus became attuned to the news 
coverage in gazettes and reacted quickly when journalists seemed to be behaving 
audaciously.  There were several instances when one or a group of editors were urged to 
moderate the tone of their coverage.  Diplomats sometimes described certain 
newspaper gazettes as a kind of libelle, littered with abusive statements.128  However, it 
was more often the case that diplomats sprang into action in reaction to the publication 
of a contentious article.  Foreign reporting which seemed to be going too far was 
viewed with seriousness.  It was rare for the French foreign minister to declare that an 
article highlighted by a diplomat should simply be ignored; this only happened on nine 
occasions across the period covered by this study (in 1771, 1775, 1778, twice in 1779, 
1780, 1781, 1784 and 1785.  See Appendix A for details).129  When the French ministry 
came across a report in a gazette that it was unhappy with, there were a number of 
potential ways to resolve the problem.  The management of news usually involved the 
cooperation and assistance of the French diplomat resident in the town which had 
produced the offending piece.  The external censorship process could be launched 
either from within France by persons within the ministry, by the diplomats beyond 
French borders or from the objections of a third party.  French officials became 
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particularly anxious if an article had been reprinted by other Francophone editors or 
translated and republished in non-French gazettes.130  These reprints compounded the 
damage done by the original article.  Once the diplomat was on alert, he usually 
negotiated with the editor of the newspaper under fire and only petitioned the local 
authorities to take action too in more serious cases.  Diplomats could try to bully editors 
into compliance by threatening to exclude journals from the lucrative French market.  
These techniques constituted part of the French government’s strategy of exemplary 
punishment which can also be seen in its approach to the book trade.  Newspapers 
directly fed off one another which meant that measures taken against one editor would 
have wider repercussions.   
Given the deliberate scarcity of political news within France, it is hardly 
surprising that French diplomats were particularly sensitive to anything which 
referenced the internal workings of the French state.  We already know that the 
Francophone press came under fire for its reports on the aftermath of the Maupeou 
coup in the early 1770s.  D’Aiguillon despaired at the coverage of French politics in the 
Gazette intéressante of Düsseldorf. 
 
En général je vois que le gazetier est mal servi par ses correspondants en France, et il 
serait de son intérêt de les choisir mieux instruits ou plus fidèles.  Il débite au hasard des 
anecdotes fausses et controuvées et ne peut pas résister à la démangeaison de parler des 
matières du Gouvernement qui ne sont et ne peuvent être du ressort d’un nouvelliste 
public.131 
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The French government purposely restricted the kind of political news which 
was to be found in French gazettes and pursued the same concerns in the extra-
territorial sphere.  This political management continued across the final years of the old 
regime.  In March 1789 for instance, the foreign ministry threatened to exclude the 
Gazette d’Amsterdam from the French market after it published a letter to Jacques 
Necker, the contrôleur général, within its pages.132 
Related to this desire to rein in discussion of French politics was the concern to 
protect France’s reputation on the international stage.  The foreign ministry sought the 
retraction of articles which might undercut France’s standing as one of the great powers 
of Europe.133  This became an especially pressing concern during the period from 1778 
to 1783 when France was engaged in the American War of Independence.  In July 1778, 
La Vauguyon, the ministre plénipotentiaire in The Hague, remonstrated to Vergennes about 
the Gazette de La Haye.  La Vauguyon believed that the British ambassador to the United 
Provinces had been calculatingly supplying the Dutch periodical press with anti-French 
articles.134  Vergennes agreed upon the seriousness of this matter and advised La 
Vauguyon to warn the editor that his paper would be excluded from France if it 
continued to print such pieces.  Chalgrin, the chargé d’affaires in Cologne, had similar 
concerns.  In August 1778, he informed Vergennes of a report published in the Gazette 
de Cologne which detailed a naval battle between France and Britain.  The article had 
portrayed Britain as the victorious force in this clash.  The Gazette de Cologne was 
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subsidised by George Cressner, a British diplomat stationed in Cologne, which suggests 
why it might have supported Britain in the conflict.135  Chalgrin persuaded the abbé de 
Jeaurinvillier, the editor of the Gazette de Cologne to print a retraction of the offending 
article in this instance but the diplomats working in Cologne continued to find fault 
with this paper’s coverage of the war.   
Managing the way the French state was depicted, in both internal and external 
terms was the most important aspect of control.  The French government also 
expressed particular anxiety about the portrayal of France’s political and social elites.  
Protecting reputations was considered to be a very important duty.  Self-interest was 
obviously at play here; the regime was determined to defend the honour of its elites.  
However, it must also be taken into consideration that the status quo of the ancien régime 
was very much dependent upon the political and financial leadership of this elite.  Any 
attacks on elite figures, whether they were targeted towards individuals in government 
or not, had wider implications.  However, the foreign ministry did concentrate on 
defending political elites rather than those who had no connection to the French 
government.   
Understandably, the foreign ministry was sensitive to any slanders directed 
against its own officials.  It was the diplomats’ responsibility to monitor the 
Francophone newspaper press which made them the first to notice any articles which 
discussed them personally.136  Manzon, the editor of the Courier du Bas-Rhin was accused 
of misquoting the French diplomats on a number of occasions.137  However, articles 
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concerning the French foreign ministers were viewed with much more seriousness.  In 
the spring of 1772, the Gazette de Leyde came under fire after it mentioned that the 
former foreign minister, the duc de Choiseul, was in retirement and selling his 
paintings.138  This reference was problematic because it could be interpreted as an 
insinuation that the duc was experiencing financial problems and might therefore harm 
his credit.  As discussed in Chapter 2, d’Aiguillon was upset by coverage of the Guînes 
affair in the Gazette d’Utrecht and asked Vergennes to compel the relevant editors to 
retract these articles.139   
Vergennes was adept and thoughtful in matters of censorship but there are still 
several examples of him using the structures of extra-territorial control to preserve his 
own reputation.  In April 1777, Vergennes commanded that the editor of the Gazette de 
Liège be asked to retract an article which alleged that the foreign minister had bestowed 
a passport upon an adventurer who claimed to be the Prince Justiniani de Chio.140  The 
foreign ministry also looked after its allies.  Vergennes was intent on protecting one of 
his close friends, Louis René Édouard, cardinal de Rohan.  In September 1782, 
Vergennes instructed Louis-Théodore Hérissant, the chargé d’affaires in Regensburg, to 
request that the editor of a gazette published in the German town of Erlangen retract an 
article about the cardinal.141  Vergennes wished Hérissant to stress to the editor that 
Rohan was indeed an honourable man.  Shielding Rohan from criticism became a more 
pressing concern during the period from 1785 to 1786 in the context of the diamond 
necklace affair.  Rohan became implicated in an intricate plot to defraud the royal 
jewellers out of this extravagant piece of jewellery.  As we shall see in Chapter 5, 
Vergennes sent envoys abroad to chase down witnesses who could potentially exonerate 
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Rohan.  He also endeavoured to control discussion of the cardinal in the extra-territorial 
press.  In June 1786, Vergennes ordered that a warning be issued to Luzac for the 
manner in which Rohan had been presented in the Gazette de Leyde.142 
Yet the French foreign ministry was not completely self-interested and also 
showed concern when other social or political elites from outside the foreign office 
were discussed in the foreign press.143  The extent to which inappropriate articles on 
notable personages could have wider implications can be illustrated with a few cases.  In 
April 1770, Du Prat, chargé d’affaires in The Hague, reported that the Gazette d’Utrecht had 
printed an alarming article about the financier M. de la Balue. 
 
Votre Grandeur sait qu’il y est du que Sa Majesté, en voulant bien acquitter les dettes 
contractées par M de la Balue avec les Etrangers, n’entendait satisfaire qu’aux 
engagements pris par lui, comme Banquier de la Cour.144 
 
In presenting its readers with details of Balue’s debts, the Gazette d’Utrecht 
challenged the financial surety of the French state.  Accordingly, Du Prat put pressure 
on the Gazette d’Utrecht to retract this article. 
Newspaper coverage of French elite figures could also have wider ramifications.  
Thomas Arthur, comte de Lally, baron de Tollendal was a French general who led 
troops in India during the Seven Years Wars.  Overwhelmed by enemy forces, he was 
compelled to surrender.  He survived but his failure ended up costing him his life and 
he was executed by the French state in 1766.  His son, Trophime-Gérard, marquis de 
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Lally-Tollendal was dedicated to clearing his father’s name and in 1778 managed to 
persuade Louis XVI to annul the decree which had sentenced him to death.  Garnier, 
the chargé d’affaires in Brussels, was disturbed by an article in the Gazette des Pays-Bas 
which discussed this change of heart, presumably because it intimated the fallibility of 
the King.  In this instance, Garnier involved François Charles de Velbrück, the Prince-
Bishop of Liège, who promised to do everything in his power to ensure that the paper 
printed a retraction.145   
Articles which mentioned members of the French royal family were taken 
particularly seriously by the foreign ministry.  In April 1776 Vergennes told O’Dunne, 
the ambassadeur in the Palatinate-Zweibrücken, that he had received serious complaints 
about the licence of the author of a periodical printed in Düsseldorf.146  These 
complaints had come from an army officer called Thomas Augustin de Gasparin who 
referred to the Correspondance littéraire secrète as a ‘libelle’.147  According to Gasparin, this 
‘monstreuse production’ spoke impudently of Marie-Antoinette and put forward a 
harsh critique of the actions of the French ministry.   
The Correspondance littéraire secrète was a weekly bulletin written in the form of a 
letter to a foreign reader which had been launched in January of the previous year.  It is 
known that from 1780 to February 1784 the French journalist and bookseller Louis-
François Mettra published this work in the village of Münz, close to the city walls of 
Cologne.148  After the banks of the Rhine burst and flooded his shop in January 1784, 
Mettra transported his enterprise first to Deutz, close to Cologne and then in March 
1785 further south to Neuwied.149  However, scholars have not yet been able to 
                                                          
145 Paris, AMAE, CP Pays-Bas Espagnols et Autrichiens 171, fol. 165, Garnier to Vergennes, 30 
June 1778.  
146 Paris, AMAE, CP Palatinat-Deux-Ponts 117, fol. 350, Vergennes to O’Dunne, 26 April 1776.   
147 Paris, AMAE, CP Liège 67, fol. 11, Gasparin to Vergennes, 16 April 1776. 
148 Freedman, Books Without Borders, p. 64.  




pinpoint where exactly the Correspondance littéraire secrète was based during the period 1775 
to 1780.150  Vergennes’ letter indicates that this work started life in Düsseldorf.   
It has also been proposed that the Correspondance littéraire secrète might have been 
in the hands of someone other than Mettra prior to 1780.151  This suggestion is also 
corroborated by the diplomatic correspondence.  In April 1776, Vergennes asked 
O’Dunne to try to unearth the identity of the author of this news-sheet and collect 
together some passages from the text so that the French state could bring formal 
complaints to the authorities in the Palatinate-Zweibrücken.152 O’Dunne reported back 
that the author was an individual known as Norbert who was ‘un aventurier qui a une 
trop mauvaise tête pour écrire sagement’.153  This was Karl von Neorberg, although his 
name usually appears as Norbert in the diplomatic correspondence.  O’Dunne was 
already well acquainted with Neorberg.  The diplomat had been ordered to complain to 
the Elector Palatine about him earlier in the 1770s when Neorberg was the editor of the 
Gazette intéressante.154  The Elector had threatened Neorberg with corporal punishment if 
he continued his audacious reporting.  In 1776, O’Dunne promised to appeal to the 
Elector Palatine once again.  With a reputation for daring journalism and his Gazette 
intéressante coming to an end in December 1773, it seems that it was indeed Neorberg 
who took up the reins of the Correspondance littéraire secrète in 1775.   
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It is important to note that the Correspondance littéraire secrète was something of a 
unique example.  During the period under consideration in this study, other foreign 
journals did not get into trouble for their coverage of the French Queen.  This says 
something about the efficacy of the French government’s strategy.  Foreign gazetteers 
appreciated the limits of acceptability and recognised that this kind of reporting would 
not be acceptable if they wished to continue to trade in France.  It is also important to 
recognise that the Correspondance littéraire secrète did not have a particularly large 
circulation within France; more copies were sold in the German states.155  However, it 
remains the case that the French government did not succeed in pacifying this title 
completely.  The periodical continued to report on the latest happenings from Paris and 
Versailles (including the royal family) until 1793.  
Although it was usually either the diplomats or the foreign minister who noticed 
an indiscreet article in the foreign press, complaints sometimes came directly from the 
individual who had been reported on.  Before he was made Louis XVI’s first minister at 
the end of the 1780s Etienne-Charles de Loménie de Brienne was Archbishop of 
Toulouse.  In August 1775, Brienne told Vergennes that the Gazette d’Utrecht had 
described him as being tolerant of Protestants.  There was probably a great deal of truth 
in this article.  Brienne was an enlightened intellectual and might even have been an 
atheist.  In spite in this, Brienne sought to protect his reputation and job by asking 
Vergennes to admonish the Gazette d’Utrecht for this perceived slight.156  It is unclear 
whether Vergennes followed up on this request but other evidence indicates that he 
might not have done.   
In July 1780, Dom Franc, a monk from the abbey of Saint-Germain-des-Prés, 
claimed that the prior of the abbey had been maligned by an article in the Gazette 
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d’Utrecht.157  Vergennes was unmoved and told Dom Franc that he would be better off 
contacting the editor of the gazette directly.158  Vergennes was not however, 
unsympathetic to all such complaints.   In September 1780 John Holker, a 
manufacturing entrepreneur based in Rouen objected to an article which had been 
printed in the Gazette d’Utrecht.159  Holker claimed that the article criticised his son, John 
Holker Jr, who was French consul in Philadelphia.  In this instance, Vergennes agreed 
that the article was inappropriate and organised for the gazette’s editor to be rebuked 
and a retraction to be printed.160  The French foreign ministry was attentive when it 
came to newspaper articles which mentioned French elite figures.  However, some of 
these articles were taken more seriously than others.  The French government was most 
opposed to critical discussion of members of the royal family but rarely came across this 
in the periodical press.  As a result, it was able to focus on those articles which 
referenced individuals with political power within France.  Other individuals who 
objected to the French government when they appeared in the foreign periodical press 
had a chance of getting their voices heard but this was by no means guaranteed.     
Another way in which the French state tried to manage the extra-territorial press 
was by attempting to prevent the discussion and promotion of texts which it disagreed 
with.161  Eighteenth-century periodicals commonly included book reviews and excerpts 
as a way of marketing new titles.  On 23 February 1776 the parlement of Paris 
condemned Inconvénients des droits féodaux, a pamphlet thought to be inspired by Turgot 
which critiqued the privileges held by the French nobility.162  The author was Pierre-
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François Boncerf, although some additional material had been lifted from writings by 
the baron de Montesquieu.  Boncerf was fortunate enough to receive a letter from 
Voltaire which responded to and praised his work.  Judging that such commendation 
might help his cause, Boncerf quickly had copies of the letter printed and forwarded 
them to the editors of the Dutch Francophone gazettes.  The French government was 
able to stop copies of this letter from circulating in Paris and in March Turgot, the 
contrôleur général asked Vergennes to make sure that the missive did not appear abroad 
either.163  Vergennes asked Desnoyers, French diplomat in The Hague, to send this 
request to the editors of the newspapers in Holland.  The pressure weighing down on 
Boncerf also compelled him to write directly to Gosse, the publisher of the Gazette de La 
Haye, to plead for him not to include the letter in his journal: ‘Ce serait aller contre 
l’intention de l’auteur et la mienne, et je puis vous l’assurer contre celle du 
Gouvernement.’164  Desnoyers was confident that the editors in question would adhere 
to French wishes and there is no evidence that these journalists needed any further 
convincing to obey.165  
Another incident goes to show that, although it was not their primary focus, 
French officials did sometimes complain about material relating to religious questions.  
In June 1780, Vergennes told La Vauguyon, the ministre plénipotentiaire in The Hague, to 
send a circular letter to the editors of the Dutch gazettes.  This letter was to request that 
these editors refrain from reviewing or publishing extracts from Bernard Lambert’s 
Requête des fideles à nos seigneurs les evêques de l’assemblée générale du clergé de France.166  This 
treatise on the state of the Roman Catholic faith in France claimed that the Church was 
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under attack and that the French state was partly to blame for its decline.167  This was a 
religious work which had implications for the political authority of the French 
government which helps to explain why action was taken against it.   
Again, the French foreign ministry was especially concerned to prevent material 
relating to members of the royal family from being discussed in the periodical press.  In 
May 1775, Gaussen, chargé d’affaires in Berlin, became anxious about the Gazette littéraire 
de Berlin.  The journal’s editor was a French writer by the name of Joseph Du Fresne de 
Francheville.  Gaussen had heard that Francheville had in his possession a pamphlet 
entitled, Mémoire de Louis XV and was planning to present an extract of the text in his 
gazette.  Francheville had the approval of the Prussian foreign minster, Ewald Friedrich 
Graf von Hertzberg, who had already ‘effacé quelques passages dans lesquels le vil 
auteur de cette vile production osait attaquer la mémoire du feu Roi’.168  Gaussen 
however, remained concerned about the text.  Vergennes agreed that such works which 
discussed members of the royal family were dangerous, even if they appeared after their 
death.169  Under pressure from Gaussen, Francheville agreed to omit the extract from 
his paper.  He also assured Gaussen that his copy of this Mémoire de Louis XV was the 
only one available in Berlin.  Gaussen visited several booksellers and journalists in 
Berlin before writing to Vergennes to confirm that this did seem to be the case.170  
Vergennes did not authorise measures anywhere else in Europe against this text which 
indicates that the publisher probably wanted to advertise the work in Francheville’s 
gazette to rouse interest before bringing the work to market.  The French government 
put a halt to this plan and thus to the publication of this work.  Regulating the 
periodical press was another avenue for controlling the circulation of literature.  By 
preventing works being discussed and advertised, French officials hoped to lessen their 
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impact.  When it came to texts relating to the royal family, the French foreign ministry 
was engaged in efforts to suppress the pamphlet itself as well any extracts that might be 
printed.    
  There were times when economic considerations influenced French attempts to 
regulate the foreign periodical press but such instances were rare.  Upholding the rights 
of French publishers and journalists beyond French borders was never a priority for the 
foreign ministry.  As was the case in the book market, the French state was not willing 
to chase every transgression when it came to the periodical press.  On the rare 
occasions when issues relating to privileges were raised, they were very much a 
secondary consideration or used merely as a pretext to take measures against on a 
particular title.171  However, there was one point in this period where the contravention 
of a privilege did instigate measures in the extra-territorial sphere.  In May 1770, 
Choiseul, the French foreign minister, received a complaint from Jacques Lacombe, a 
Parisian bookseller and publisher who owned the privilege to a number of French 
journals.  Lacombe claimed that Marc-Michel Rey, the Genevan publisher based in 
Amsterdam, was printing a counterfeit edition of the Mercure de France.172  Far from 
trying to conceal his piracy, Rey had advertised his edition in an April issue of the 
Gazette d’Amsterdam.  Choiseul did nothing, however, and it was not until February 1771 
that La Vrillière, his successor, decided to consider Lacombe’s complaint.  La Vrillière 
instructed Du Prat, chargé d’affaires in The Hague, to ask the Dutch authorities to 
admonish Rey.  Rey appeared before magistrates in Amsterdam and by way of defence 
argued that Lacombe’s Mercure de France took too long to arrive in Holland and was too 
difficult for Dutch readers to get hold of.173   
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Du Prat doubted the authorities in Holland would monitor Rey’s activities in 
future and so advised that Lacombe would be better off making a deal with the 
Genevan in order to receive monetary compensation for the infringement of this 
privilege.  This represented the only time across the years from 1770 to 1789 that 
economic concerns were at the forefront of external policing (see Appendix A for 
details).  The only similar occasion came in November 1777 when the journalist Linguet 
protested about the publication of a counterfeit edition of his Annales journal.174  His 
complaints were not followed up by the French government.   In 1771 the French 
government took a long time to take action against Rey and ended up being resigned to 
him continuing with his counterfeit operation.  The question of economic competition 
was simply not the French foreign ministry’s main concern and no other action was 




Once an offensive article had been brought to the attention of the foreign ministry, the 
next step usually involved the diplomat negotiating with the foreign journalist.  
Negotiation was confined between the diplomat and journalist in 89 of the 125 official 
responses under discussion in this study (see Appendix A for details).  Editors were 
pressured to print a retraction of the article in question or warned more generally to 
approach with caution any commentary which might relate to the French state.  Like 
foreign officials, journalists apologised and stressed their ultimate deference to the 
French state.  However, editors outside France did not usually try to avoid complying 
with French wishes as foreign authorities routinely did.  Most often, the editors would 
acquiesce immediately to French demands and print a complete retraction as quickly as 
                                                          




possible.175  When, for example, the French government took issue with an article in the 
Gazette de Schaffhouse in September 1771, Swiss officials underlined the total submission 
of the gazetteer; 
 
Il nous a fait connaître d’une manière à n’en pouvoir douter qu’il avait tiré lui même ces 
nouvelles d’autres papiers publics, et qu’il les avait insérés dans sa Gazette sans aucun 
mauvais dessein; il a offert de les rétracter à la première occasion.176 
 
The editors of most Francophone journals depended upon being able to access readers 
within France.  For fear of being excluded from this lucrative market, editors were quick 
to respond when French officials took issue with their journals.   
Censer and Vercruysse have contended that Jean Luzac, the editor of the Gazette 
de Leyde, was one of the only Francophone journalists who defended his newspaper 
overtly before the French authorities.177  This broad study confirms that Luzac does 
seem to have been braver than other journalists.  He was not prepared to capitulate 
completely before the French authorities and we have already seen how he fought back 
during the Maupeou coup.  In the early 1770s, he objected to French attempts to 
prevent newspapers from reporting on the aftermath of the Maupeou coup.  Luzac’s 
confidence in his journalistic convictions was buttressed by the Gazette de Leyde’s 
increasing market share, both inside and outside France.  This international market 
lessened the effect of a temporary ban from France.  Luzac had other subscribers he 
could rely upon in the interim.  By contrast, the Gazette d’Utrecht was financially weaker 
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because it depended upon its sales in France.178  As such, the editor of this paper was 
more likely to acquiesce to French demands.  
Luzac might have been more confident than many other editors in the face of 
French protests but his defiance only went so far.  For example, when the Gazette de 
Leyde was temporarily banned from France later in March 1785 Luzac responded in the 
same deferent manner as other gazetteers.179  Vergennes seems to have issued this 
short-term proscription under pressure from Marie-Antoinette after the Gazette de Leyde 
took an anti-Austrian line over the dispute surrounding the closure of the Scheldt 
river.180  Following the ban, Luzac stressed his ultimate loyalty to France, his respect for 
Louis XVI and claimed ignorance as to the nature of the unsuitable article which he had 
supposedly printed: ‘Il se pourrait néanmoins, que nous fut échappé quelque trait, dont 
l’aiguillon nous aurait été inconnu à nous-mêmes.’181 
Luzac was one of the only journalists courageous enough to stand up to the 
French government but his defiance was ultimately constrained.  Although he was keen 
to defend the integrity of his newspaper, Luzac was equally aware that the French 
government had the power to damage his profits by preventing his journal from 
circulating within France.  He was braver than other journalists but ultimately 
constrained by his ties to France in the same way that they were.      
Luzac’s stance was a delicate mix of defiance and submission.  Other gazetteers 
were less confident in defending themselves explicitly but some did manage to find 
different ways to resist French demands.  The main means of circumventing French 
hostility was to simply continue publishing the kind of articles that the French 
government objected to.  For two and a half years, diplomats in Cologne found fault 
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with articles in the Gazette de Cologne which they claimed portrayed France as the weaker 
power in the American War of Independence.182  On each occasion, the gazette’s editor 
apologised and claimed that he would not make the same mistake again.183  Tiring of 
these excuses, Vergennes eventually decided to ban the gazette from France temporarily 
in January 1781.184  
Manzon, the editor of the Courier du Bas-Rhin was another journalist who did not 
submit totally to French demands.  Despite repeated rebukes from French diplomats 
for his reports on the French state, Manzon did little to modify the content of his 
journal.185  He was something of a unique case in so far as he had an arrangement with 
the Prussian authorities whereby he promoted their interests in his gazette in return for 
official protection.186  This position of relative safety gave Manzon the assurance to be 
bolder in selecting material on French politics for publication in his journal.  The Courier 
du Bas-Rhin was also a particular concern for the French foreign ministry since officials 
worried that the Dutch newspaper press routinely copied articles which appeared in 
Manzon’s journal.187  Manzon was admonished several times during the 1770s and 
1780s but the French government did not succeed in totally imposing its will on this 
journalist since the protection of Prussia prevented further measures from being 
implemented effectively.  The Courier du Bas-Rhin was the Gazette de Leyde’s major rival 
but French worries were kept in check by the fact that the Courier du Bas-Rhin did not 
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have a huge audience within France.  It also adopted a more politically conservative 
tone than the Gazette de Leyde.  As such, Manzon’s defiance was irritating but not 
considered to be catastrophic.   
There were editors, then, who seem not to have taken heed of French 
complaints fully or immediately.  Yet objections were not normally made as regularly as 
was the case for the Gazette de Cologne.  Having entered into war in 1778, the French 
state was keen to project an image of strength on the international stage and so kept up 
pressure on the Gazette de Cologne.  French officials were more sensitive in 1778, which 
helps to explain why several complaints were made.  However, it must be stressed that 
Francophone gazetteers were admonished repeatedly in the course of the 1770s and 
1780s.  Despite professing to be apologetic, these journalists continued to print material 
which French officials found intolerable.  At the same time, it was rare for gazetteers to 
repeatedly offend the French government over a short period of time.  This suggests 
that French efforts to regulate the press had a real impact in the short term.  The 
Bourbon regime could not prevent extra-territorial gazettes from reporting on French 
news but it was able to impose a relatively effective system of regulation upon these 
titles. 
Another way in which editors attempted to defend their journals was to appeal 
directly to French diplomats.188  Luzac was able to persuade several officials to speak in 
favour of his Gazette de Leyde.189  Even when Luzac chose to stand up to the French 
government in the early 1770s, he was still able to persuade diplomats to write to 
d’Aiguillon endorsing him.  When the Gazette de Leyde was temporarily banned in 1785, 
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Luzac was sure that Bérenger, the chargé d’affaires in The Hague, would vouch for him.  
Luzac told Vergennes this, claiming that ‘Sr de Bérenger qui a bien voulu nous honorer 
toujours de son estime, et qui connait à fond notre façon de penser et d’agir’.190  The 
gazetteer was right to have faith in the diplomats working in The Hague. Vérac, French 
ambassadeur in The Hague, was quick to point out to Vergennes that Luzac had always 
shown a great deal of loyalty to the French state.191  Vergennes himself, who seems to 
have been pressured into laying down this prohibition, even wrote to Louis XVI 
endorsing Luzac and asking for the ban to be rescinded.192  Such close relationships 
were largely a result of the conscious efforts of the journalists who were situated outside 
the French state.  They recognised that if they wanted their gazette to be tolerated 
within France, it made sense to ingratiate themselves with French diplomats.  As Rétat 
has noted, gazetteers employed exaggeration, hyperbole, irony and flattery in efforts to 
charm diplomats and evade punishment.193   
Other editors went further to try to win over the French authorities.  For 
example, Jean Tronchin Dubreuil, the editor of the Gazette d’Amsterdam, attempted to 
make links with French officials in the course of his business trips to Paris.194  
Journalists even tried to stress their relations with the French diplomatic corps when the 
relationship was not a particularly close one.  When he was trying to win permission to 
circulate his newspaper via the French postal system, Jeaurinvillier, the editor of the 
Gazette de Cologne, underlined that he had always worked well with the ambassadorial 
team in Cologne even though French diplomats complained repeatedly about the 
gazette.195  Empathy between editors and French officials could be useful as it arguably 
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put diplomats in a stronger position to convince gazetteers to print material which the 
French state approved of.  This was important because the majority of disputes were 
settled between editor and diplomat.  Editors put a lot of effort into developing 
relations with French diplomats but it is clear that these close relationships also had 
benefits for the French state.  
Popkin has suggested that the French government was disinclined to complain 
to foreign powers when it came to the periodical press.196  This comprehensive study 
offers overwhelming evidence to confirm that this was the case.  In 29% of cases 
relating to the periodical press, French diplomats supplemented their negotiations with 
journalists by making a formal complaint to foreign authorities.  This is contrast to 
foreign powers being involved in 60% of instances relating to books and pamphlets (see 
Appendix A for details of these instances).   The idea of coordinating press 
management with officials outside France was not the preferred option for two reasons.  
As outlined in this chapter so far, the French state had a lot of influence over extra-
territorial journalists.  These gazetteers wanted to be able to sell their papers in France 
and as such, tended to be responsive to French requests for compliance.  The foreign 
ministry was also wary of involving foreign officials because they were well aware that 
they tended to be obstructionist and evasive.  It was more trouble than it was worth to 
consult foreign powers when attempts to police the newspaper press occurred so 
frequently.  Such a line of action would have wasted a lot of time.   
There were instances when the French foreign minister deemed it necessary to 
involve foreign officials in their negotiations.  This usually happened when unwelcome 
articles appeared which related to the two major topics which concerned the French 
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government: articles relating to French state affairs or French political elites.197  When 
challenged by the French government, officials outside France followed the example of 
most gazetteers by adopting a compliant stance.  Officials feigned shock at the article in 
question and promised to do all they could to improve the content of the journal which 
had come under fire.  In September 1782, Vergennes took issue with coverage of the 
American War of Independence in the Gazette de Schaffhouse.  In two separate letters to 
Bâcher, the French chargé d’affaires in Solothurn, officials in Schaffhausen underscored 
that they had made their own moves to encourage moderation in this gazetteer even 
before they received notice of French displeasure.  The editor of the Gazette de 
Schaffhouse was summoned to the Conseil where he was rebuked and ordered to be more 
cautious in selecting material for his newspaper.  Still, Vergennes and Bâcher both 
doubted whether they could really trust officials in Schaffhausen to be vigilant in the 
future.198   
As has been made clear in Chapter 3, foreign authorities claimed to be willing to 
comply with French wishes whilst at the same time making moves to protect and 
defend those printing and trading in their immediate locality.  But the French 
government did have success working with officials outside France when it came to the 
periodical press.  Foreign powers were only consulted in a minimum of the more 
serious cases and so officials recognised that on these relatively rare occasions it might 
be in their best interests to fall in line with French wishes.  What is more, admonishing 
                                                          
197 For these kinds of complaints, see Paris, AMAE, CP Allemagne 654, fol. 245, Hérissant to 
Gemmingen, September 1782; Paris, AMAE, CP Hambourg 103, fols. 209-10, La Houze to 
Vergennes, 13 November 1778; Paris, AMAE, CP Hollande 521, fols. 259-60, 12 February 
1771; Paris, AMAE, CP Hollande 523, fols. 161-63, 7 May 1771; Paris, AMAE, CP Hollande 
532, fol. 57, Montbarey to Vergennes, 26 January 1778; Paris, AMAE, CP Pays-Bas Espagnols 
et Autrichiens 171, fol. 165, Garnier to Vergennes, 30 June 1778; Paris, AMAE, CP Prusse 201, 
fol. 373, Vergennes to d’Esterno, 14 November 1782; Paris, AMAE, CP Suisse 382, fol. 121, 24 
September 1771; Paris, AMAE, CP Suisse 415, fol. 224, Vergennes to Bâcher, 19 September 
1782. 
198 Paris, AMAE, CP Suisse 415, fols. 261-62, Bâcher to Vergennes, 6 October 1782; Paris, 




a local editor was an easy and effective way for foreign governments to demonstrate 
that they supported the French state.  Officials working in the foreign ministry had 
concerns about whether authorities outside France could police the print trade 
effectively but this was worry was concentrated in the book market where foreign 
officials were most often involved.      
Moving beyond merely putting pressure on editors to print retractions, the 
French government had another means of managing the newspaper press.  This 
involved threatening the editor of the periodical with exclusion from the French 
market.199  The Bourbon ministry recognised that the large size of the French market 
made it critical to the success of the Francophone journals.  As such, threats to block 
access to French readers could have a real impact.  The precedent for this method of 
control was set in 1759 with a major policy shift which Feyel has called the ‘Postal 
Revolution’.200  Prior to this date only five extra-territorial gazettes had been permitted 
to circulate through the French mail, but in 1759 the duc de Choiseul, foreign minister 
at the time, decided to allow foreign newspapers unfettered access to France.  Taken at 
face value, this move seems to suggest that the government was taking a more relaxed 
approach to the extra-territorial press.  Yet looking more closely, the Postal Revolution 
of 1759 mirrors the approach to external policing pursued by the foreign ministry 
during the 1770s and 1780s.  The ministry recognised that it was impossible to control 
every aspect of the circulation of the printed word.  Even with draconian controls in 
place, journals could still make their way into France.  In 1759, as in the later period, the 
French government responded pragmatically by being tolerant and then clamping down 
only in the case of activity which it felt to be completely unacceptable. By allowing 
Francophone journals de facto access to French readers, the ministry put itself in a good 
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position to castigate foreign editors who were loathe to lose their connection to the 
French market.  
The threat of prohibition was a major weapon for the foreign ministry.  If a 
gazette could not be delivered via the French posts, the cost of its transportation shot 
up and these costs had to be passed onto customers.  High subscription fees obviously 
discouraged potential and current subscribers from keeping up with a particular journal 
and so the overall damage to profits was compounded.  Threats were issued 
immediately in serious cases or if a gazetteer was seen to be publishing a succession of 
inappropriate articles.  It was envisaged that even the threat of such a punishment 
would be sufficient to persuade journalists to modify the content of their newspapers.  
The diplomats at least believed that this approach worked.  In January 1775 Vergennes 
ordered that the journalists behind the four main Dutch Francophone newspapers 
should be threatened with exclusion from the French market.  Noailles, French 
ambassadeur in The Hague, issued the threat and was able to report back to Vergennes 
that all four editors were printing a retraction.  Noailles tried to emphasise that such 
measures could bear fruit: ‘J’ai souvent réitéré, Monsieur le Comte, les mêmes menaces 
puissent-elles cette fois-ci faire un meilleur effet pour l’avenir.’201 
When it came to the task of regulating the periodical press, the French foreign 
ministry tried to employ its international power to the best possible effect.  
Implementing an outright ban was difficult so the French state focused its energies.  
Threatening prohibition did have an impact on gazettes and it also had the benefit of 
conserving the resources which might have been poured into upholding any bans.  Yet 
there is a need to differentiate between the success of these warnings in the short and 
long term.  Threatening Dutch editors with exclusion from the French market 
succeeded in convincing journalists to print retractions and scared other gazetteers but 
                                                          




it did not stop them from ever printing offensive articles again.  French diplomats thus 
played a critical role in micro-managing the gazettes, using repeated threats to ensure 
compliance.    
Rétat has suggested that the French government did not have the authority to 
make these threats a reality by completely closing its borders to extra-territorial 
gazettes.202  It is fair to say that inefficiencies in the administration of the French print 
trade made it difficult for the French authorities to uphold prohibitions.  Some of these 
complications can be perceived by following the prohibition which was placed upon the 
Gazette des Pays-Bas in April 1771.  A few weeks later, the French foreign minister, La 
Vrillière, received word that the journal was making its way into France in spite of this 
ban.  The gazetteer was passing copies clandestinely through provincial post offices and 
smuggling journals into Paris from just outside the capital.203  This shows how editors 
could get their papers into France in spite of bans. 
The baron de Bon, ministre plénipotentiaire in Brussels, realised that prohibition 
had not worked.  Instead, Bon orchestrated an arrangement with the editor of the 
Gazette des Pays-Bas whereby the editor agreed to submit all articles on France to prior 
censorship.204  The editor had found a way to circumvent the ban but his methods were 
hardly practical in the longer term.  Newspapers had to be able to inform their 
subscribers of how to collect their gazettes and also needed to create confidence that 
they would arrive.  The Gazette des Pays-Bas could not reach the French market in this 
manner indefinitely.  What is more, there were other examples of proscriptions which 
worked fairly effectively in the short term, especially during the aftermath of the 
Maupeou coup.  Across the period from 1770 to 1789 the French government banned 
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foreign gazettes from France on at least 11 occasions (this occurred three times in 1771, 
in 1776, 1780, 1782, 1785, twice in 1787, 1788 and 1789.  See Appendix A for details).   
These prohibitions were usually short-term, generally lasting only a matter of weeks.  
Prohibition was a way to shock gazetteers into line by reminding them of the power 
that France could have over the success of their business.  For the French ministry, the 
desired effect of issuing these bans was twofold.  First, it was a way to punish and 
hopefully bring into line an unruly gazetteer.  Secondly, it was seen as part of the 
government’s strategy of exemplary punishment.  This again was part of the policy of 
focused censorship.  French officials hoped that with attention focused on banning one 
gazette for a short period of time, other journalists would self-censor their publications 
for fear that the same treatment would be meted out to them.   
Prohibition - or at least the prospect of it - was an effective tool because 
gazettes were a poor vehicle for clandestine distribution.  Technically periodicals could 
circulate without going through the French postal system but it was relatively easy for 
the French state to pinpoint and halt their dissemination.  In order to achieve stable 
sales within France, newspapers needed a fixed office and an avenue of distribution to 
ensure regular deliveries.  This kind of solidity meant that newspapers were vulnerable 
to the machinations of the French state.  The foreign office managed subscriptions to 
foreign gazettes which put French officials in a powerful position to take action against 
newspaper coverage which they did not approve of.  The French state had an effective 
system for managing the newspaper trade, keeping it within acceptable boundaries 
rather than trying to prohibit it entirely.  Prohibitions then were an extension of the 
government’s strategy of micro-management more than they were authoritarian 
measures.  Even when a gazette was banned, French officials recognised that these 




Another way in which the French government was able to extend control over 
the extra-territorial press was through the negotiation of permissions to circulate 
through the French postal system.  The Swiss publisher the STN was involved in a 
bargaining process when it came to a periodical publication which touched upon 
politics and literature, the Journal helvétique.205  The firm acquired the rights to this journal 
in August 1769 and set about trying to broaden its readership outside the Swiss states.  
In July 1770 one of the directors of the STN wrote to Choiseul, then the French foreign 
minister, in order to make arrangements for the Journal helvétique to be disseminated 
within France.  Ostervald knew that the Journal encyclopédique, composed and printed by 
Pierre Rousseau in Bouillon, had established an office in Paris to receive subscriptions 
and distribute journals and he asked permission for the STN to do the same.206  
Choiseul saw no reason to oppose the dissemination of this journal and arranged for the 
Journal helvétique to be distributed via the French postal system for a fee.207   
Ten years later the STN became more aggressive in its attempts to market this 
periodical within France.  The firm’s directors reckoned that part of the reason that the 
Journal helvétique lacked appeal for French readers was that its political news was 
frequently out of date by the time it reached France.  So in 1781 the STN decided to 
split the periodical into two separate titles.  The Journal helvétique continued to contain 
political and literary news and the company also began to print a purely literary 
periodical aimed primarily at non-Swiss readers which was named the Journal de 
Neuchâtel.208  The STN’s directors now needed to secure French support for the 
                                                          
205 On the Journal helvétique, see Michel Schlup, ‘Le Rêve impossible de la Société typographique 
de Neuchâtel: un Journal helvétique et ‘parisien’!’, in L’édition neuchâtelois, ed. by Schlup, pp. 143-
55. 
206 Paris, AMAE, CP Suisse 380, fol. 249, Ostervald to Choiseul, 11 July 1770.     
207 Paris, AMAE, CP Suisse 380, fol. 340, Ostervald to Choiseul 4 September 1770; Michel 
Schlup, ‘Diffusion et lecture du Journal helvétique, au temps de la Société typographique de 
Neuchâtel, 1769-1782’, La Diffusion et la lecture des journaux de langue française, ed. by Hans Bots, 
pp. 59-70 (p. 63). 




dissemination of this new title.  The STN endeavoured to negotiate with Miromesnil, 
the garde des sceaux, and Néville, the directeur de la librairie, but to no avail.209  Members of 
the French administration refused to bestow a privilege upon this journal and this 
ultimately led to its demise. The STN ceased to publish the periodical at the end of 1782 
after failing in its efforts to increase the number of people who subscribed to the work 
from outside the Swiss states.210  The French ministry did not take decisions about 
bestowing privileges lightly and in other cases, the refusal of permission was more 
immediate and final.  
The issue of privilege was particularly significant when it came to Linguet’s 
Annales.  This political journal was published between 1777 and 1792, first from 
London and later from Brussels and Paris.  With a peak circulation of 30,000 copies, the 
Annales reached more readers than the entire French newspaper press combined.211  
Although it had a lot of subscribers, other gazettes may have had more people reading 
each copy of a paper.  It was also stridently critical in tone and discussions of domestic 
politics were frequently to be found amongst its pages.  As was the case with the Gazette 
de Leyde, Linguet’s journal could be bold and was very popular within France.  As such, 
the French authorities had a double incentive to keep a close watch over it.  Linguet was 
volatile but he also had powerful allies at court.  He supposedly even enjoyed the 
esteem of Louis XVI who subscribed to the Annales.212   
When he launched his journal in April 1777, Linguet used aggressive tactics to 
demand favourable treatment.  He threatened to publish a corpus of libelles which would 
slander current and former members of the French government: d’Aiguillon, 
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Miromesnil and Maurepas.  After lengthy discussions, Vergennes agreed in August 1777 
to give the Annales a tolérance tacite which would permit the periodical to be disseminated 
through the French mail system.213  Unfortunately by the time this had been settled, one 
of Linguet’s libelles had already appeared.  This was his Aiguilloniana, the text targeted 
towards the former foreign minister.214  Linguet, did, however agree to suppress the rest 
of his collection of calumny.  Linguet got what he wanted but it could also be said that 
his arrangement worked in the French ministry’s favour too since it followed in the 
example of the ‘Postal Revolution’ of 1759.  As Burrows has argued, by allowing 
Linguet to access the French market, the government retained some leverage over him 
which they hoped would encourage him to confine his articles within acceptable 
limits.215  Vergennes also confirmed his approval of Linguet when the journalist asked 
for and received permission to move the Annales to Brussels in 1778.216  Vergennes 
agreed that Linguet could continue the Annales from the continent in the belief that this 
favour would help keep Linguet loyal to the French state.    
There were other factors which inclined French officials to offer their support 
to Linguet.  First, his fundamental loyalty to the French monarchy coupled with his 
enormous popularity meant that his writings could potentially bolster the stability of the 
ancien régime.  Indeed, it was reported that Vergennes had actually offered Linguet a 
pension to become a state propagandist that he had turned down.217  More importantly, 
French officials feared that Linguet’s would publish the explosive attacks on the French 
ministry which he had threatened.  This was a risk which was particularly potent since 
Linguet had many allies at court who could provide him with a wealth of incriminating 
information.  Linguet was an unusual case, an unpredictable journalist who thought 
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nothing of aggravating the French state.  He was very different to other Francophone 
gazetteers who underlined their deference to and respect for the French government.  
Moreover, Linguet had powerful allies who were ready to protect him from harm.  
Linguet’s unique character meant that he required careful management.  The French 
government was prepared to tolerate him in the hope that this would incline him to 
think more carefully about the kind of articles he printed.  This tolerance came to a 
dramatic end in September 1780 when, on account of his writings, Linguet was arrested 
in Paris and locked up in the Bastille.218  He did not emerge until May 1782.     
Linguet’s singularity becomes clear when we consider how the French 
government treated Mallet Du Pan, the Genevan journalist who continued the Annales 
after Linguet was sent to prison in 1780.  In the early 1780s Mallet Du Pan beseeched 
Vergennes several times to authorise his version of Linguet’s Annales and then later his 
own journal with a tolérance tacite.219  Mallet Du Pan stressed that the success of his 
periodical would be undermined if he could not secure permission to disseminate it 
through the French posts.220  These pleas fell on deaf ears.  Vergennes declared that 
Mallet Du Pan was covering French politics in too much detail and that in covering this 
subject at all, he was encroaching upon the privilege of existing French journals.221  
Mallet Du Pan’s periodical was able to reach some French readers through clandestine 
channels but Vergennes’ hostility meant it could not enjoy the same success as 
Linguet’s.  Linguet’s politics, personality and popularity meant that the government was 
torn between appeasing and aggressively repressing him.  Less prominent journalists like 
Mallet Du Pan had little in the way of leverage and were forced to submit to conditions 
imposed on them by the Bourbon ministry.  The French state made use of its structure 
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of permissions to keep journals in check.  French officials were able to deny the right to 
circulate through the posts to periodicals they disapproved of.  The state also employed 
these privileges in the hope of subjugating editors who were keen to retain their access 
to the French market.   
In addition to negotiation and suppression, the French government had another 
means of control at its disposal.  In some cases, the French state was able to arrange for 
foreign officials or French censors to check over the content of newspapers prior to 
their dissemination within France.  Journalists outside France would stress their own 
willingness to assent to such instruments of control in the hope of being permitted to 
market their work to French readers.  Mallet Du Pan repeatedly underlined his 
willingness to submit to censorship and the moderation of his views; he had ‘rien de 
commun avec les autres journaux’.222  Vergennes was unsympathetic to Mallet’s request, 
but there were other instances when the foreign ministry considered the possibility of 
putting firmer structures of pre-publication censorship for Francophone journals in 
place.  When the Dutch gazettes seemed unruly in 1774, Desnoyers proposed that these 
newspapers might be persuaded to present articles relating to France on separate sheets 
which could be easily changed or replaced.223  Burrows and Darnton have acknowledged 
that the French government also approved the circulation of the London edition of the 
Courier de l’Europe on the condition that issues were submitted to a French censor before 
they were published.224   
Censorship also worked relatively effectively when it came to the Gazette des 
Pays-Bas in 1771.  Seeing that prohibition had not been entirely effective and finding the 
local authorities to be unresponsive, Bon, ministre plénipotentiaire in Brussels, turned back 
to the gazetteer.  Bon initially requested that all items be communicated to him prior to 
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publication.  When the editor baulked at this request, the two parties settled on an 
agreement whereby all articles relating to the French state would be subject to 
censorship from a secretary of state in Brussels.225  Bon then advised d’Aiguillon to 
rescind the ban on the Gazette des Pays-Bas in favour of this new arrangement.  He 
promised to continue to monitor the local mechanisms of censorship and regularly send 
copies of the newspaper to d’Aiguillon for verification.226  So the French government 
found a way to control the content of a gazette without having to keep in place a ban 
which had proved difficult to sustain.   
This agreement was shaken only a few times during this period.  In 1778, 1786 
and 1787 French diplomats took issue with reports relating to the French state which 
the local official in charge of censorship had already given his assent to.227  In 1778 and 
1786, the French diplomat complained to local officials who professed to be contrite 
and promised to reprimand the editor and the censor of the Gazette des Pays-Bas.  By 
1787, the French state was preoccupied with the pre-revolutionary crisis which meant 
that this censorship arrangement was not a priority.  Montmorin, the French foreign 
minister, merely suggested that the editor should be scolded.228  Pre-publication 
censorship therefore worked well for the Gazette des Pays-Bas but began to break down 
towards the end of the ancien régime.  This form of censorship was comparatively rare 
because it was complicated to organise and depended upon the obedience of foreign 
officials who were difficult to control.  Nevertheless, its existence shows that the 
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French government had well-developed and effective techniques to manage the 
periodical press which did not involve overt aggression.    
The realities of managing print made French officials aware that proactive 
methods of control only succeeded within certain limits.  The French government also 
employed more subtle techniques designed to manage and manipulate the flow of 
information available to extra-territorial gazetteers.  The French foreign ministry saw 
the potential benefits in using foreign journals to spread its own propaganda since these 
newspapers had a reputation for independence and credibility.  The publisher 
Panckoucke had an agreement with the French government that allowed him to include 
some items of political interest in his journals.229  The titles of his Journal de Genève and 
Journal politiques de Bruxelles suggested a foreign provenance but they were actually 
printed inside France.  The French state authorised Panckoucke to print some political 
news in the hope of attracting readers away from foreign periodicals which were more 
difficult to bring into line.  Foreign editors sometimes got a one-off payment for 
reporting on certain topics and some journalists even enjoyed a regular pension from 
the French court in return for favourable coverage.230  More commonly, the foreign 
ministry exploited the French diplomats’ rapport with foreign journalists by asking the 
diplomats to lobby to have certain articles inserted in the Francophone press.231   
In the early 1780s, the government devised a particularly effective method of 
managing the news.  Early in 1781, Vergennes instigated a campaign against the 
nouvellistes working in Paris and, after raids and arrests, several newsmongers ended up in 
the Bastille.232  Pascal Boyer was one of the writers imprisoned in January 1781 but his 
arrest ended up leading to an arrangement with the French authorities whereby he 
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supplied news on French politics to foreign gazettes.  This agreement came about partly 
thanks to the intervention of Louis-Melchior-Armand, vicomte de Polignac, French 
ambassadeur in Solothurn, who interceded with Vergennes on Boyer’s behalf.  Polignac 
pointed out that there was no evidence of Boyer’s guilt to be found amongst his papers 
and also intimated the potential value of the latter’s journalistic skills.233  Boyer had 
worked for several gazettes and also furnished Polignac himself with a bulletin of 
interesting titbits on his last trip to Paris.  Vergennes was in agreement on the subject of 
Boyer’s innocence and told Polignac that he would do his best to help him out in some 
way.234  This promise was quickly realised as Vergennes found a way to reconcile 
Boyer’s journalistic talent with government interests.  Boyer was put at the head of a 
semi-official news bureau in Paris which was subsidised by the French government and 
personally supervised by Vergennes.235   
This office supplied information on French politics to the Gazette de Leyde and 
several other Francophone periodicals.  Popkin’s analysis of the content of the Gazette 
de Leyde indicates that, largely thanks to Boyer, the paper took a more conservative 
stance on French politics for much of the 1780s.236  It is unclear whether Luzac knew 
about the intimacy of Boyer’s connection with the French government.  Regardless, 
Luzac accepted pre-approved news from Boyer’s semi-official bureau across the final 
decade of the ancien régime.  Popkin has uncovered evidence which suggests that Antoine 
Bernard Caillard, secretary at the French embassy in The Hague, was instructed to win 
over the editor of this gazette.237  Caillard entered into a regular correspondence with 
Luzac in the hope of influencing the content of his newspaper.  These methods of 
manipulating information were designed to make the periodical press easier to manage.  
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If information was controlled, the diplomats would ideally be able to spend more time 




Exploring the extent to which the French state was successful in managing the foreign 
periodical press can help us to better appreciate the wider implications of this system of 
control.  Was the French government able to limit the impact journals might have had 
on the French populace?  With the press largely censored within France, extra-territorial 
newspapers were of crucial importance in spreading information about political events 
that might not have otherwise been available.  The newspaper press provided a regular 
forum for the discussion of political issues.  This chapter has illustrated that the French 
government found ways to manage extra-territorial gazettes and ensure that the details 
of French politics were covered in a manner that it found acceptable.  Indeed, it focused 
much of its attention on this task.  The French foreign ministry seems to have had more 
success regulating the press than it did when it came to controlling the dissemination of 
books and pamphlets.   
During the 1770s and 1780s French officials worked hard to prevent overt 
criticism of France from being published in the press.  Foreign gazetteers were thus 
subjugated to the French state to an extent but this did not mean that their journals 
were all insipid and devoid of any influence.  Extra-territorial gazettes remained 
important in providing political information to the French populace.  What is more, the 
French government’s focus could have been too narrow.  French officials concentrated 
on the elements which it felt were subversive but other articles which examined 




have undermined the French state just as easily.238  Nevertheless, the foreign ministry 
was able to limit coverage of French affairs of state.  This was the information which 
was arguably of most relevance to the French populace.  The French government could 
not prevent the extra-territorial press from entering France, nor did it want to.  It had a 
working system in place to ensure that coverage stayed within acceptable boundaries.       
The French government was never completely successful in its efforts to 
control the Francophone media.  Yet, French officials recognised that complete 
command over foreign periodicals was unlikely to be achieved and sought to work 
effectively within more limited parameters.  The French state had enough influence 
over editors to ensure retractions were printed speedily in most cases.  This meant that 
the potentially lengthy and contentious negotiations with local authorities could be 
avoided in all but the most serious cases.  It was rare for a gazette to be excluded from 
the French market but French officials employed the threat of prohibition skilfully to 
keep editors in line.  It makes sense to question whether printed retractions and 
sycophantic apologies really had any impact on readers once the offensive article had 
already been printed.  Perhaps the damage had already been done.  However, it is 
important to remember that in most cases a printed retraction was enough to satisfy the 
French government.  Moreover, it was rare for gazettes to re-offend in the immediate 
aftermath of being reprimanded by the French state. Threats and prohibitions also 
made other editors anxious and inclined them to self-censor material that might 
provoke the consternation of France.   
The diplomats monitored the extra-territorial press continually and tried to 
tweak coverage in order to protect the reputation of the French state and its elites.  
When more serious measures were needed, the French foreign ministry worked on the 
principle of making an example of any journalists who were becoming unruly rather 
                                                          




than fully flexing its muscles in the extra-territorial arena.   The government’s primary 
aim was to curtail critical discussion of affairs relating to the French state and this 






Chapter 5 – Policing Print: The French Government and the 
Extra-Territorial Book Trade 
 
The French government kept a close eye on the Francophone periodical press and 
complaints about this medium were frequent.  Yet the state’s most active policing was 
directed towards the extra-territorial book trade.  This chapter will consider how the 
foreign ministry endeavoured to curb the dissemination of texts which it considered to 
be very dangerous.  Between 1770 and 1789 the issue of regulation foreign books and 
pamphlet was considered by the French government on at least 68 occasions (see 
Appendix A for further details of these instances). This chapter is primarily based upon 
the major affairs of external censorship in this period.  It will argue that the Bourbon 
state was relatively successful in censoring the production of literature which it found 
abhorrent in the 1770s.  It will illustrate that the French state set its own limits when it 
came to the extra-territorial trade.  There was a functioning idea of what could and 
could not be tolerated which guided external censorship.  The illicit element in the 
extra-territorial book trade became more aggressive in the early 1780s but in the 
summer of 1783 a change of tactics allowed the French government to take control 
once again.  French dominance over the foreign book trade lasted at least until the 
onset of the pre-revolutionary crisis.   
 
Illicit Books and Pamphlets 
 
As has been outlined, there were no firm guidelines detailing the kind of literature 
which was considered unacceptable.  Chapter 2 explored how diplomats and foreign 




stopped from circulating.  French officials did not usually articulate why exactly an 
individual title should be pursued.  Despite uncertainty over the specifics, there was a 
general understanding shared by French officials in relation to the sorts of texts which 
were intolerable.  By following the discussion on external censorship through the 
foreign ministry correspondence, it is evident that the French government was primarily 
concerned about certain themes.  What also stands out is a remarkable tolerance.  
French foreign ministers were prepared to withstand most books and only reacted to 
the publication of a limited range of titles.  By the final decades of the ancien régime, the 
liberalising influence of the Enlightenment had started to penetrate the corridors of 
power.  Openly ‘Enlightened’ ministers like Malesherbes or Turgot displayed clemency 
and advocated reform.1  Although d’Aiguillon and Vergennes were far from being 
proponents of the Enlightenment, it seems fair to say that they could not help but be 
influenced by such shifts in the intellectual atmosphere.  The questioning and critical 
strands of Enlightenment thought broadened the possibilities for contemporary debate 
in the context of rising literacy rates and an increased demand for the printed word.2  In 
this climate, it was unrealistic for the French government to expect to be able to uphold 
the same rules of censorship which had applied at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century.  This kind of pragmatism was particularly important when it came to the extra-
territorial print trade.  The difficulty of imposing control beyond French borders 
compelled the foreign ministry to concentrate attention on what seemed to be the most 
reprehensible literature.     
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Internal government documents from the period used a formula to understand 
subversive texts.  Officials repeatedly asserted that works which seemed to threaten the 
state, the Church or the tenets of conventional morality needed to be stopped.  This 
doctrine was interpreted in a very specific manner when it came to the extra-territorial 
print trade; the French authorities targeted a limited range of works abroad.  Texts 
which discussed matters of state were certainly a concern.  As explored in Chapter 4 in 
relation to the extra-territorial periodical press, the Bourbon ministry was determined to 
limit what information about French politics was publicly available.  Affairs of state 
were considered to be the business of the King and his ministers rather than something 
which should be up for discussion in a public forum.   
The need to buttress the stability of the state and uphold standards of morality 
overlapped when it came to the genre of texts which was pursued most often by the 
French foreign ministry.  Officials were especially aggrieved by libelle literature and the 
most extraordinary examples of external policing were directed towards these texts.  
These works slandered those at the summit of French society and portrayed them as 
being embroiled in sexual scandals, financial plots and courtly intrigues.  It is vital to 
appreciate that the foreign ministry rarely reacted to the publication of texts which 
undermined the Roman Catholic Church; protecting the faith was simply not a priority.  
Officials charged with the task of policing print abroad had a clear idea of the kind of 
material which needed to be suppressed.    
As examined in Chapter 4, the French diplomatic team spent a lot of time trying 
to limit the discussion of France’s internal affairs in Francophone journals.  This 
concern was also the primary motivating factor when it came to the matter of policing 
the book trade.  As an example, in January 1782 Castelnau, the résident in Geneva, 
alerted Vergennes to the publication of a small pamphlet which he suspected had been 




contained a few lines which were critical of the French state.3  Vergennes did not 
authorise Castelnau to try to uncover the author or publisher of this work but was 
happy to learn that local authorities were taking measures against it.  The foreign 
minister was satisfied when Castelnau informed him that the Petit Conseil in Geneva had 
condemned the work and declared that all copies were to be burnt. 
French officials also found texts relating to the French justice system to be 
disquieting when they targeted the inequitable circumstances of arrest and the 
conditions of imprisonment.  The comte de Mirabeau’s Des Lettres de cachet et des prisons 
d’état from 1782 condemned the deployment of lettres de cachet to arrest and imprison 
men indefinitely without due process.  Vergennes issued orders against the Swiss 
publishers who had printed this work.4  French diplomats were also vigilant when two 
works on the Bastille came onto the market in the Netherlands in September 1783.  
These were Linguet’s account of his incarceration in France’s most notorious prison, his 
Mémoires sur la Bastille and a second, augmented edition of Remarques historiques et anecdotes 
sur le château de la Bastille.5  Bérenger, the chargé d’affaires in The Hague, told Vergennes 
that he would do all he could to unearth the identity of the printers.  The diplomat also 
informed the Grand pensionnaire in Holland of the publication of these texts and tried to 
stress ‘la nécessité d’en prévenir la propagation, en infligeant des peines sévères tant aux 
auteurs, qu’aux imprimeurs et libraires qui se rendent leurs complices’.6  However, the 
impact of this kind of literature should not be over-emphasised.  In their work on the 
Bastille, Lüsebrink and Reichardt have emphasised the importance of such pamphlets in 
perpetuating a view of the French monarchy as despotic.7  It is important to remember 
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that there were only a handful of such titles in the later eighteenth-century.  
Nevertheless, the sensational nature of the exposés written by Linguet and Mirabeau, 
two men who had been incarcerated themselves, made these works international best-
sellers.  The French government made efforts to prevent their dissemination but readers 





Information about politics was important but the government was also concerned about 
those texts which maligned the reputation of powerful elite figures or members of the 
royal family.  These texts were considered to be all the more potent since they 
combined information about French politics with slanderous allegations.  The 
prolonged campaigns of external policing which will be explored in this chapter were 
largely targeted towards this kind of literature.  Those in the foreign ministry were also 
most likely to vocalise the motivations for extra-territorial censorship when elites had 
been attacked.  Such texts were known as libelles.8  The fourth edition of the Dictionnaire 
de l’Académie française of 1762 and Jean-François Féraud’s Dictionnaire critique de la langue 
française published from 1787 to 1788 both defined the word as ‘écrit injurieux’.9  Libelles 
were described in the Encyclopédie by the chevalier de Jaucourt as follows, ‘écrit satirique, 
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injurieux contre la probité, l'honneur et la réputation de quelqu'un’.10  This element of 
slander was considered to be a key component of any libelle.  Miromesnil, the garde des 
sceaux, expressed concerns about texts which contained ‘injures concertées dans le 
dessein de nuire à la France ou à des particuliers, et qui forment par cette raison la 
première classe des véritables libelles’.11  It must also be stressed that the term libelle was 
often employed in ambiguous ways by members of the French government.  Libelle was 
used as a reference point for any kind of illicit or controversial material.12  This more 
generalised use of the word libelle is acknowledged in Féraud’s Dictionnaire critique de la 
langue française.13   
This study argues that the French government regarded libelles as absolutely 
intolerable works which needed to be suppressed.  The fear of libelle literature was deep-
rooted in old regime France.  In the early seventeenth century for instance, it was 
decreed that writers found guilty of composing slanderous texts were to be put to 
death.14  Whilst this extreme measure was seldom enforced, it suggests how far and for 
how long the publication of libelles worried French officials.  Libelles were a cause for 
concern because they constituted an affront to the traditions of hierarchy, honour and 
deference upon which the ancien régime was grounded.  The research of William Reddie 
and Charles Walton has underlined the continuing importance of the idea of a code of 
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honour in eighteenth-century France and beyond.15  Darnton’s study of the history of 
the libelle genre also stresses its resonance for contemporaries.  Whilst the stories of 
political, financial and sexual corruption might seem exaggerated today, this style of 
literature was specifically designed to appeal to eighteenth-century readers and it gained 
potency by repeating anecdotes to create a powerful narrative of official degradation.16  
Slander thus had the potential to seriously undermine individual reputations, with 
significant political ramifications when the figure in question was a member of the 
French royal family or government.  The governmental obsession with the suppression 
of libelle literature is thus a product of the significance placed upon matters of honour 
and reputation in eighteenth-century France.  Such texts were also problematic because 
the French government was committed to restricting the public’s access to information 
about French state affairs.  As Burrows and Darnton have acknowledged in their 
respective studies, the most contentious libelles had a political context.17  They 
represented an attack on the government, its personnel or its policies.  Finally, self-
interest was also key here.  The powerful figures in the French ministry leapt to the 
defence of their friends, colleagues and superiors.   
As explained in Chapter 4, French diplomats repeatedly reprimanded newspaper 
editors who printed articles which might be seen to malign powerful figures.  The major 
international campaigns which were launched against libelles provide evidence that the 
Bourbon regime viewed these texts as a fundamental challenge to the stability and 
power of the French state.  The foreign ministry was obsessed with controlling the 
image of the elite figures who led France and libelles which discussed members of the 
royal family were viewed with particular seriousness.  Although these types of works 
                                                          
15 William M. Reddy, The Invisible Code: Honor and Sentiment in Postrevolutionary France, 1814-1848 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 1-17; Walton, pp. 113-115. 
16 Darnton, The Devil in the Holy Water, pp. 267-75. 
17 Burrows, Blackmail, Scandal and Revolution, pp. 171-73; Darnton, The Devil in the Holy Water, pp. 




sometimes had an erotic element, Burrows has argued that the sexual content of libelles 
has been overstated.18  Most of these texts did not mention sex explicitly.  This 
suggestion is corroborated by this broader study.  The government was most concerned 
about the personal element in libelle literature, regardless of whether or not there was 
any sexual content.  Moreover, the French foreign ministry did not concentrate on 
works which were primarily pornographic or erotic in nature.19  Such works generally 
needed to be connected to contemporary politics in some way before the French 
government would consider pursuing them.   
There are many examples of the foreign ministry acting in the extra-territorial 
arena when texts which attacked the reputation of elites appeared on the scene.  The 
foreign ministry also endeavoured to pre-empt the publication of defamatory texts.  The 
diplomatic corps were instructed to engage in efforts to curb the dissemination of these 
texts and try to punish those who had been involved in their production.  The French 
authorities were even prepared to take measures against libelles when the individuals 
under attack in the works showed little concern for them.  In July 1782, Vergennes tried 
to uncover the author of Extrait du journal d’un officier de la marine de l’escadre de M. le comte 
d’Estaing, the attack on the admiral comte d’Estaing which had been printed by the STN 
in Neuchâtel.20 Vergennes was presumably alerted to the work after the STN sent 1,800 
copies to Poinçot, one of the major booksellers in Versailles.21  Vergennes asserted that 
this work was a ‘libelle punissable’ and instructed Bâcher, the chargé d’affaires in 
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Solothurn, to try to find out who had written the work.22  The foreign minister stressed 
that it was imperative to defend the reputations of military and naval leaders, even if the 
comte d’Estaing himself was not taking the work particularly seriously.  Ostervald, one 
of the directors of the STN, claimed to have no knowledge of the source of this 
manuscript but Vergennes urged Bâcher to continue to seek out this information.23    
As the research of Burrows and Darnton has emphasised, it was texts 
(rumoured or real) which denigrated members of the royal family which were 
undoubtedly taken the most seriously by the French authorities.24  Extraordinary efforts 
were made to prevent French readers from getting their hands on such texts.  For 
instance, in June 1777, the French government learned that a pamphlet entitled La Reine 
des welches et sa surintendante; ou, les deux amants femelles was due to be published imminently 
in London.25  This was the first known pamphlet to maintain that Marie-Antoinette was 
a lesbian.  Noailles, the French ambassadeur in London, had trouble tracking down the 
work so Vergennes asked Nathaniel Parker Forth, a British envoy working in Paris, to 
help stop the work.  Forth was able to locate the printed copies, buy up the entire 
edition and bring it to the French capital under lock and key in January 1778.26  This 
example demonstrates that extra-territorial policing was most determined when it came 
to the matter of suppressing works which attacked members of the French royal family.   
The libelle trade in eighteenth-century France cannot be fully understood without 
some appreciation of the complicity of the governmental elite in this literature.  In his 
earlier work, Darnton postulated that scurrilous libelles were produced by resentful 
would-be philosophes who lived and worked in the Parisian gutter.  It was the failure of 
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these ‘hacks’ to achieve real literary success which imbued their writing with a torrent of 
anger powerful enough to sap the strength of the French monarchy.27  Jeremy Popkin 
countered this line of reasoning with evidence that from at least the time of the 
Maupeou coup in 1771, pamphleteers were writing at the behest of political elites who 
used pamphlets to settle disagreements between themselves.28  The idea that this 
provocative literature could not have reached publication without some support from 
French officials has been confirmed by Darnton’s latest study of the libelle genre. 29  In 
addition to highlighting more of the ministerial complicity uncovered by Popkin, 
Darnton also shows that several police officials grasped the chance to make money 
from the libelle trade.   
An awareness of elite complicity was an important consideration when it came 
to the task of policing libelles in the extra-territorial sphere.  The French foreign office 
could not openly attack the powerful ministers who sponsored such works and so 
concentrated instead on chasing the authors and publishers who had brought them to 
market.  The diplomatic correspondence shows that the foreign ministry was 
particularly worried about authors like Linguet since it was feared that their elite 
connections would give them access to much potentially incriminating intelligence.  The 
extent to which courtiers, ministers and police officials patronised the illicit book trade 
helps to explain why total control of the book trade was impossible to realise.  The 
governmental elite were accustomed to contesting each other through the use of libelles.  
This was a fact of life and the foreign ministry had to find a way to circumvent elite 
patronage in order to deal with the worst aspects of the libelle genre.   
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Tolerance Extended Abroad 
 
In considering the policing of the extra-territorial print trade, it is just as important to 
ascertain which kinds of texts French officials declined to chase.  One sector of the 
book trade which does not seem to have necessitated repressive measures was 
philosophical thought.  By the last decades of the old regime, the Enlightenment was 
becoming less and less controversial and had many adherents at Versailles.  Across the 
1770s and 1780s, there were still philosophical works which were rejected by censors or 
condemned and confiscated by the authorities within France.30  However, the French 
foreign ministers were not prepared to mobilise the diplomatic network to suppress 
philosophical texts.  This was because external censorship was focused, targeted only 
towards what were considered to be the most reprehensible books.   
This mix of tolerance and resignation is evident in debate surrounding the 
publication of an edition of the Encyclopédie in Geneva.  In July 1771, both Sartine, the 
directeur de la librairie and lieutenant général of the police of Paris, and d’Aiguillon, the 
foreign minister, became anxious when Christophe de Beaumont, the Archbishop of 
Paris, complained about a new edition of the Encyclopédie which was being published in 
Geneva by the Cramer brothers.31  Hennin, the résident in Geneva, had already informed 
the foreign ministry about the Cramers’ involvement with this text but he had not been 
listened to.  As a result, Hennin assumed that the brothers were preparing the edition in 
association with Paris booksellers with the tacit consent of the French government.32  
The foreign ministry was ready to tolerate the publication of the Encyclopédie until the 
Archbishop of Paris became involved.  Even then, the state declined to take serious 
measures against the edition, despite knowing the identity of the publishers.  Hennin 
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visited local booksellers and publishers and tried to warn them off by asserting that this 
version of the Encyclopédie would not be allowed to circulate in France.  However, local 
traders were able to resist this pressure as they claimed the edition was also going to be 
sold in the rest of Europe.  Hennin’s pessimism about the possibility of stopping the 
Genevan Encyclopédie was enough to convince d’Aiguillon that any further action would 
be futile.33  The foreign ministry did not take issue with the publication of the 
Encyclopédie until they were compelled to by the complaints of the Archbishop.   
We see further evidence of indifference to this text in 1776.  In December of 
this year Néville, the directeur de la librairie, condemned an augmented Swiss edition of 
the work, this time printed by Felice in Yverdon.34  Vergennes did not authorise any 
action to curb the spread of this edition.  Evidently philosophical works were not 
thought to constitute a big enough problem to necessitate international policing 
campaigns.  Indeed, in his work on the STN edition of the Encyclopédie Darnton pointed 
out that, ‘Far from arousing any opposition among the French authorities, the quarto 
[edition of the Encyclopédie] was advertised, shipped and sold everywhere in the country 
with their active support’.35  Suppressing philosophical discourse was not a priority for 
the French government and was even less of a pressing concern in the extra-territorial 
arena.  It was not the case that these kinds of works were purely theoretical without a 
tangible connection to contemporary politics or events.  Philosophy itself could 
represent a forceful challenge to the status quo.  Yet, any potentially subversive 
elements in such works were difficult to perceive and assess, especially when compared 
to the bold nature of the libelles.    
The system of extra-territorial policing also showed little concern for texts 
which challenged the authority of the Roman Catholic Church.  This attitude was largely 
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extended to material which was anti-clerical, irreligious or which promoted other faiths.  
This was simply a corollary of the foreign ministry’s strategy of highly focused 
censorship.  The authorities were prepared to tolerate the circulation of the majority of 
books; they only directed measures against those which were considered to be the very 
worst titles.  Birn’s research into the work of the royal censors has demonstrated that 
they showed toleration to Protestant works, within certain limits.36  This same tolerant 
attitude can be seen in the French foreign ministry.  Yet there were also some practical 
factors which could explain why works which challenged the Catholic religion might 
have been tolerated.  For much of the 1750s and 1760s, religion was one of the most 
controversial issues of the day and also had a political edge.  The Jansenists were a 
Roman Catholic sect whose influence grew in the early eighteenth century.37  In 1713 a 
papal bull enacted by Pope Clement XI condemned several tenets of Jansenism as 
heretical.  This bull Unigenitus became French law in 1730.  Despite coming under attack 
from the crown, the Jansenists did have the support of the parlements.  Some magistrates 
were Jansenists themselves; others saw the battle over Jansenism in political terms; as a 
way to defend the state from papal intervention.  Pressure from the Jansenists in the 
parlements compelled Louis XV to attack the Jesuits, a rival Catholic sect.  In 1764 the 
Jesuit order was dissolved in France; Jesuits were forced to renounce their vows or be 
expelled from France.   
By the final two decades of the ancien régime, much of the heat had dissipated 
from the issue of religion.  There is also the question of the severity of the threat posed 
by such works.  The only major and overt work of atheism published in these years was 
Système de la nature; ou, des loix du monde physique et du monde moral by Paul-Henri Thiry, 
baron d’Holbach.  This is in contrast to the string of libelles which were printed or in the 
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offing during the 1770s and 1780s.  But this is not the full story.  By following 
instructions issued by the French foreign ministers, it is clear to see that in this period 
these men took the deliberate decision not to pursue works which disputed the Roman 
Catholic faith.  Published for the first time in 1770, Système de la nature was a radical work 
of materialism which denied the existence of God.  However, there is no evidence that 
the French foreign ministry acted to prevent this work from being sent into France 
from abroad or punish those who had been involved in its production.  Mark Curran 
has suggested that in the context of the Maupeou coup, the French state was too 
distracted to chase copies of Système de la nature.38  This is probably true but it was also 
the case that pursuing these kinds of works was not part of the government’s strategy.  
Protestant works were also able to circulate unchallenged.  For example, the STN was 
free to market its editions of the Protestant Bible in France despite a French prohibition 
against the sale of this text.39   
It is probably fair to say French officials would have preferred that texts which 
attacked Roman Catholicism did not reach the market.  Yet, there were only three 
occasions in this period when the foreign ministry was prepared to take action to 
prevent the circulation of texts which were primarily focused on challenging the 
Catholic faith (in 1780, 1782 and 1787.  See Appendix A for further details).  As an 
example, in May 1787, Chrétien François de Lamoignon, marquis de Bâville, now the 
garde des sceaux, reported that 600 copies of a work promoting Jewish rights had made 
their way into France.  According to Lamoignon, this text was De La Réforme politique des 
juifs by Christian Wilhelm von Dohm, a writer who also worked as a secretary within the 
Prussian foreign ministry.40  Lamoignon specifically mentioned this title and author but 
it is likely that he was referring to a work attributed to Mirabeau which was published in 
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1787.  Sur Moses Mendelssohn, sur la réforme politique des juifs et en particulier sur la révolution 
tentée en leur faveur en 1753 dans la Grande Bretagne encompassed parts of Dohm’s work 
within its pages.41  The French translation of Dohm’s original work, De la Réforme 
Politique des juifs had initially been condemned by French censors and suppressed when it 
was published for the first time in 1782.42  Lamoignon stressed that foreign traders 
should not be permitted to simply ignore French laws but Montmorin, the foreign 
minister, declined to authorise any measures against this text.  Again this shows how far 
the foreign ministry was prepared to tolerate the circulation of such texts because it was 
concentrating instead on halting the spread of works which attacked the French state or 
its leaders.   
This willingness to overlook anti-Catholic literature has wider implications for 
current perceptions of the power of the illicit print trade in eighteenth-century France.  
Darnton has suggested that the old regime monarchy was ‘desacralized’ by forbidden 
literature.43  In the eighteenth century, the King’s right to rule was seen as being handed 
down from God.  In Darnton’s view, tales of the royal’s family’s sexual exploits and 
financial decadence in libelles undermined the sacred legitimacy of the French monarchy.  
Other scholars have doubted that the stories in libelles really had the power to 
fundamentally challenge the legitimacy of the monarchy in ancien régime France.  
Burrows, Eisenstein and Popkin have all pointed out that readers might just as easily 
have taken libelles with a pinch of salt.44  The findings of this research project indicate 
that the French state was not overly concerned with the matter of protecting the Roman 
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Catholic faith from challenges expressed in print.  The focus of extra-territorial policing 
was political and the state clearly saw power in political rather than religious terms.  It 
was texts with a political resonance which were targeted for repressive measures.  
Works which discussed rights of Jews had political implications because it was the 
French state which decided whether or not political rights should be extended to this 
sector of the populace.45  Texts which were simply anti-clerical or concerned with 
explicitly theological questions did not merit action in the extra-territorial arena.            
Piracy was another aspect of the extra-territorial print trade which the foreign 
ministry tended not to concern itself with.  As emphasised in Chapter 1, publishers 
working outside France routinely contravened the permissions and privileges issued by 
the French administration of the book trade.  Yet counterfeit editions printed beyond 
France’s borders were not seen as a pressing problem.  The idea that foreign publishers 
were profiting from piracy and undercutting the business of provincial French traders in 
the process did concern the French government.  However, it was not something that 
the foreign ministry concentrated on as part of its strategy of focused policing.  Piracy 
was unfortunate but not something that they explicitly aimed to remedy.  Counterfeit 
editions were discussed in the diplomatic correspondence on occasion but such works 
were never pursued with the same kind of vigour as libelles or political tracts.  In August 
1772, Jean-Pierre François Ripert de Monclar, the procureur général of the parlement of 
Provence, contacted d’Aiguillon to inform him that a counterfeit edition of a work that 
he had published in 1769 was being printed in Lausanne.46  This was his Mémoire du 
procureur général du Roi du parlement de Provence, sur la souveraineté du Roi à Avignon et dans le 
comtat Venaissin.  D’Aiguillon instructed Beauteville, the ambassadeur in Solothurn, to ask 
that the cantonal authorities in Berne to stop the work from circulating.  Beauteville 
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doubted that such measures would be successful and that was enough to convince 
d’Aiguillon to drop the matter completely, telling Beauteville: ‘il serait superflu de faire 
de nouvelles démarches, et vous pouvez laisser tomber entièrement cette affaire’.47  
D’Aiguillon was unenthused about continuing to pursue this work as it was illicit in 
economic rather than in ideological terms.   
The economic threat of extra-territorial publishers who competed with their 
French counterparts was something that officials working within the internal 
administration of the book trade wrestled with.  However, it did not take precedence 
for the foreign ministry which concerned itself primarily with trying to contain and 
control overly offensive titles.  Scholarship on piracy in eighteenth-century France has 
emphasised that French officials were prepared to tolerate the publication of counterfeit 
books, both inside and outside France.48  It can be argued that the same kind of 
clemency guided the government in its attempts to police the extra-territorial book 
trade.  The state focused its attention on preventing the publication and curbing the 
circulation of what it considered to be the worst kinds of texts.  As such, it was 
prepared to accept the circulation of works which were philosophical, profane or which 
criticised the Roman Catholic Church. 
The foreign ministry had a pragmatic approach to the texts it endeavoured to 
pursue beyond French borders.  Its strategy of focused policing to an extent confirms 
current views of forbidden literature in eighteenth-century France.  Works with a 
political context were regarded as especially challenging. However, works which 
undermined religion or which had an explicitly sexual content were less important in the 
illicit print trade than once thought.  French foreign ministers did not deem it necessary 
to chase these kinds of texts abroad.  This is not to say that it was only works with a 
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political edge which had subversive power in the later eighteenth century.  Nevertheless, 
it is important to recognise how the French state perceived threats in the extra-
territorial sphere and why it concentrated external censorship so closely. 
  
Geography and Chronology of Policing Print  
 
Based on findings from The French Book Trade in Enlightenment Europe Database, 1769-
1794, Curran has stressed that we need to pay more attention to geographical 
distinctions in the extra-territorial print trade.  He has suggested that on the continent 
there were essentially two geographical spheres of trade: Dutch and Swiss.49  It seems 
that Hennin, French résident in Geneva, might have agreed with this assessment.  In 
January 1772, Hennin was engaged in a bibliographical fact-finding mission to discover 
where exactly copies of a second edition of Le Gazetier cuirassé had been published.  
Hennin noted that the copies of Le Gazetier cuirassé which were being sold by Téron in 
Geneva differed both in the quality of paper and in the typeset from another copy he 
been able to acquire.  Hennin was a little confused.  The typeset used on Téron’s 
volumes looked Dutch to him but the poor quality of the paper it was printed on 
suggested that the job had been done in the Swiss states.50  Hennin knew that Dutch 
publishers sometimes used bad quality paper from elsewhere to disguise the fact that 
they had printed a particular work.  After conducting further investigations in Geneva, 
Hennin decided that this edition of Le Gazetier cuirassé had in all probability been printed 
by Rey in Amsterdam. 
The difference between print trades in different areas of Europe had clear 
implications for the government’s strategy of external policing.  The French foreign 
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ministry had most difficulty imposing its will in Britain.  Authors working there were 
not constrained by censorship, the relatively high level of press freedom made for a 
dynamic newspaper press and the British authorities were openly hostile to France.  
Some scholars have suggested that by the later eighteenth-century Holland was 
becoming less of a centre for illicit publishing and bookselling.51  These activities were 
shifting more to smaller states in the Swiss states and the regions of the Holy Roman 
Empire.  This study corroborates this line of thinking to an extent.  As the evidence 
presented in Chapter 3 makes clear, French officials spent more time trying to control 
the dissemination of texts which they deemed offensive in Brussels, Liège, Neuchatel 
and Geneva than they did the Netherlands.  But this difference was not overwhelming 
and the Dutch publishing industry continued to concern the French government.  
Rather in the final decades of the old regime, the French foreign ministry risked 
becoming overwhelmed as illicit publishing flourished across the continent.  Traders in 
the Swiss states and those based in territories which were part of or close to the Holy 
Roman Empire joined those in the Netherlands as publishers of contentious books.  
Another important element of external policing was that the French authorities 
often looked to Paris to judge the seriousness of the threat posed by an illicit text.  This 
was because the French capital came under the jurisdiction of the lieutenant général of the 
Paris police, the individual who furnished the French foreign minister with much 
information about literature.  With Paris being France’s cultural centre and close to the 
seat of power in Versailles, the government had more of an idea of the works which 
were circulating there than it did outside Paris.  Foreign publishers tended to do most 
business with booksellers in the provinces.  The officially legitimated printers in Paris 
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dominated the trade within France which meant that provincial book dealers were keen 
to extend their commercial links abroad.  Yet the foreign ministry still used the Paris 
book trade as a way of ascertaining whether certain books represented a real danger.  As 
such, it could be argued that French officials were also worried about the effect that 
printed matter might have on the Parisian populace.  There were several times when the 
issue of whether a work was circulating in Paris factored into Vergennes’ decision about 
pursuing particular texts.52  Considering the print trade in the capital was an easy way for 
the French government to find out what was circulating within France but it also 
indicates that the state was especially concerned to control the kind of literature that 
reached the French capital.  This relates back to the thinking behind extra-territorial 
policing.  French officials knew that it was impossible to keep everything in check so 
they focused on the aspects that they could control.  Paris was well within the reach of 
the French state so attention was centred there.   
As referenced in Chapter 1, scholarly discussion of French attitudes to the extra-
territorial book trade has concentrated on the libelle genre.  Burrows and Darnton have 
both examined the way in which the French government attempted to impose its will 
on the writers, publishers and vendors of libelles.  This research both encompasses and 
moves beyond the libelles.  In doing so, it will add nuances to the chronology of policing 
outlined by these two historians.  Burrows’ evidence signifies that the number of libelles 
produced in London was at a relatively low level from March 1778 until mid 1781.53  
This was mirrored on the continent with the policing of print at a low level in the later 
1770s and then exploding during the early 1780s.  During the later period, the French 
government expended little energy on the extra-territorial book trade.  The most 
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threatening books that were published in this period emanated from London.  The 
wider European picture also indicates that this period of quiet contrasted sharply with a 
flurry of illicit publishing activity in the period 1781 to 1783 which spread across other 
areas of Europe too.  The beginning of the 1780s was a particularly challenging time for 
the French foreign ministry when it became embroiled in several protracted operations 
in pursuit of those involved in the production and dissemination of illicit texts.   
This fresh evidence also presents a new perspective on a shift in governmental 
tactics which occurred in 1783.  Burrows has argued that it was in 1783 that the foreign 
ministry decided to treat the London libellistes with greater detachment.  The French 
government had become exasperated with chasing these writers and disillusioned with 
the practice of paying significant sums in the hope of maintaining the libellistes’ silence.  
From 1783 onwards, then, the French authorities scorned and ignored the demands of 
the libellistes.  This shift was not completely clear-cut.  Vergennes certainly toyed with 
the idea of pouring scorn on seemingly offensive literature on several occasions prior to 
1783 and in the years following he also worried about whether this was really the best 
strategy to adopt.  As we have seen in Chapter 2, there was also wider uncertainty and 
disagreement between the foreign minister, his diplomats, the lieutenant général of the 
Paris police and the garde des sceaux over whether the government should be passive or 
aggressive in its approach to literature.   
Yet this thesis argues that 1783 was indeed the crucial moment.  It was in this 
year that the government began to try to ignore the threat of illicit books as far as 
possible.  This shift was accompanied and encouraged by the implementation of a new 
regulation governing the importation of foreign books which was put into place on 12 
June 1783.  This edict was designed to undermine the extra-territorial print trade by 
making it law that all books imported into France had to be inspected centrally in Paris.  




management of the extra-territorial book trade.  This change applied to more than just 
libelles; it hit the illicit print trade in its entirety.  Finding himself unable to deal 
adequately with an onslaught of illicit literature in the early 1780s, Vergennes resolved 
to try a different approach.  The mechanisms for inspecting imported books were 
revised and the foreign minister tried as hard as he could to ignore deplorable texts 
which were being printed abroad. 
 
Illicit Publishing in the 1770s 
 
In line this with this chronology, the early 1770s were a relatively calm period in the 
policing of books published in the extra-territorial arena.  Relatively calm that is, aside 
from the campaign to constrain the libelliste Morande.  In the early 1770s the foreign 
ministry invested a lot of energy into its pursuit of Morande.  The first sign of official 
anxieties about Morande came in August 1771, a month after the first edition of Le 
Gazetier cuirassé was published in London.  The French censor François Louis-Claude 
Marin sent a report to d’Aiguillon which expressed concern that the text contained ‘des 
horreurs contre les personnes les plus respectables et on n’épargne pas même le roi’.54  
Sartine, the directeur de la librairie and lieutenant général of the Paris police issued orders 
against the work.55  Booksellers in Paris and Versailles who sold Le Gazetier cuirassé were 
arrested and any copies found were confiscated.56  The foreign ministry targeted a 
second edition of Le Gazetier cuirassé in Holland and in 1774 eventually agreed to pay 
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Morande a life-long pension on the agreement that he would never again libel members 
of the French government or royal family.57  
However, the pursuit of Morande was really the aberration of the early 1770s.  
There were few other works which were targeted for similarly repressive measures.  
Political context goes some way to explaining this quietude in the extra-territorial arena.  
The French government was especially concerned to protect its image in the aftermath 
of Maupeou’s high-handed coup.  The rapid pace of events meant that most political 
commentary on the affair was to be found in the extra-territorial newspaper press as 
opposed to books and pamphlets.  As outlined in Chapter 4, the French foreign 
ministry spent a lot of time trying to limit discussion of the Maupeou coup in the 
Francophone periodical press.  Maupeou’s reforms also sparked a wave of antagonistic 
pamphlets which were published inside France.  The French government expended 
much energy to bring this oppositional writing under control.  In the early 1770s a 
succession of booksellers were thrown into the Bastille for offering such pamphlets for 
sale.58  It is also conceivable that Le Gazetier cuirassé worried the foreign ministry and 
provoked a harsh response partly because of the accusations of despotism it contained.   
However, Hudson has suggested that the French state was never really able to 
get its hands on the publishers or authors of texts which decried Maupeou’s reforms.59  
Looking back, Lenoir also suggested that the government lost its grip over the print 
trade in this period.60  In the early 1770s, in the aftermath of the Maupeou coup, the 
French ministry was arguably distracted from its duties in the extra-territorial arena.  It 
concentrated on its most immediate issue of policing the production of pamphlets 
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within France.  Beyond the French state, the foreign ministry was focused on 
preventing journalists from discussing the affair.  This was because most contemporary 
political commentary in this period was clustered in foreign gazettes.  It was also 
because it was considerably easier to bring editors in line than it was to find and 
prosecute pamphleteers and publishers. 
Another factor which explains why the policing of the extra-territorial book 
trade was not particularly active in the early 1770s relates to the leadership of 
d’Aiguillon as foreign minister.  As described in Chapter 2, d’Aiguillon was much less 
involved in the processes of external censorship than his successor Vergennes.  When 
the government was investigating the publication of an edition of the Encyclopédie in 
Geneva in 1771, Sartine, the directeur de la librairie and lieutenant général of the Paris police, 
implored d’Aiguillon to do something to curb its dissemination.61  D’Aiguillon 
maintained that external measures would have little impact and tried to shift the 
responsibility back onto Sartine by stating that it was better to concentrate on 
confiscating copies at the French border.62   
We also see evidence of French diplomats notifying d’Aiguillon of potentially 
dangerous texts to little avail.  In March 1774, the marquis de Noailles, ambassador in 
The Hague, suggested to d’Aiguillon that measures should be taken against a new libelle 
which was being printed in London.63  Presumably Noailles was employing the elastic 
definition of libelle to refer to Morande’s Remarques historiques et anecdotes sur le château de la 
Bastille which was published in London in 1774.  In April 1774, Desnoyers, another 
diplomat in The Hague, told d’Aiguillon that he had seen the prospectus for a new 
anthology called La Gazette de Cythère; ou, histoire secrète de Madame la comtesse du Barry, a 
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work which has been attributed to François Bernard.64  This collection included a 
scandalous life story of Louis XV’s mistress which Desnoyers felt was ‘contresens d’une 
véritable méchanceté’.65  Desnoyers’ suggestion that the author should be tracked down 
and punished was met with silence from d’Aiguillon.  The diplomat tried to get 
d’Aiguillon to take his complaints seriously by stressing that ‘C’est une saison 
dangereuse par la facilité que les libelles ont de se glisser dans les villes, au milieu des 
distractions de la nation.’66  But Desnoyers was not listened to until Vergennes took 
over the post of foreign secretary.  
Some of d’Aiguillon’s failings can also be seen in an important affair from 1773.  
In March of this year, the bookshop of the widow Stockdorf, a bookseller in Strasbourg, 
was raided by the French authorities.  Stockdorf and her assistant were taken all the way 
to Paris where they were locked up in the Bastille.67  This was not the first time that 
Stockdorf had spent time in this fortress.  In November 1771 she was incarcerated there 
for bringing illicit texts, including Le Gazetier cuirassé and Système de la nature, to Paris.68  
With Stockdorf being castigated for the second time in 1773, the matter was taken 
much more seriously.69  She was again accused of trading heavily in seemingly repugnant 
books and was targeted in particular for selling libelles against Madame du Barry and 
Louis XV, entitled La Putain parvenue: ou histoire de la comtesse de Barry and Mémoires pour 
servir à l’histoire de Louis XV respectively.  French officials also strongly objected to 
Stockdorf’s decision to sell Les Adieux du duc de Bourgogne et de l’abbé Fénelon by 
Dieudonné Thiébault which was a text where the two named protagonists discussed the 
French system of government and possible alternatives.  Finally, Stockdorf was targeted 
                                                          
64 Paris, AMAE, CP Hollande 526, fols. 173-78, Desnoyers to d’Aiguillon, 26 April 1774. 
65 Paris, AMAE, CP Hollande 526, fols. 173-78, Desnoyers to d’Aiguillon, 26 April 1774. 
66 Paris, AMAE, CP Hollande 526, fols. 7-8, Desnoyers to d’Aiguillon, 10 May 1774.   
67 Paris, BA, Archives de la Bastille, MS 12398, fol. 6, November 1771.  
68 Paris, BA, Archives de la Bastille, MS 12398, fol. 6, November 1771. 




for selling what was referred to as La Correspondance complète, although the author of this 
collection is not indicated in governmental documentation.    
A letter found amongst Stockdorf’s papers suggested that she had received these 
books from Du Four, a publisher in Maastricht.  Sartine asked d’Aiguillon to request 
that the Dutch States-General issue a punishment to Du Four.70  This was another 
occasion where d’Aiguillon had failed to be proactive and had to be prompted into 
taking action.  On d’Aiguillon’s instructions, Desnoyers and the comte Des Escotais, 
chargé d’affaires in The Hague, arranged a meeting with a clerk from the Dutch States-
General.71  During this meeting they arranged for the Dutch authorities to search and 
seize Du Four’s papers and books.   
As discussed in Chapter 3, Desnoyers complained to d’Aiguillon about the 
obstructionism employed by Dutch officials but he did express the view that the 
authorities in the United Provinces were likely to be more vigilant in future.72  Stockdorf 
was treated more severely.  She spent more than four months in the Bastille.  In July 
1773 she was tied up on the Place de Grève in Paris holding a sign which carried the 
words, ‘Marchande libraire faisant à Strasbourg en récidive le commerce de livres 
contraires à la religion et aux bonnes mœurs’.73  The use of this phrase shows that the 
government desired to communicate a strong stance against works challenged the 
Roman Catholic faith, even if in practice officials tended to be more concerned by 
works with more political implications.  Following her release from the Bastille in 
August she was banned from setting foot in Paris or Strasbourg for the next nine years.  
Placards detailing the treatment meted out to Stockdorf were posted up for all to see in 
                                                          
70 Paris, AMAE, CP Hollande 525, fol. 3, d’Aiguillon to Sartine, 6 April 1773; Paris, AMAE, CP 
Hollande 525, fols. 8-9, d’Aiguillon to Des Escotais, 18 April 1773. 
71 Paris, BA, Archives de la Bastille, MS 12398, fol. 164, Desnoyers to Noailles, 26 March 1773; 
Paris, BA, Archives de la Bastille, MS 12398, fol. 166, Des Escotais to d’Aiguillon, 26 March 
1773. 
72 Paris, BA, Archives de la Bastille, MS 12398, fol. 164, Desnoyers to Noailles, 26 March 1773.   




Paris and the provinces.74  The Stockdorf affair constitutes a clear instance of exemplary 
punishment.  The foreign ministry did its best to attack Du Four but it directed its 
wrath primarily towards Stockdorf who could be easily punished.  It also hints at 
d’Aiguillon’s listlessness.  The foreign minister only took action against Du Four after 
he had been pressed to do so by Sartine.  The diplomatic corps tried their best to 
support him but policing the extra-territorial print trade was simply not a priority for 
d’Aiguillon.  It was only when Vergennes came to power that external censorship 
became more systematic.   
But it takes something more than the personal failings of d’Aiguillon to explain 
why policing of the print trade was less intensive in the early 1770s.  During this period, 
extra-territorial print was constrained by protectionist legislation which was designed to 
promote French bookselling and publishing.  Whilst the foreign ministry concentrated 
on containing the circulation of what it considered to be the very worst titles, the 
internal administration of the French book trade wished to lessen the involvement of 
foreign book dealers in the French trade.  It was hoped that cutting off foreign traders 
would stimulate the French publishing industry.  Yet any attempts to restrict the foreign 
print trade necessitated a delicate balancing act.  Provincial booksellers were less 
successful than their Parisian counterparts who received the lion’s share of any 
privileges which were granted.  Consequently, provincial traders relied upon their 
connections with foreign publishers and booksellers to survive.   
Across 1771 the French government raised the cost of paper, a move which 
buttressed the business of foreign traders who did not have to pay the same 
overheads.75  In the hope of reviving the French print trade, a tax was levied on 
imported books in September 1771.  This tax was set at 60 livres per quintal of books 
                                                          
74 Paris, BNF, MF 12398, fol. 310, 13 August 1773. 




which made importation a costly business.76  This move was also met with a wave of 
protests from provincial book traders who wrote to the French government to stress 
that they actually depended on their trade with publishers and booksellers who worked 
outside France.  Under pressure, the French state backed down and reduced the tax 
twice, once in November 1771 and again in October 1773.77  In April 1775 it was finally 
abolished.78  Policing foreign books was a less pressing concern in the early 1770s 
because the French state was quite successful in using internal legislation to restrict the 
business of extra-territorial traders.  Unfortunately such legislation adversely affected 
the trade of provincial French booksellers too and by mid 1775 the French state had 




When dealing with errant publishers, the French foreign ministry usually followed a 
strategy of exemplary punishment by appealing to foreign authorities to issue 
reprimands and punishments.  In the case of defiant authors, the French state was more 
likely to become heavily involved in the process of chasing and disciplining these 
individuals.  Targeting writers allowed the French state to go right to the source of 
where literature was emanating from.  This distinction came about partly due to the 
actions of the authors themselves.  Whilst the most clandestine publishers could go 
about their business trying not to be noticed by the French authorities, writers would 
often get in touch with the French authorities on their own initiative.  Authors 
habitually contacted the government threatening to publish a controversial pamphlet 
which they pledged that they could also suppress for the right fee.  Blackmail payments 
                                                          
76 Paris, BNF, MF 22070, fols. 30-34, 24 September 1771.  
77 Paris, BNF, MF 22179, fol. 317, 24 November 1771; Paris, BNF, MF 22179, fol. 409, 17 
October 1773. 




were most often issued to the writers of libelles.  The French government was keen to 
protect the reputation of important elite figures, especially if they had political ties.  The 
particular individuals who were maligned in these texts also worried about their possible 
impact and appealed to the French state to prevent their circulation.  Libellistes 
recognised these dual spheres of concern and frequently sent their threats both to the 
French government and to the individuals they had attacked in the pamphlet.   
Paying off a libelliste was considered to be an undesirable option but it was a 
tactic which the foreign ministry resorted to on several occasions in the 1770s.  These 
agreements were well-known in the libelliste community and were even reported in some 
contemporary literature and this information encouraged other writers to seek payment 
from the French state.79  The unique nature of the British context must be stressed here.  
Authors working in London had particular success in drawing money from the French 
government because British libel law offered no real help to non-residents.80  The 
French foreign ministry tried to persuade the British government to reform these laws 
so that writers who defamed French subjects would be punished, but little progress was 
made.  Moreover, as France and Britain were diplomatic enemies, the British authorities 
were reluctant to help France protect its international image.  France had a lot more 
influence in continental Europe where it was able to lean on local authorities to become 
involved in pursuing authors and publishers.  Both outside and within Britain, some 
authors tried to try to call the foreign ministry’s bluff.  They would offer to try to help 
the French government uncover information about the illicit print trade in return for a 
cash payment.81  Part of the reason that so many writers appealed to the state for pay-
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offs was because they knew that the government took on individuals like themselves as 
agents and spies.   
These appeals were also related to the nature of the eighteenth-century literary 
market.82  It was during the eighteenth century that the commercialisation of the book 
business began to really take off as authors started to connect with a wider audience.  
Yet links between writers and patrons persisted.  As Edward Andrew and Geoffrey 
Turnovsky have both recently emphasised, Enlightenment writers frequently trumpeted 
their independence despite recognition that economic necessity compelled most to 
continue to rely on patrons.83  Authors who lacked social and literary connections found 
it practically impossible to live by the pen.  They required the ongoing financial support 
of affluent benefactors since it was usual practice to sell manuscripts to publishers for a 
one-off fee without being able to take a share of any future profits.  The prospect of 
securing employment with the French government was thus an attractive one.  Issuing 
payments to authors was a way to stop libelles from hitting the market but French 
officials could never be sure of the efficacy of this method of suppression.  It was hard 
for the foreign ministry to determine whether texts which had been threatened were 
genuinely in the pipeline.  The state was also acutely aware that it could not trust 
authors and publishers to destroy every single copy of a libelle, even if they had received 
a payment from the government.  Indeed, by the early 1780s French officials had begun 
to doubt whether paying off and chasing authors was really the best means of managing 
the extra-territorial print trade.  After the French government was forced to wrestle 
with a wave of foreign literature, an important change of policy was enacted in 1783.  
Vergennes decided that he was no longer prepared to give in to the demands of the 
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libellistes and began to try to scorn their attempts at intimidation.  The circumstances and 
implications of this shift will be explored in full later in the chapter.   
Handing out suppression payments was not the only manner in which the 
foreign ministry tried to deal with wayward writers.  The French government also tried 
to hunt and punish the authors of contentious literature.  Marie-Madeleine Anne 
Levasseur de la Touche, also known as Madame de Godeville was an author who 
caused problems for the French government.  Similar to Morande, Godeville was a bold 
adventurer with many elite contacts. During the 1770s and 1780s, the foreign ministry 
tried to control her movements and prevent the publication of her memoirs.  Godeville 
initially became known to the foreign ministry in the early 1770s after she uncovered the 
government plot to kidnap Morande in London and helped him to evade capture.84  In 
1774, Godeville published an account of her time in London as Voyage d’une française à 
Londres; ou, la calomnie détruite par la vérité des faits where she denied knowledge of both 
Morande and the milieu of the libellistes.85   
Godeville is probably best known for her affair with Beaumarchais which lasted 
from 1774 to 1777.86  She most likely met Beaumarchais as a result of her involvement 
with Morande.  Beaumarchais was associated with the libellistes in London and was sent 
to the British capital to suppress a number of works in the mid 1770s.87  There has been 
some passing acknowledgement that Godeville’s engagement with illicit literature 
continued into the early 1780s but the French government’s determination to restrict 
her output has not yet been fully explored.88  In mid 1779, Godeville arrived in The 
Hague, procured a printing press and began using two assumed names, the marquise de 
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l’Épine and the comtesse de Verrière.89  Early in 1780 she attempted to blackmail Louis 
François Armand de Vignerot du Plessis, duc de Richelieu, a courtier and great nephew 
of the cardinal de Richelieu, the most powerful statesman of the seventeenth century.  
The duc de Richelieu was an infamous womaniser and Godeville warned him that she 
was about to publish Les 74 aventures de Mathusalem, a collection of erotic verse which 
would throw light on his love affairs.90  Richelieu relayed this warning to Lenoir, who 
then authorised a payment of 25 louis to be sent to Godeville via Beaumarchais.91  This 
pay –off worked to dissuade Godeville from ever publishing her thoughts on Richelieu.    
The foreign ministry became involved in February 1780 when La Vauguyon, the 
ministre plénipotentiaire in The Hague, told Vergennes that a woman was arranging the 
publication of a different book entitled, Le Cri de l’humanité au Roi; ou, mémoires de Mme la 
Comtesse de Verrière.92  La Vauguyon included a prospectus of the work in his dispatch to 
Vergennes.  In it, Godeville promised that her memoirs would reveal ‘les détails sincères 
de toutes mes persécutions, de chaque prison que j’ai subies, des cruautés que j’ai 
éprouvées et des particularités que je dois à l’humanité’.93  In La Bastille dévoilée, a 
sensationalist exposé of the workings of the Bastille which was published in 1789, it was 
claimed that La Vauguyon was anxious because Godeville’s work maligned his Spanish 
mistress.94  Godeville said that she had been humiliated by her and publishing this 
pamphlet was part of a plan for revenge.  La Vauguyon did not communicate any such 
worries to Vergennes and there seems to have been enough that was troubling in 
Godeville’s memoirs without this element of slander.  After consultation with Maurepas 
                                                          
89 Paris, AMAE, CP Hollande 540, fol. 108, La Vauguyon to Vergennes, 1 February 1780; Paris, 
AMAE, CP Hollande 540, fol. 310, Vergennes to Lenoir, 29 March 1780. 
90 Paris, AMAE, CP Hollande 541, fol. 116, 1 June 1780. 
91 Louis Charpentier, La Bastille dévoilée; ou, recueil des pièces authentiques pour servir à son histoire, vol 7 
(Paris: Desenne, 1789), p. 100.  Note that this text was supposedly based on papers from within 
the Bastille but that it was also published early in the revolution with the objective of 
denigrating the ancien régime government.      
92 Paris, AMAE, CP Hollande 540, fol. 108, La Vauguyon to Vergennes, 1 February 1780.  
93 Paris, AMAE, CP Hollande 540, fols. 114-15, 1 February 1780.   




and Lenoir, Vergennes agreed that Godeville posed a serious threat.95  The police 
inspector Brugnières was already in The Hague and Vergennes commanded him to 
organise for her to be arrested and repatriated to France.  Within two weeks Brugnières 
was able to track down Godeville and compel the Dutch authorities to incarcerate her 
in a civil prison until extradition could be arranged.96  Godeville’s return to France was 
delayed because she had many local creditors who were demanding repayments to the 
sum of 3000 Dutch florins.  La Vauguyon negotiated with a local banker for these debts 
to be paid off and on 24 May Godeville reached the Bastille.97 
Godeville spent around a year in the Bastille and in March 1781 was transferred 
to the convent of the Madeleine in La Flèche where she remained for another year.98  
After escaping the convent, she began to trouble the foreign ministry again in mid 1784.  
This time she was in Lausanne, calling herself the marquise de l’Épine and trying to 
peddle her memoirs to Swiss publishers.  Vergennes instructed the vicomte de Polignac, 
the French ambassadeur in Solothurn, to ask the authorities in Berne to arrest Godeville, 
along with any publisher who had been involved with her.99  The foreign minister also 
wanted local officials to seize the manuscript of Godeville’s memoirs and any printed 
copies which were to be found.  The authorities in Berne moved speedily to conduct a 
thorough search of the shops of printers and booksellers in Lausanne but nothing was 
uncovered.  Local traders acknowledged that Godeville had tried to interest them in her 
memoirs but maintained that they had refused to deal with her.100   
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This was self-censorship at work.  Godeville was notorious and traders in 
Lausanne did not want to risk incurring the wrath of the French authorities by agreeing 
to publish her memoirs.  As in 1780, Godeville was being targeted for a text that she 
had not yet published but this time Vergennes did not authorise any further measures to 
be taken against her.  Polignac advised Vergennes that Godeville had gathered around 
3000 subscriptions for her memoirs but would be forced to pay this money back if she 
could not find a publisher.101  She had tried Neuchâtel without success and had now 
moved onto Geneva.  Godeville was also heavily pregnant which Polignac felt would 
make the task of surveillance easier for the diplomatic team in the Swiss states.  
Vergennes was also content to let Godeville roam free in 1784 because, since the 
previous year, he had been following a policy of ignoring the threat of illicit literature as 
far as possible.  He wanted to scorn Godeville and Polignac’s points about Godeville’s 
pregnancy and lack of success in finding a publisher confirmed that this was a rational 
strategy in the circumstances.    
Within its policy of focused policing, the French foreign ministry only pursued 
those authors which it took particularly seriously.  So why was Godeville taken to be so 
problematic? After all, her memoirs never made it into print in spite of her best efforts 
in 1780 and 1784.  She did publish Voyage d’une françoise à Londres in 1774 but the 
incoherent composition of this text rendered it obscure and almost unintelligible.  There 
were practical reasons why Godeville frightened the French government.  In The Hague 
in 1780 she was able to acquire her own printing press which meant that she could 
publish exactly what she wished with ease.102  Godeville was also burdened with a 
multitude of debts and this poverty, coupled with ‘La vivacité de sa tête’, contributed to 
her audacity and recklessness. 103   
                                                          
101 Paris, AMAE, CP Suisse 417, fols. 221-22, Polignac to Vergennes, 27 May 1784.   
102 Paris, AMAE, CP Hollande 540, fol. 323, March 1780. 




However, there was a much more important element of Godeville’s personality 
which disturbed the French government.  This was her personal connections with the 
French courtly and political elite.  Godeville was beautiful (according to Beaumarchais 
at least) and promiscuous.  Aside from her affair with Beaumarchais, Godeville was also 
rumoured to have had dalliances with the duc de Choiseul and the duc de Richelieu.104  
It was also insinuated that Lenoir himself had also been one of Godeville’s lovers and 
used money from the state to support her.105  In his letters to Vergennes, Lenoir indeed 
displayed anxiousness about Godeville’s links with high society.  Lenoir was uneasy 
about the sensitive information or significant papers that this femme galante might have 
got her hands on.106   
In 1780, the police chief determined that extradition was the best course of 
action since it would allow the French authorities to take possession of these papers.  
According to one source, this plan did not unfold as Lenoir had hoped.  When the 
interrogating officer in the Bastille tried to open Godeville’s letters, she protested that 
they were a private correspondence with men that she hoped to protect.  When the 
officer persisted, Godeville created a distraction by snatching his wig.  In the course of 
the ensuing tussle between these two, Godeville managed to throw her cache of papers 
into the fire, destroying them forever.107  Vergennes and La Vauguyon shared Lenoir’s 
concerns about Godeville’s power to slander governmental figures.108  Brugnières even 
fretted that she was planning to form an association of libellistes and use her own 
printing press to publish a slew of defamatory works.109  A government report which 
summarised the affair of 1780 stressed that Godeville was a very dangerous individual 
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who should not be allowed to reoffend.110  Even though her memoirs never made it to 
publication, the French government was uncomfortably aware that Godeville’s 
connections with elites would bring potency to her work.  Lenoir and Vergennes were 
resolute that she needed to be imprisoned despite the fact that she was yet to have 
committed any real offence.  
The comte de Mirabeau was another author who caused concern for the French 
foreign ministry but he was treated somewhat differently to Godeville.  Mirabeau is best 
known for his pivotal role in leading the early stages of the French Revolution.  Under 
the old regime, he gained infamy as an aristocratic adventurer who turned out a series of 
political, financial and erotic pamphlets in the hope assuaging his mounting debts.  Most 
of the pamphlets which bore Mirabeau’s name were the product of a collaborative 
effort with hired pens.  Mirabeau’s fame was perceived as a selling point.  In addition to 
his pamphleteering, his pre-revolutionary life was marked by several spells in prison.  
Mirabeau’s father invoked multiple lettres de cachet against his volatile son in an effort to 
curb his propensity to run up debts, clash with powerful figures and take up with 
unsuitable lovers.  Indeed, the foreign ministry was drawn into tracking Mirabeau down 
in 1777 after he fled abroad with the wife of another man.  In May of that year 
Vergennes arranged for Mirabeau to be arrested by the Dutch police and the comte was 
taken straight to Vincennes prison where he remained until August 1782.111   
It was during his time in Vincennes that Mirabeau wrote a series of pamphlets 
which would seriously alarm the foreign ministry.  Following his release from 
incarceration Mirabeau travelled to Neuchâtel where he arranged for three of his 
pamphlets to be published: Des Lettres de cachet et des prisons d’état, Le Libertin de qualité; ou 
ma conversion and L’Espion dévalisé.  This affair will be explored later in this chapter.  
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Suffice to say here that the French government were very anxious about the printing of 
these pornographic and political works and pressured the authorities in Neuchâtel to 
seek out and punish the publishers involved.  The contrast with the manner in which 
Godeville had been treated a year earlier is marked.  Mirabeau was released from prison 
and immediately arranged for not just one but three contentious texts to be printed 
abroad.  Yet the foreign ministry did not call for Mirabeau himself to be punished; they 
concentrated their attention instead on the publishers.  This could be evidence of 
Vergennes merely trying out a new technique.  However, it is also striking to see that 
the French foreign ministry did not suspect Mirabeau as a matter of course.  On 26 
August 1782, Bâcher, the chargé d’affaires in Solothurn, notified Vergennes that Mirabeau 
had arrived in Neuchâtel eight days earlier and was trying to negotiate with local 
publishers to print his L’Espion dévalisé.112  Vergennes did not heed this warning and only 
ordered that measures were to be taken against Mirabeau’s pamphlets once they 
appeared on the market a few months later in November.  On 3 November 1782 
Bâcher told Vergennes that Mirabeau had left Neuchâtel but the foreign minister 
declined to instruct others within his diplomatic team to watch out for the comte taking 
shelter in their locality.113   
Mirabeau held onto his freedom and continued to write provocative pamphlets 
across the 1780s.  In February 1788 Falciola, chargé d’affaires in Berlin complained to the 
authorities there about the sale of Mirabeau’s Avis aux bataves sur le stathoudérat.114  The 
text was considered inappropriate because it discussed French politics and finances, as 
well as the foreign policy interests of the French state in the Levant.115  Mirabeau’s work 
was also diplomatically embarrassing for France.  The French authorities had actually 
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stationed Mirabeau in Berlin on a diplomatic mission in the latter half of 1786 and they 
were now forced to stress that the comte did not have official authorisation to interfere 
in external politics.116  But again it was the text rather than Mirabeau himself who was 
under fire here.  A year later in January 1789, Mirabeau decided to publish an account of 
his diplomatic mission in Prussia as Histoire secrète de la cour de Berlin.117  Once more, this 
work was very embarrassing for the French government.  A French diplomatic agent 
had concluded his mission by publishing an exposé which criticised the Prussian King 
as weak and ineffectual.  This work was condemned by the French government, 
confiscated at customs and also pursued beyond the borders of France.118  Montmorin 
suspected that the text had originally been published somewhere in the Swiss states and 
d’Esterno, ministre plénipotentiaire in Berlin, revealed that it had been reprinted in 
Frankfurt.119  Montmorin told d’Esterno that steps were being taken to prevent the 
dissemination of the work within France and asked for the same to happen in Berlin.  
Police in the Prussian capital rounded up all booksellers and publishers in the city and 
ordered them to hand over any copies of the text or face arrest.120    
It is easier to appreciate why Mirabeau escaped punishment in 1789.  The 
French state was preoccupied with preparations for the Estates-General and Mirabeau 
himself was attracting even more attention as he sought election to the body, initially 
from the nobility and when this failed, from members of the Third Estate.  Moving 
away from the context of 1789, it remains the case that the foreign ministry never 
chased Mirabeau himself in the way it did Godeville or other troublesome authors like 
Morande and Linguet.  One reason that Mirabeau escaped punishment surely has to be 
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that he was a pamphleteer who concentrated on political matters rather than a libelliste 
who denigrated individual figures on a more personal level.  L’Espion dévalisé did satirise 
those in power during the reign of Louis XV but in 1788 and 1789 it was Mirabeau’s 
more political texts relating to other nations which disturbed the French government.  
The writings of Godeville, Linguet and Morande consistently threatened to expose the 
intimate details of the lives of France’s political and social elites.  As we have seen, these 
were the kinds of works which were taken most seriously by the French government.   
The most important explanation as to why Mirabeau was never arrested for his 
pamphleteering relates to his close relations with powerful forces at court.  Mirabeau 
was supported by Malesherbes and Calonne and was on the payroll of the police as an 
informant.121  There is still much more to discover about his pre-revolutionary political 
networks.  Montmorin even admitted that ‘il paraît que M. de Mirabeau a dans cette 
compagnie des protecteurs qui mettront à profit la lenteur des formes pour le soustraire 
à la conviction et aux châtiments’.122  Mirabeau published a string of offensive works 
but his powerful protectors helped him to evade punishment.  There are clear parallels 
with the manner in which the French government treated Linguet, another unruly 
author with elite connections.  Linguet was imprisoned in the Bastille from September 
1780 to May 1782 but was arrested on the pretext of a written attack on the duc de 
Duras.  Linguet was not arrested in 1777 when he threatened to print several libelles nor 
in 1783 when he published his Mémoires sur la Bastille.      
As with Linguet, perhaps the French authorities also appreciated that the 
Mirabeau’s skill for propaganda could make him an asset to the government.  
Vergennes’ biographer has highlighted that one of the foreign minister’s key tactics was 
to attempt to weaken the opposition by buying off one of its members, and we know 
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that the foreign minister tried to win Linguet’s support with such a scheme.123  Indeed, 
Mirabeau appealed to Durival, directeur des finances in the foreign office and the man 
charged with subsidising pamphleteers for the French state.  However, the French 
government turned against Mirabeau after he published a combative series of financial 
pamphlets in the mid 1780s.124  With prompting from Calonne, Vergennes did later 
decide to bestow upon Mirabeau a foreign mission at the Prussian court.  Mirabeau 
took a preliminary trip to Berlin in early 1786 and was officially stationed at the court 
from July 1786 to January 1787.  The foreign minister’s faith in Mirabeau backfired in 
January 1789, however, when Histoire secrète de la cour de Berlin was published, much to the 
anger of Prussia and the humiliation of France.  French officials were frustrated by 
Mirabeau’s pamphleteering and the diplomatic network was used to prevent the 
dissemination of the contentious works which he published abroad.  However, it is clear 
that Mirabeau himself was too close to the French government to be targeted directly.  
Godeville had elite connections too, supposedly even with Lenoir, but her former 
lovers were not prepared to keep her safe from harm.  Rather than antagonise Mirabeau 
through imprisonment, the foreign ministry attempted to tame him by bringing him 
closer into their sphere of influence. 
 
A Period of Crisis: 1781 to 1783 
 
Some of the campaigns against the writings of Godeville and Mirabeau occurred during 
a challenging period for the French government.  The years from 1781 to 1783 were 
particularly fraught when it came to the matter of policing the extra-territorial print 
trade.  This period was marked by several prolonged affairs during which the foreign 
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ministry struggled to find and punish authors and publishers who had brought 
contentious works onto the market.  It is important to contextualise this somewhat 
extreme period.  It was also preceded by a time of relative calm when there were hardly 
any protracted instances of external policing.  In August 1781, there was an attempt to 
ensure that the regulations which governed the importation of printed matter into 
France were upheld.  Yet, the subsequent problems faced by the foreign ministry in its 
efforts to keep print under control makes it evident that these reforms did not entirely 
succeed.   
On 25 August 1781, an arrêt was issued from the Conseil d’état which reiterated 
the rules for the importation of books.125  If customs officials discovered any illicit texts 
coming across the border, they were to put together a report and send this to the 
nearest chambre syndicale along with the books in question.  All texts coming into France 
were then to pass through the nearest chambre syndicale where they would be examined by 
the officers of the guild and an inspector of the book trade. At this point, any 
objectionable literature would be confiscated.  The edict warned that these procedures 
would be adhered to, ‘à peine de cinq cents livres d’amende et de confiscation des 
chevaux, voitures, harnois et de plus forte peine en cas de récidive’.126  It also 
incorporated a financial inducement for customs officials to watch out for potentially 
illicit texts.  They would receive half the proceeds from any fine issued to the trader 
who was to receive such books.  It must be emphasised that this statute contained little 
which was new.  It was instead a means of reiterating the importance of following 
existing protocols to the letter.  Other moves designed to restrain the print industry 
were also put in place in 1781.  Also in August, a new chambre syndicale was established in 
Metz to apprehend a greater proportion of the texts which flowed into France from the 
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Netherlands and the German and Swiss states.127  As explained in Chapter 4, efforts 
were also made in January 1781 to extend control over the extra-territorial newspaper 
press with the establishment of the state-supervised news bureau in Paris which could 
supply pre-approved information to the editors of foreign gazettes.128   
The small cluster of policies enacted in 1781 indicates that the French state was 
thinking seriously about how best to manage the extra-territorial trade.  However, from 
late 1781 until 1783 the system of policing print was under immense pressure as a series 
of offensive books threatened to surge into France.  A string of crises in external 
censorship underscored that the current structure of control was inadequate and 
induced Vergennes to rethink his approach in more radical terms.  
Many of the problems that the foreign ministry encountered in the early 1780s 
ultimately stemmed from Jean Claude Jacquet de la Douai.  Jacquet was one of Lenoir’s 
spies and through his spying duties was able to develop connections with several 
members of the French ministry.129  In April 1781 he was appointed the inspector in 
charge of foreign books having been involved in the suppression of a series of 
scandalous pamphlets which maligned the French royal family.130  The creation of this 
position also offers more evidence that the French government was actively trying to 
bring the extra-territorial print trade under control in 1781.  Jacquet was dispatched on a 
mission to Amsterdam and The Hague to buy up copies of libelles, including a 
scandalous story about Marie-Antoinette.  This was probably the Essais historiques sur la 
vie de Marie-Antoinette d’Autriche, reine de France which was finally published in a full print-
run in 1789.131   
                                                          
127 Paris, BNF, MF 22079, fol. 436, 18 August 1781. 
128 Popkin, ‘The Gazette de Leyde and French Politics’, pp. 95-96.   
129 Charpentier, vol 3, pp. 36-48; Darnton, The Devil in the Holy Water, pp. 124-36. 
130 Darnton, The Devil in the Holy Water, pp. 124-26.   
131 Pierre Étienne Auguste Goupil, Essais historiques sur la vie de Marie-Antoinette d’Autriche, reine de 




The government became suspicious of Jacquet after Lenoir received tip-offs 
from a number of sources, including Morande, who was now co-opted into state service 
as a spy.  Jacquet took samples of pamphlets to Lenoir, claiming that he had received 
them from authors working abroad who were willing to suppress them for a fee.  
However, Jacquet was actually abusing his position as inspector by using it as a cover to 
manage a production line of libelles which were composed in Paris, printed abroad and 
then shipped back into France.  Lenoir gave Jacquet money to suppress libelles but 
Jacquet poured this instead into his own publishing enterprise.  Lenoir and Vergennes 
arranged for the police officer Receveur to follow Jacquet on a second trip to London.  
When Jacquet returned to Paris from London the police searched his belongings and 
uncovered a manuscript of the Essais historiques written in Jacquet’s own hand.  By this 
point, Lenoir was convinced that Jacquet was responsible for a number of other libelles 
which targeted prominent members of the French ministry.  He was arrested and sent 
to the Bastille on 30 October 1781.132  Jacquet refused to confess and after claiming 
insanity was transferred to the asylum at Charenton in November 1782.  A year later he 
was brought back to the Bastille where he remained until July 1789. He was released just 
five days before the storming of the prison. 
In the aftermath of these arrests, the French government spent a lot of time 
tracking down and arresting any men who had collaborated with Jacquet.  In October 
1781, the Paris police were able to incarcerate several of these individuals including 
Costard, a printer-bookseller who had been Jacquet’s copyist, and Michel-Louis de 
Marcenay, who was responsible for printing some of Jacquet’s libelles.  Writers 
associated with Jacquet were also arrested.  Théophile-Imarigeon, the abbé Duvernet, 
was sent to the Bastille in October 1781, although he claimed to have been duped into 
                                                          




handing three of his manuscripts over to Jacquet.133  The foreign ministry became 
engaged in this campaign to chase Jacquet’s associates and prevent the dissemination of 
any libelles that he had arranged to be published abroad.  In November 1781, the police 
inspector Brugnières was sent to Brussels where he was able to put pressure on the local 
authorities to arrest Jean-Baptiste Imbert de Villebon and Antoine La Coste de 
Mézières.134  La Coste de Mézières was alleged to have written libelles (based on sensitive 
information provided by Jacquet and his contacts in Paris) which Imbert de Villebon 
then arranged to have printed in Brussels.   
Papers seized from Mézières indicated that he had been involved in the 
composition of two texts, Confession générale de Madame la comtesse du Barry which 
discussed the final mistress of Louis XV, and La Diligence, ou dialogue entre trois gens qui ne 
sont pas trop sots sur les affaires du temps, a work on current affairs which slandered Marie-
Antoinette.135  Mézières and Imbert de Villebon were held in custody in Brussels until 
January 1782, when they were both extradited to France and incarcerated in the 
Bastille.136  Père François Guillaume Imbert de Boudeaux, brother of Imbert de 
Villebon, was also arrested in Paris in December 1781 and sent to the Bastille the 
following January on suspicion of being one of Jacquet’s stable of writers.137  Later in 
1782 Receveur was dispatched to Amsterdam where he arrested the chevalier de Launay 
on suspicion of writing libelles for Jacquet.138  Launay was brought back to the Bastille on 
4 September 1782 but was found dead in his cell 20 days later.  From Brussels and 
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Amsterdam, Receveur brought back printed copies of the Essais historiques sur la vie de 
Marie-Antoinette, two anti-Necker pamphlets and Les Joueurs et M. Dusaulx, a work about 
the exploits of French elite figures in Parisian gambling dens.139  
This assault on Jacquet’s network of libellistes illuminates the testing conditions 
faced by those responsible for policing print in late eighteenth-century France.  Jacquet 
had foxed the French state by becoming a double agent, using his official position to 
draw other men into an international ring of illicit publishing.  He was able to engineer, 
or at least to threaten, the production of the kind of literature that most troubled the 
French authorities.  Before he was found out, Jacquet told Lenoir that he had 
discovered a number of libelles which were in the pipeline with titles such as, Les 
Aventures de Madame de Polignac, Le Ministère de Vergennes and Le Cri de la France contre M. de 
Maurepas.140  None of these titles appeared subsequently which suggests that Jacquet 
fabricated them and was probably planning to engineer their publication himself in the 
hope of encouraging Lenoir to continue funding his foreign missions.  The printing of 
libelles which attacked Necker, Madame du Barry and Marie-Antoinette was set in 
motion by Jacquet and his accomplices.  At least two of the men involved with Jacquet 
had also been police spies.141  Lenoir employed the Imbert brothers to feed him 
information about underground publishing but then realised that they might be 
inventing title in the hope of securing suppression fees.  The Jacquet affair also looked 
to be an instance of history repeating itself.  In March 1778, Pierre-Antoine-Auguste 
Goupil Des Pallières, the inspector of the Paris book trade, had been arrested and sent 
to the Bastille for his involvement with libelles.142  Jacquet was inspired by Goupil’s 
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actions and followed a scheme of organising foreign missions to suppress libelles about 
Marie-Antoinette at the same time as commissioning these texts.   
Yet this affair demonstrates that the French state could still impose its will on 
print even in challenging circumstances.  The government sent out a strong message by 
imprisoning Jacquet and at least seven of his associates in the Bastille.  Jacquet was kept 
locked up until 1789 and writers like Marcenay and Mézières spent relatively long spells 
of more than one and a half years in the Bastille, even though they confessed to their 
involvement in Jacquet’s operation.  This provides evidence that the foreign ministry 
was willing to go beyond its strategy of concentrated, exemplary punishment in 
extraordinary cases.  The scale of the offences committed here was considerable and the 
foreign ministry was obliged to work closely with the Paris police to break up Jacquet’s 
network.  The French state was also remarkably successful in either pre-empting the 
publication or suppressing printed copies of Jacquet’s libelles.  The Essais historiques sur la 
vie de Marie-Antoinette was probably the worst that Jacquet had to offer and the French 
government was able to buy up copies at the source in Holland and Brussels.143  
Cooperation between the Paris police and the foreign ministry meant that Jacquet’s time 
as a double agent came to a dramatic end in October 1781, but the whole affair had 
served to underline the French government’s vulnerability to the menace or publication 
of libelle literature.  
The exposure and termination of Jacquet’s network of book dealing was clearly 
a major challenge for the foreign ministry, as well as a significant coup once the affair 
was resolved.  Yet a consideration of the wider European context makes it clear that the 
French state faced a string of similarly taxing situations in the early 1780s.  In January 
1782, just as the Imbert brothers and Mézières were being jailed in the Bastille for their 
involvement with Jacquet, the foreign ministry became concerned about works which 
                                                          




were being published in Geneva.  Vergennes received word from Lenoir that a 
publisher called Jean Abram Nouffer had sent advertisements to Parisian booksellers in 
September and October 1781 which announced the sale of a number of provocative 
texts.144  Lenoir also knew that Nouffer’s business partner, Duvillard fils, had come to 
Paris in June 1779 to distribute book catalogues which advertised seemingly subversive 
texts.  Vergennes declared that ‘La licence du premier de ces écrits rend le Sr. Nouffer 
digne de punition’.145  The foreign minister was referring to Joseph Lanjuinais’ 
Supplément à l’espion anglois.146  This text purported to be a continuation of the popular 
work L’Espion anglois by Mathieu-François Pidansat de Mairobert, which had been 
published in 1779.147  The Supplément à l’espion anglois ostensibly centred its attention on 
the American War of Independence but dwelt heavily on the subject of French politics.  
Burrows has suggested that the Supplément shocked the French authorities largely 
because of two pages of calumny against Marie-Antoinette.148  The text insinuated that 
Marie-Antoinette’s excessive spending was weakening the French state; 
 
Vous savez, Milord, que cette Princesse fait les dépenses le plus extravagantes; peut-être 
même n’ignorez-vous pas que son luxe effréné a coûté pendant un temps à la nation 
plusieurs millions par semaine.149   
 
Lenoir said that copies of this work had found their way into the hands of 
booksellers in Paris and Versailles.150  Nouffer had also been promoting La Vérité rendue 
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sensible à Louis XVI par un admirateur de M. Necker, a work which advocated toleration for 
Protestants, and Histoire d’un pou françois, a satirical account of the American War of 
Independence told from the perspective of a louse.151  Vergennes told the baron de 
Castelnau, résident in Geneva that he was to ask the Petit Conseil there to take measures 
against Nouffer.  Vergennes also instructed Castelnau that he was to put pressure on 
the authorities in Geneva to do all they could to discover the authors of these texts, as 
well as those individuals who had been selling them.   
On 16 January 1781, Nouffer’s print-shop was sealed by Genevan officials and 
the publisher was taken into custody where he remained for close to a month.152  In the 
course of searching Nouffer’s shop the Genevan authorities uncovered and confiscated 
four copies of Supplément à l’espion anglois, two or three copies of Histoire d’un pou françois 
and, more surprisingly, ‘une partie assez considérable’ of the two most recent volumes 
of the Mémoires secrets pour servir à l’histoire de la république des lettres en France, depuis 1762 
jusqu’à nos jours.153  This multi-volume work was a renowned chronicle of political and 
cultural events which took place between 1762 and 1787.  It was published 
anonymously in instalments from 1777 to 1789 and has been attributed to Louis Petit 
de Bachaumont.  Vergennes despaired that ‘les auteurs ont eu pour but d’y rassembler 
des matériaux pour l’histoire, et qu’ils s’y permettent tout à qui pert nuire au Royaume 
et ternir les réputations’.154   
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Nouffer was interrogated in Geneva on the basis of a list of questions provided 
by Lenoir which Vergennes had forwarded to Castelnau.155  The publisher admitted to 
printing and selling both Histoire d’un pou françois and La Vérité rendue sensible but 
maintained that he was not responsible for the Supplément à l’espion anglois.  Nouffer 
claimed that the initial advertisement for this work actually came from a German 
publisher and cited the nature of the typeset and paper as proof that the first 
announcement had not been printed in the Swiss states.156  The fact that Nouffer sent 
promotional material into France himself could not be denied, but the Genevan 
asserted that he was merely trying to gauge interest in the work before he stocked his 
shop with copies.   
Despite being under intense pressure from the French authorities, the Petit 
Conseil accepted Nouffer’s defence and cleared him of the charge of publishing the 
Supplément à l’espion anglois.157  The Conseil even tried to counter French accusations by 
pointing out that Nouffer had just been selling a work with a similar title, L’Espion 
anglois by Mairobert.  The body also claimed that Nouffer had made counterfeit copies 
of a Dutch edition of the Mémoires secrets.  This is interesting because the publication 
history of the Mémoires secrets has long been ambiguous.  The title page of the each 
volume of the text announced that it was published in London.  Scholars have assumed 
that this was a false imprint and the latest bibliographical research indicates that the text 
might have been printed in the United Provinces.158  The account presented by the 
Genevan authorities confirms this idea.   
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On 13 February 1782 the Petit Conseil determined that Nouffer had already been 
punished enough for the works that he had printed and sold; a short spell in prison had 
disrupted his business.  Nouffer was formally admonished, ordered to pay the costs of 
the trial and set free.  The Nouffer affair again highlights some of the difficulties that 
the foreign ministry experienced in its efforts to manage the extra-territorial book trade.  
The Supplément was a significant work.  Burrows has suggested that this was the only 
libelle targeting Marie-Antoinette which circulated prior to 1789.159  Castelnau, the résident 
in Geneva, was convinced that Nouffer had indeed published the Supplément à l’espion 
anglois but he could not compel the Petit Conseil to discipline him further without more 
evidence.160  Fearing that important papers may have been deliberately destroyed prior 
to or during the raid on Nouffer’s shop, Castelnau did manage to persuade the Genevan 
authorities to arrange a second enquiry into the Supplément à l’espion anglois.161   
However, it is important to recognise that Castelnau’s exasperation was not 
totally echoed by Vergennes.  The foreign minister was not especially upset by 
Nouffer’s publication of La Vérité rendue sensible, a work in favour of religious toleration, 
or Histoire d’un pou françois, which discussed French politics and foreign policy.162  It was 
the Supplément which outraged him.  Moreover, Vergennes told Castelnau to convey to 
the Petit Conseil that Louis XVI was very grateful for the manner in which it had treated 
Nouffer.163  It is easy to understand why Vergennes might have been reluctant to admit 
that the Genevan government had defied his orders.  The struggle to rebuke Nouffer 
also relates to the foreign ministry’s policy of seeking exemplary and measured 
punishment for at least one individual.  Regardless of whether Nouffer really had 
published the Supplément, he had been imprisoned, interrogated and formally chastised 
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and other local printers would presumably now be wary of making the same mistakes.  
It is also important to remember that Vergennes did little to chase up the second 
enquiry on the Supplément à l’espion anglois, confirming the idea that one exemplary 
punishment was sufficient in his view.164   
It is also interesting to note that whilst Vergennes expressed his disapproval of 
the Mémoires secrets, he did not issue explicit orders against it.  Popkin has proposed that 
the French government might have tolerated the Mémoires secrets in order to discredit its 
own propaganda about just how subversive it really was.165  It has also been underlined 
by Sarah Maza that the French government monitored the Parisian salon of Marie Anne 
Doublet, where the Mémoires secrets is believed to have started life.166  When it came to 
Nouffer in 1782, however, the decision to accept the publication of the Mémoires secrets 
seems to have also been linked with the idea of exemplary punishment.  Nouffer had 
been punished for the Supplément à l’espion anglois and that was deemed sufficient.  
Vergennes told Castelnau to stress to the authorities in Geneva that they needed to be 
more vigilant in future.167  Castelnau was also instructed to find out more about the 
publishing industry in Geneva.  Vergennes wanted the French résident to pinpoint the 
lawful traders and identify those who were more likely to be drawn into illicit printing.  
The foreign minister believed that the Supplément à l’espion anglois had come from Geneva 
and so he made a special effort to establish limits on the print trade there.  Although the 
French government was only able to ensure the confiscation of a few copies of this 
work, it was hoped that the pressure it applied in Geneva would discourage other 
traders from getting involved with the Supplément.   
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The foreign ministry was placed under further strain in February 1782 at around 
the same time as Nouffer was being tried in Geneva.  This time it was the threat of a 
libelle which was the catalyst for an international policing campaign.  This campaign 
illustrates many of the difficulties the French government faced in its attempts to keep 
the foreign print trade under surveillance and control.  In February 1782, Charlotte de 
Bournon Malarme and her husband Jean-Etienne Malarme arrived in Paris, bringing 
with them (so they claimed) 500 copies of a libelle.  They took their text, entitled Les 
Fripons parvenus, ou l’histoire du sieur Delzenne, straight to Delzenne himself.  Fearing the 
impact of such defamation, Delzenne agreed to pay the Malarmes 1,500 livres to 
suppress the work.168  At around the same time, Lenoir was visited in his office by 
Henri-Alexis Cahaisse.  Cahaisse presented Lenoir with the manuscript of Les Fripons 
parvenus and promised that he could find the perpetrators of this and other libelles, 
including a defamatory work about the comte d’Artois, brother of Louis XVI.  This 
offer appealed to Lenoir and he arranged with Vergennes for the police officer 
Brugnières to travel to Liège with Cahaisse in tow and the two arrived there on 28 
February 1782.169   
Cahaisse declared that he knew at least five men who were implicated in the 
production of libelles.  These men went by the names of Boissobert, Clary, Daulet, Milon 
and Knapen.  On arrival in Liège, Cahaisse told Brugnières that Daulet was actually in 
Cologne.  After arranging with Léonard, the chargé d’affaires in Liège to seize and search 
the papers of the other suspected culprits, Brugnières set off for Cologne.  Cahaisse 
claimed to be too ill to manage the journey and the reason for his absence quickly 
transpired.170  Brugnières’ investigations in Cologne made it clear that Daulet and 
Knapen did not exist.  Brugnières was now convinced that Cahaisse himself was 
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implicated in the production of libelles and rushed back to Liège to confront him.  Back 
in Liège, Léonard told Brugnières that after having investigated Clary and Milon, he was 
convinced of their innocence.  Although they were both writers, there was nothing 
within their papers to suggest that they were involved with libelle literature.  At this point 
Brugnières also received a letter from Lenoir which confirmed Cahaisse’s guilt and 
presented information about his links with the Malarme family.  The purpose of 
Brugnières’ mission had shifted and he was now in hot pursuit of Cahaisse and the 
Malarmes.  
The three associates sought shelter in nearby Aachen.  Léonard, the chargé 
d’affaires in Liège, appealed to officials there to arrest and extradite them back to France.  
The authorities in Aachen were obstreperous.  The grand mayeur of Aachen was 
conspicuously absent for weeks and his lieutenant claimed that he did not have the 
authority to issue orders for their arrest in his absence.  These delays enabled the three 
to escape again, this time to the neighbouring principality of Jülich.  On hearing this 
news, Brugnières travelled straight to Düsseldorf where the comte de Nelsselrode, the 
chancellor of Jülich, resided.  The police inspector persuaded the chancellor to remind 
the obstinate officials in Aachen that it was their responsibility to capture the wayward 
trio, even if they were now hiding out in Jülich.  Simultaneously, the comte de 
Montezan, French envoy in Munich appealed to Charles Theodore, the Elector Palatine, 
to compel the authorities in Aachen to act.171   
Feeling the force of the Elector Palatine’s disapproval, the grand mayeur of 
Aachen finally made decisive moves to secure the capture of Cahaisse and the 
Malarmes.  The grand mayeur sent word that proceedings against the three individuals 
would be halted if they presented themselves at the city hall in Aachen.  When they 
arrived, they were duly arrested.  After Léonard arranged for the debts that the trio had 
                                                          




run up in the locality to be settled, Brugnières took them back to Liège accompanied by 
a military escort provided by the Elector Palatine, comprising of two officers and 15 
grenadier guards.  Locked in prison in Liège, Cahaisse confessed that he had written the 
libelle which maligned Delzenne and then sold it onto a printer in Liège named Urban.  
This admission was corroborated by Urban, who added that Charlotte de Bournon 
Malarme had promised him that further manuscripts would be forthcoming.172  The 
French government now had enough evidence to prove that Cahaisse and Charlotte de 
Bournon Malarme were libellistes and at the beginning of May 1782 they were taken back 
to Paris and imprisoned in the Bastille.173   
On this occasion, the guilty parties received their due punishment.  But as 
before, the success of the foreign ministry’s external policing campaign was far from 
total.  The French state was at the mercy of uncooperative officials in Aachen who 
impeded French attempts to secure the arrest of Cahaisse and the Malarmes for as long 
as they possibly could.  These delays were exacerbated as the trio leapt from state to 
state, forcing Brugnières and the French diplomats to become entangled with a range of 
foreign authorities.  Cologne, Liège, Aachen, Jülich and Düsseldorf are all relatively 
close on the map, but it took Brugnières days to trail from town to town and close to 
two months to finally arrest the three.  It must also be stressed here that the guilty 
parties were already known to the French government.  Cahaisse had already been 
arrested twice and had spent time in the Prison of Saint-Lazare in Paris whilst the 
Malarmes had been exiled from France for fraud.174  In this instance, the French state 
proved itself unable to prevent recidivism in spite of the penalties it had imposed on 
these individuals.  As usual, the punishment administered here was measured.  Jean-
Etienne Malarme was not taken to the Bastille along with his wife because he was not 
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suspected of authoring any of the libelles in question.  French officials also decided 
against trying to seek a punishment for the printer Urban who admitted to his 
involvement with the trio.  The foreign ministry concentrated on making an example of 
Cahaisse and Charlotte de Bournon Malarme and was less concerned about Urban 
because Les Fripons parvenus never reached the market.  French officials certainly strained 
to deal with the twists and turns of this complex case but ultimately succeeded in 
punishing the main culprits.    
The foreign ministry was challenged once again in October 1782 when 
Vergennes became concerned that Neuchâtelois printers were publishing a number of 
inflammatory works thought to be penned by the comte de Mirabeau.  Des Lettres de 
cachet et des prisons d’état was a forceful treatise on the link between arbitrary 
imprisonment and despotism which Mirabeau wrote during his incarceration in 
Vincennes prison where he had been placed as a result of a lettre de cachet.  Libertin de 
qualité, ou ma conversion was a pornographic novel and L’Espion dévalisé was a scandalous 
and satirical look back at the reign of Louis XV.  The latter work is normally attributed 
to Baudouin de Guémadeuc but since Mirabeau sold the three manuscripts together in 
Neuchâtel he presumably wrote at least part of it.  Darnton has considered the 
publication of these titles in one of his early articles.175  New evidence from the 
diplomatic correspondence can shed light on the French government’s response to this 
affair. 
Around 13,000 copies of Mirabeau’s work on lettres de cachet flooded the 
European market, causing a sensation which attracted the attention of the French 
government.176  Lenoir was able to confirm Vergennes’ suspicion that it was printers in 
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Neuchâtel who were advertising the texts to French booksellers.177  Vergennes then 
called upon Bâcher, the chargé d’affaires in Solothurn, and the baron von der Goltz, 
Prussian ambassador to France, to intercede with the authorities in Neuchâtel.178  The 
foreign minister wanted Mirabeau’s original manuscripts to be seized and the 
dissemination of any printed copies to be blocked.  Under duress from both Prussian 
and French officials, the Conseil d’état in Neuchâtel moved relatively swiftly.  Officials 
searched local print-shops and declared that it was a firm by the name of Jonas Fauche 
fils aîné, Favre et Jérémie Witel which had printed Des Lettres de cachet et des prisons 
d’état.179  The three partners were sent to prison for three days and nights and were 
ordered to appear before the Conseil d’état on 12 November 1782 to explain their 
conduct.180  The authorities in Neuchâtel confiscated copies of Mirabeau’s works from 
the print-shop of Fauche fils aîné, Favre et Witel and decreed that the shop was to stay 
closed for the next two months.181 
The French government found it much easier to deal with the government in 
Neuchâtel than with the authorities who became involved in the pursuit of Cahaisse and 
the Malarmes.  The Conseil d’état in Neuchâtel was responsive to French demands and 
quickly arrested the culpable printers.  Yet Swiss officials also deceived the French state 
during this affair.  After Fauche fils aîné, Favre et Witel had been arrested for publishing 
Mirabeau’s work on lettres de cachet, the Neuchâtelois maintained that they knew nothing 
of the publication of his other works.182  According to an associate of Fauche fils aîné, 
Favre et Witel, Mirabeau’s presence in Neuchâtel in July 1782 had been a big event with 
the comte passing copies of the manuscript of Des Lettres de cachet et des prisons d’état 
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around for several prominent officials to read over.183  The French Book Trade in 
Enlightenment Europe Database also suggests that Fauche fils aîné, Favre et Witel had 
indeed printed all three works.  The STN received its copies of L’Espion dévalisé and Le 
Libertin de qualité from this neighbouring company.184  Despite the lingering uncertainty 
over the full extent of the guilt of the Fauche fils aîné, Favre et Witel firm, Vergennes 
expressed satisfaction with the way events had played out in Neuchâtel.185  The official 
strategy of securing a measured exemplary punishment had been realised.  Vergennes 
vaguely suggested to Goltz that the Conseil d’état should continue to be vigilant to the 
printing of similar works but made no effort to follow up with Bâcher when it came to 
the source of the other two pamphlets.   
In 1783, it was the print trade in London which began to cause real problems 
for the French government.  The police inspector Receveur was sent to London in 
March 1783.186  His primary goal was to prevent the appearance of two libelles in 
particular but Receveur was also directed to uncover whatever information he could 
about any other texts which might be forthcoming.  Receveur entered into negotiations 
with the author Pelleport and the publisher David Boissière in the hope of suppressing 
La Naissance du dauphin dévoilée and Les Petits soupers et nuits de l’hôtel de Bouill-n.187  The 
former work accused Marie-Antoinette of infidelity.  The latter was the story of the love 
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lives of the German princess of Bouillon, her family and friends, written in the form of 
a conversation between strangers at the opera.  It targeted the French naval minister, 
the marquis de Castries, as well as a number of other prominent members of the 
aristocracy.  Pelleport and Boissière refused to accept the suppression fees suggested by 
Receveur and as negotiations dragged on, Pelleport threatened two further libelles: Les 
Passe-tems d’Antoinette was another work which maligned the French Queen whilst Les 
Amours et aventures du vizir Vergennes targeted the foreign minister.  At the same time as 
Receveur was bargaining with Pelleport and Boissière, the French diplomatic team were 
lobbying the British government in the hope of prompting legal reform of the country’s 
libel laws.  Both of these efforts ultimately failed.  Receveur returned to France in June 
having been unable to convince Pelleport and Boissière to agree put a stop attacking the 
French monarchy and ministry in print.  It was not until 1792 that the British 
Parliament tightened the laws on defamatory writings with The Libel Act.  Receveur 
was able to gain some ground, however, as the libelles against Marie-Antoinette and 
Vergennes which Pelleport had threatened never made it to market. 
 
12 June 1783 and its Aftermath 
 
Following Receveur’s return to France in June 1783, the French government changed 
tack in an attempt to wrestle back control over extra-territorial print.  On 12 June 1783, 
Vergennes sent a command to the ferme générale, the body in charge of customs and tax 
collections.  Vergennes ordered that all books imported into France were to be sent 
immediately to Paris for inspection before going onto their final destinations.  This 
measure had the potential to severely disrupt the normal trading practices of foreign 




Complying with this edict necessitated new transport arrangements and resulted 
in long delays, both of which were costly.  In usual circumstances, it was the provincial 
traders within France who paid the importation costs when they did business with 
foreign publishers.  From June 1783 the additional costs of transporting books to and 
from Paris fell upon provincial booksellers, making cross-border trade an expensive 
exercise.  The order of 12 June 1783 did not stop clandestine publishing and 
bookselling entirely but a more centralised system of inspection made it much more 
difficult to smuggle contentious texts past the French authorities.  Crates of books now 
circumvented provincial officials who, being further away from the French centre of 
power, tended to be less efficient and more open to bribes.  From 12 June 1783, every 
imported book was to be inspected by officers of the chambre syndicale in Paris.  The 
long-established dominance of the Parisian book trade guild meant that these officers 
were generally hostile to booksellers in the provinces.  Members of the chambre syndicale 
in Paris had no incentive to protect their provincial competitors.  This measure also 
impacted upon the book trade in Paris.  Typically, illicit books destined for Paris were 
sent to a nearby village and then smuggled into the French capital in stages.  Vergennes 
had ordered that all texts were now to be sent to Paris in the first instance.  Burrows 
and Darnton have both stressed the importance of this decree, but there is still more to 
be said about its implementation and implications.188    
The decree passed on 12 June 1783 was notable for being Vergennes’ personal 
decision.  Vergennes’ edict constituted an independent judgement made by a minister at 
the height of his powers which did not go through the formal channels of the direction de 
la librairie.  Across the early 1780s Vergennes amassed more and more power.  
Following the death of Louis XVI’s chief advisor, the comte de Maurepas, in 
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November 1781, Vergennes’ strength reached a peak.  He informally took over 
Maurepas’ role as first minister and had responsibility for financial as well as for foreign 
affairs.189  The order passed on 12 June 1783 related to the internal administration of the 
French book trade as much as it did to extra-territorial print.  Vergennes was able 
extend his dominance beyond the sphere of foreign affairs at this juncture in an effort 
to try and keep the print trade under his control.       
As a conservative individual, Vergennes was disturbed by the trade in libelle 
literature.  But more importantly, he worried about how tales of monarchical and elite 
decadence, debauchery and despotism would affect French readers.  As we have seen, 
the foreign ministry concentrated on trying to prevent the publication and spread of 
libelles across the final decades of the ancien régime.  From 1782 to 1784 Vergennes was 
also lobbying the British government to prohibit the publication of libelles by act of 
Parliament in the place where the libelle trade was at its worst.190  The lack of progress 
made in these negotiations played its part in convincing Vergennes to take matters into 
his own hands.  The decision taken by the French foreign minister in June 1783 can 
thus be read as a proactive attempt to strengthen the foreign ministry’s long-term policy 
of targeting and suppressing libelles as they appeared across the continent. 
  Vergennes certainly detested libelles but the decision he took in the summer of 
1783 had serious implications which went far beyond controlling the content of texts 
which were imported into France.  It is clear that the period from late 1781 to mid 1783 
was a time of crisis for the foreign ministry as it struggled to maintain influence over the 
arena of extra-territorial print.  Vergennes and his team battled to curb the 
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dissemination of a string of offensive works which appeared on the scene in these years.  
The texts which troubled the foreign ministry were largely libelles which slandered 
political figures and members of the royal family but politically charged works like 
Supplément à l’espion anglois or Des Lettres de cachet et des prisons d’état could also cause 
consternation.  Extra-territorial control was contested by government officials 
becoming double agents, by libellistes trying to blackmail the French state and by 
obstructive foreign authorities resisting French demands.  Dealing with this series of 
complex and protracted affairs was exhausting and by 1783 Vergennes had become 
convinced that something had to change.  As Burrows has pointed out, Receveur’s 
return to France in May 1783 following his failed mission to suppress libelles in London 
probably constituted the immediate trigger for a change in policy.191  Vergennes 
suggested as much in a letter to Lenoir in June 1783.192  However, as the preceding 
discussion has illustrated, it was a wider and sustained barrage of material from across 
Europe which really compelled Vergennes to set out in a new direction.   
The data collected in the course of this thesis supports the idea that there was 
an escalation of the problem of extra-territorial print during the early 1780s.  This is 
made clear in Figure 7. 
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 Figure 7: Frequency of Official Responses to the Extra-Territorial Print Trade 
(Books and Pamphlets) by Year, 1770-1789 
 
 
The French government’s involvement in the policing of literature began to 
intensify in 1781, reached a peak in 1782 and remained high in 1783.  This graph does 
not tell us everything.  The events that occurred from 1781 to 1783 were major affairs 
spanning several months and involving titles which the French government found 
intolerable.  Taking the STN as an example of a sizeable extra-territorial book trader, 
sales data indicates that its trade was at a peak in the years 1781 to 1782.193  There is also 
evidence that Vergennes appreciated how it was becoming increasingly difficult to 
manage the extra-territorial book trade.  After the French government secured the arrest 
of Nouffer in January 1782 Vergennes despaired that offences relating to the book trade 
were becoming more and more common in Geneva.194  In August 1781, the French 
state had tried to keep the extra-territorial book trade in check by restating the 
importance of following existing regulations relating to the inspection of imported 
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material.  The challenging circumstances that the foreign ministry found itself in 
subsequent to these reforms make it clear that this approach did not work.  The current 
measures for internal inspections were inadequate and the structures of external policing 
were strained.   
The French government remained concerned about the same kinds of books, 
but in the early 1780s the extent of this literature began to become overwhelming.  As 
such, it made sense to initiate a radical transformation of the manner in which books 
were imported into France.  The inspiration for this reform may have come from 
Néville, the directeur de la librairie.  In a memorandum on the book trade in Versailles 
written in February 1783, Néville postulated a number of ways in which the French 
state might be able to impose some form of control.195  One of the tactics Néville 
suggested was making sure that all books were inspected in Paris before they made they 
entered Versailles.   
Vergennes complemented his order of 12 June 1783 by encouraging his 
colleagues to pay closer attention to the illicit print trade.  Vergennes asked Lenoir to 
watch closely over hawkers in Paris and to punish them severely if they were found to 
be selling books which seemed to be objectionable.196  Claude-Jean Rigoley, baron 
d’Ogny, the intendant général des postes, was also told to halt the circulation of any 
suspicious looking packages of books that were found to be circulating through the 
postal system.  Across late 1783 and early 1784 Vergennes also considered striking 
another blow at the extra-territorial print trade by re-introducing the tax on imported 
books which had been rescinded in April 1775.197  The French government also mooted 
the possibility of formally reiterating the regulations on the inspection of imported 
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books, as it had already done in August 1781.198  The moves made by Vergennes in 1783 
were an attempt to move beyond reactive policing and were accompanied by other 
proposals which might strengthen French dominance.  The French foreign minister 
initiated a strategic shift to try to subdue an illicit book trade which seemed to be 
spiralling out of control.  Foreign publications were challenging the usual structures of 
external policing so Vergennes changed his focus to internal mechanisms for regulating 
the printed word.    
Some contemporaries suspected that motives of economic protectionism were 
also at work here.  In a letter to the STN, the author Louis-Sébastien Mercier 
mentioned the decree of June 1783, claiming that 'le prétexte, c’est le cours des libelles; 
le but c’est l’argent'.199  Scholarship by Birn, Rigogne and Roche amongst others has 
made it clear that censorship in eighteenth-century France was influenced by economic 
as well as by ideological considerations.200  French officials had a responsibility to 
stimulate French trade and industry and the publishing business was no exception.  
Foreign publishers and booksellers who sold books to French clients generated profits 
at the expense of traders within France.  In 1783, the task of buttressing French trade 
and industry took on a particular significance as the French economy was suffering 
from the huge debts incurred in the course of the American War of Independence.  
During his time in power Vergennes’ understanding of finance also developed and he 
became more concerned with France’s economic issues.  In 1780 he was charged with 
the administration of a number of provinces and his jurisdiction included the big 
mercantile towns of Marseilles, Rouen and Lyon.  The latter two towns were both 
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centres of publishing and book-selling.201  Later, in February 1783 Vergennes tried to 
implement a new approach to economic management through the coordination of a 
cross-departmental budget overseen by a committee which he headed.   
Vergennes’ engagement with the economic sphere was a clear component of his 
decision to tighten the system of inspection for books imported into France.  The order 
of 12 June 1783 undercut the extra-territorial book trade and worked to the benefit of 
booksellers and publishers in Paris who could be closely supervised by the state. There 
is the possibility that Parisian booksellers put pressure on the French state to enact and 
then to uphold this order.  The monopoly of traders working in the French capital had 
been damaged by the reforms implemented in August 1777 which were designed to give 
a boost to provincial booksellers.  Parisian traders thus welcomed 12 June 1783 and the 
havoc it wreaked in the provinces.   
However, it is important to recognise that protectionist motives were very much 
of secondary significance for Vergennes in 1783.  Thanks to a deluge of provincial 
protests which flooded into central government, French officials quickly realised how 
far the decree of 12 June 1783 severely damaged the provincial trade.  Jean-André 
Périsse-Duluc was a bookseller and publisher who was also a syndic at the chambre 
syndicale in Lyon.  He fiercely objected to Vergennes’ edict, asserting that the order was 
equivalent to ‘une prohibition totale de la librairie étrangère’.202  Provincial booksellers 
depended on their dealings with foreign book dealers and most could not afford the 
extra costs of sending all their imported titles to Paris and back.  Since French 
booksellers regularly conducted their trade on the basis of exchanging copies, 
Vergennes’ edict damaged French exports too.  French officials paid little heed to 
complaints from the provinces and stressed that the security of the French state, its 
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religion and its moral values should not be sacrificed to mercantile interests.203  This 
judgement also shows that the French authorities were keen to make clear their 
opposition to any assault on religious orthodoxy, even if texts which challenged 
Catholicism were seldom pursued abroad.   
Vergennes did try to avoid making the situation worse.  Although he considered 
introducing a tax on imported books, he never implemented this for fear of damaging 
the provincial trade still further.  D’Ogny also contemplated the introduction of a 
system of state-employed wagon drivers who could be trusted to deliver books without 
succumbing to corruption.  This idea was also rejected because it would have been too 
expensive for most booksellers to afford.204  The edict of 12 June 1783 furthered the 
dominance of Parisian traders who, being close to the French centre of power, tended 
to be less engaged in illicit trading than their provincial counterparts.  Yet the benefits 
of boosting the trade in Paris could not compensate for the damage done to provincial 
bookselling.  Vergennes’ command of June 1783 had negative consequences for the 
French economy but he remained determined that it should stay in place.  Preventing 
the circulation of illicit titles was clearly considered more important than boosting 
provincial trade at this juncture.   
The decree of 12 June 1783 evidently marked a major change in policy.  But 
regulations in eighteenth-century France did not always translate into reality, especially 
when it came to the matter of censorship.  It was once assumed that, like much of the 
French government’s rulings on the book trade, the efficacy of Vergennes’ 
pronouncement was limited.205  It is fair to say that extending control over the 
importation of every single crate of books may have been an unattainable aim for a 
huge state in the eighteenth century.  Robert Dawson recently re-emphasised that book 
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traders could find ways to circumvent this particular edict.206  Booksellers either made a 
special request to receive their books directly (these requests were often granted) or just 
did so illegally without formal approval.  In a memorandum of protest which was sent 
to the French government, presumably to Néville, the directeur de la librairie, the Lyonnais 
bookseller Périsse-Duluc outlined eleven ways that books could still be smuggled into 
and around France in spite of the edict of 12 June.207  However, at this point Périsse-
Duluc was trying to convince the French government to rescind this decree and so it 
was in his interests to claim that it simply was not working.  There are examples of 
traders who were able to do business without adhering to the edict of 12 June 1783.  
For example, in June 1784 a bookseller from Liège complained to the French 
government after a bundle of his books which were destined for Turin had been 
stopped at customs in France and forwarded onto Paris.  This execution of Vergennes’ 
order came as a surprise to the trader from Liège, who had previously dispatched 
several crates through France without running into any problems.208 
The ruling of 12 June 1783 may not have been enforced in every instance but 
there is evidence that it did indeed take effect.  It fundamentally undermined the French 
book trade rather than merely pushing it further underground.  Burrows and Darnton 
have both argued that this change in the law did major damage to the trade of extra-
territorial publishers who relied upon their trade with French provincial booksellers.209  
The impact of the decree was immediate.  Protests from booksellers in Lille were sent 
to the French government as early as 25 June.210   
Evidence of the effects of the decree of 12 June 1783 has been one of the major 
outcomes of The French Book Trade in Enlightenment Europe Database, 1769-1794 project.  
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Data gathered from the STN records indicates that the firm’s trade with provincial 
France fell dramatically in the aftermath of Vergennes’ decree.  After 12 June 1783 the 
STN’s trade with France began to slow but more strikingly, its trade with Geneva fell.211  
By the beginning of January 1784 hardly anything was being sent to Geneva.  Such a 
marked fall implies the closure of the French market since the STN typically supplied 
French readers in collaboration with Genevan traders.  Vergennes’ order also seems to 
have been upheld for at least three years following its implementation.  According to 
information from the database, the STN sent only 2,500 books to towns in western 
France during the years 1785-1786 and sent almost nothing to the rest of provincial 
France in this period.212  It is important to recognise that there were other reasons for 
the decline of the STN’s trade in the mid-to-late 1780s.  The firm was suffering from 
doing business with traders who refused to pay their costs.  By August 1785 the STN 
had accumulated a deficit of 75,000 livres which exacerbated any damage which had 
been done by the edict of 12 June 1783.213   
However, it can also be argued that the STN was not the only Francophone 
book business which was hit hard by Vergennes’ pronouncement.  A similar decline in 
trade can also be discerned in the output of Samuel Fauche’s publishing business in 
Neuchâtel, as well as in the publishing records of presses based in Lausanne.214  Outside 
the Swiss states, Raymond Birn has also noted that the once lively business of the Société 
typographique de Bouillon dropped off in the mid 1780s, with only around twenty books 
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being published between 1784 and 1793.215  Whilst other legislation may have fallen by 
the wayside, been reinterpreted, built upon or even ignored by those in positions of 
authority, Vergennes’ directive seems to have taken effect.  Vergennes changed the way 
in which the government approached the extra-territorial print trade and this shift 
played a major role in putting the French state back in control.  The successful 
implementation of the decree of 12 June 1783 shows that the French state had the 
power to bring the print trade into line as long as it could find the right strategy to do 
so.    
Dawson argues that the impact of this decree was only short term by pointing to its 
partial revocation on 23 November 1785.  Yet this later order only freed up the passage of 
books passing through France en route to another destination.216  Vergennes’ directive still 
applied to books destined for French readers.  One factor that might have undermined this 
decree relates to Vergennes himself.  In November 1783, the foreign minister was 
discredited in the eyes of Louis XVI after d’Ormesson, the contrôleur-général, accused 
Vergennes of trying to exploit his office for personal profit.217  Vergennes’ comité des finances 
crumbled and he could no longer enjoy the prestige of being Louis XVI’s de facto first 
minister.  But we must be careful of overstating Vergennes’ fall from grace.  The foreign 
minister retained enough authority to keep his command of 12 June in place.  Moreover, his 
position had begun to stabilise again by 1785 when he started to regain the trust of the 
King.  Internal government memoranda indicate that Vergennes had to battle hostile voices 
who doubted the wisdom of reforming the system for inspecting imported books.  There 
was criticism that this authoritarian restructuring could never be totally effective.218  
Vergennes was able to quieten this opposition and even facilitate the exploration of other 
avenues which might restrict the passage of books into France.  For example, in June 1786 
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Vergennes asked d’Hémery, the former inspector of the book trade, for his thoughts on 
how the regime could prevent postal couriers from introducing banned books into the 
French kingdom.219  Vergennes fell out of favour in November 1783 but his weakened 
position was only short-term.  Even without being the predominant minister in government 
Vergennes was able to ensure that the French state stayed committed to the changes he had 
instigated in June 1783.   
The command issued on 12 June 1783 was the major element of a wider policy 
change which was implemented in the same year.  With the American War of 
Independence coming to its conclusion, some of the pressure lifted from Vergennes.  
After enduring several years of contending with the extra-territorial print trade, 
Vergennes was now able to take stock and re-evaluate his approach to the external 
policing of print.  Burrows has claimed that from 1783 onwards the French government 
began to spurn the demands of the London libellistes working in London by refusing to 
pay to suppress their offensive titles.220  Paying off writers who threatened to publish 
defamatory texts just encouraged other authors to seek the same kind of compensation.  
In 1783 Vergennes decided to stop pandering to the libellistes’ demands.  This was part 
of a broader decision to try to avoid as far as possible becoming engaged with the 
offensive elements in the foreign print trade as far as was possible.  The foreign minister 
did not explicitly inform his diplomatic correspondents of this shift in attitude nor did 
he refer to the edict of 12 June 1783.  Yet there is plenty of evidence of Vergennes’ new 
approach to policing print in the extra-territorial arena.  A government memorandum 
from 1783 confirms that French officials did feel that scorning illicit texts might be 
more effective than trying to implement authoritarian measures to control the 
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dissemination of literature.221  The memoirs of the lieutenant général Lenoir also indicate 
that the French government resolved to stop worrying about illicit texts in 1783 and 
claim that this new policy was successful.222   
The wider European picture suggests that this posture of indifference was 
extended beyond the libellistes who hoped to blackmail the French government.  From 
mid 1783 onwards Vergennes decided that, as far as was possible, contempt should be 
shown for illicit literature.  He advised ignoring most of the foreign print trade and 
would only support action to suppress what he considered to be the most extreme titles.  
The French government’s strategy of policing was now focused even more tightly.  
Vergennes was confident enough to do this because he had effectively transformed the 
French foreign ministry’s approach to print in June 1783.  Controlling the book trade 
internally was proving fruitful so Vergennes felt able to scorn the threat of further 
literature coming from abroad.  This shift in approach was at least partly inspired by the 
stance of the comte d’Adhémar, French ambassador in London.  Having been forced to 
deal with a succession of proposed and printed libelles, d’Adhémar was adamant that the 
government’s current methods were not working.  He advised Vergennes that the 
foreign ministry would be in a stronger position if it simply ignored the demands of the 
libellistes and the appearance of any libelles.223  This idea had support from other sources 
besides d’Adhémar.  For example, the chevalier de Jaucourt’s article on libelles in the 
Encyclopédie pointed out that all attempts to control this kind of literature had been 
unsuccessful and urged that ‘Les honnêtes gens embrassent le parti de la vertu, & 
punissent la calomnie par le mépris’.224  This transformed attitude complemented 
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Vergennes’ attempt to gain control over the extra-territorial print trade in June 1783.  
By narrowing its focus even further, the foreign ministry made the job of watching over 
and managing the extra-territorial print trade easier to handle.   
It must be recognised that the idea of scorning the threat of illicit literature was 
not an entirely new one in 1783.  The French foreign ministry had experimented with 
this strategy before.  As Burrows has outlined, the state stood firm against Linguet’s 
threats to publish a work slandering d’Aiguillon in 1777.225  In April 1780 French 
officials refused to negotiate with Godeville when she attempted to secure a pay-off for 
a libelle attacking the duc de Richelieu.226  As discussed in Chapter 2, there were also a 
few cases where the French foreign minister disagreed with his diplomats’ assessment of 
a text and instead decided that it could be ignored.227  In the course of their 
correspondence in September 1775, Louis XVI and Vergennes agreed that libelles should 
be scorned.  Louis XVI even foreshadowed Vergennes’ change of approach in 1783 by 
suggesting that the regime should concentrate on preventing the dissemination of these 
texts within France.228  These examples show that the French government had begun to 
question the efficacy of vigorously pursuing what it considered to be the most 
reprehensible texts.  These doubts were confirmed in the early 1780s when the French 
government repeatedly struggled to suppress offensive material across several regions of 
Europe.  This situation made it clear to Vergennes that something had to change.    
The French government continued to be challenged by extra-territorial authors 
and publishers but did its best to pay less attention to such transgressions.  By August 
1783, French officials had lost heart in their pursuit of Les Petits soupers et nuits de l’hôtel de 
Bouill-n, a work which Receveur was sent to suppress when it initially appeared in 
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London.  The Parisian publisher Panckoucke alerted Lenoir to a new edition which was 
being published in Brussels.  The foreign ministry also found information to suggest 
that La Gazette noire, another work which was probably composed by Pelleport, and 
Linguet’s Mémoires sur la Bastille were both being printed in Holland.229  Lenoir displayed 
little anxiety about the latter two works and advised Vergennes that it was best to ignore 
the publication of Les Petits soupers.230  The police chief had adopted the new 
governmental mindset which refused to take libelles seriously.  Lenoir even managed to 
convince the French naval minister, Charles Eugène Gabriel de La Croix, marquis de 
Castries, to pour scorn on Les Petits soupers despite the fact that it denigrated him 
personally.  However, it was probably the case that Lenoir was also influenced by 
Panckoucke’s assessment that it was already too late to stop the spread of this work.231  
Again, Vergennes followed Lenoir’s advice and did nothing.  Even when Bérenger, the 
chargé d’affaires in The Hague, claimed that two printers called Benet and Hack were 
likely to have printed the La Gazette noire in Rotterdam, Vergennes declined to seek any 
form of punishment for these men.232 
Vergennes’ new attitude was made plain again in January 1784.  Laurent 
Joachim Xavier Bernier de Maligny, chargé d’affaires in Geneva, sent Vergennes a few 
copies of a pamphlet entitled Histoire de la procedure, which was circulating there.233  The 
subject matter of this work is not clear since copies do not seem to have survived.  It 
can be assumed from the title at least that the text dealt with judicial processes within 
France and it may have discussed conflict between crown and parlement.  Maligny 
explained that regional officials were taking taking steps to prevent printers from 
producing this work.  Vergennes did not appear to be alarmed and replied that the work 
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was ‘si manifestement contraire à tous les principes de la raison et du droit qu’il ne peut 
faire impression’.234  The foreign minister reported that the work had probably been 
printed in London and stated that this indicated to him that publishers in Geneva were 
becoming less involved with controversial and offensive material.  To Vergennes it 
seemed like one of the major extra-territorial centres for illicit printing was in decline; 
his new strategy was paying off. 
Vergennes was still scorning the threats of libelles as late as July 1786.  Charles-
Olivier de Saint-Georges, marquis de Vérac, the ambassadeur in The Hague, sent 
Vergennes a copy of a pamphlet.235  Vérac referred to this as Lettre du chevalier de *** à un 
anglois.  The authorities in Holland had just arrested a French man known as Chesneau 
de La Tour for defaming Dutch political figures.  Upon his arrest, La Tour was searched 
and several copies of this pamphlet were found upon his person.  Vérac asked 
Vergennes for guidance as to how La Tour should be treated.236  The diplomat asserted 
that the French government should do something to stop La Tour since he was likely to 
reoffend but Vergennes did not heed this warning. Presumably after consulting with his 
cousin Louis Thiroux de Crosne, who took over from Lenoir as lieutenant général in July 
1785, Vergennes declared that no copies of this pamphlet had been found in Paris.  
Although some Parisian booksellers were advertising the work to their customers, it had 
not yet reached the French capital.  As such, Vergennes concluded, there was no need 
to seek punishment for La Tour.  The foreign minister asked Vérac to keep him 
informed but was happy to let the Dutch authorities deal with La Tour as they saw fit.237  
This decision seems to have had the desired effect since copies of La Tour’s libelle did 
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not make it to market.238  Later, in December 1786, when La Tour was released from 
prison in Holland, Vérac became anxious that he was preparing to publish new libelles.239  
Vergennes told Vérac explicitly that he should not be concerned about La Tour since 
there was no news in Paris of the libelles that he was supposedly about to publish.240   
From 1783 onwards French officials tried to turn a blind eye to illicit texts 
which were published abroad to be sent into France.  Yet the state remained prepared 
to take measures against works which it saw as being completely unacceptable and the 
French government’s reaction to the publication of Le Diable dans un bénitier in October 
1783 shows that official strategy had shifted only up to a point.241  This was another text 
emanating from Pelleport which this time went into detail about the foreign ministry’s 
extraordinary efforts to police print abroad.  It was a thinly veiled account of Receveur’s 
1783 mission to London.242  Instead of negotiating with Pelleport or sending agents 
over to arrest him, Vergennes orchestrated a plan to lure him to Boulogne in July 
1784.243  Once in Boulogne, Pelleport was arrested with ease and was taken to the 
Bastille.  He remained imprisoned until October 1788.  The French government 
changed the manner in which it dealt with Pelleport but remained determined to secure 
the capture of a notorious libelliste who had long been writing offensive material.   
Continuing concerns over material which attacked royalty can certainly be seen 
in 1783 and beyond.  At the beginning of August 1783, the abbé Duvernet wrote to the 
French government offering his services.  Like Cahaisse in 1782, Duvernet proposed to 
help Lenoir track down the authors and printers of slanderous texts which were about 
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to be published, this time in Brussels.244  Lenoir and Vergennes were already well 
acquainted with Duvernet because he had been arrested in 1781 for his role in Jacquet’s 
network of libellistes.  The writer had just left the Bastille a month earlier in July 1783.245  
Duvernet’s offer was ignored and Vergennes declined to issue any orders for the 
diplomats in Brussels to hunt libelles.  Lenoir resolved to be vigilant against any texts 
from Duvernet which might make it into the market in Paris but this was the only 
measure that was taken.246   
Lenoir did, however, express apprehension about Duvernet when he learnt that 
the author might have written a pamphlet about the French Queen, entitled Les Soirées 
d’Antoinette.  Garnier, the chargé d’affaires in Brussels confirmed that Duvernet and his 
associates (including Jean-Baptiste Imbert de Villebon who had worked with Duvernet 
before in 1781, when they had both written libelles for Jacquet) had been trying to get 
the work published in Brussels.247  At first, Garnier believed that the text had not been 
published, but this view changed when he heard from someone who had been able to 
obtain a copy.  Garnier promised Vergennes that he would try to locate any copies of 
Les Soirées d’Antoinette and added that the authorities in Brussels had put Duvernet under 
surveillance.  Vergennes, however, declined to authorise any measures against Duvernet.  
Even though Duvernet had written a work which maligned Marie-Antoinette, 
Vergennes judged that, with only a few copies in circulation, the work did not pose 
enough of a threat to warrant further action.  This course of action contrasted starkly 
with Vergennes’ decision in 1782 to chase Cahaisse and the Malarmes across several 
                                                          
244 Paris, AMAE, CP Pays-Bas Espagnols et Autrichiens 173, fols. 278-79, Duvernet to 
Vergennes, 4 August 1783. 
245 Funck-Brentano, Les Lettres de cachet, pp. 409-10.   
246 Paris, AMAE, CP Pays-Bas Espagnols et Autrichiens 173, fol. 282, Lenoir to Vergennes, 13 
August 1783. 
247 Paris, AMAE, CP Pays-Bas Espagnols et Autrichiens 173, fol. 304, Garnier to Vergennes, 30 




states when they were suspected of being guilty of composing libelles against Delzenne 
and the comte d’Artois.   
Duvernet resurfaced in the diplomatic correspondence early in 1785.  The 
authorities in Brussels had arrested him after copies of texts slandering local officials 
were found at his residence.248  Louis Joseph Hirsinger, the chargé d’affaires in Brussels, 
added that copies of Les Soirées d’Antoinette and another work called Le Singe de 40 ans 
had also been uncovered there.  Vergennes asked Hirsinger to continue to report back 
on this affair but stressed that the French government should not become involved.249  
The French authorities had compelling evidence that Duvernet had authored a 
scandalous pamphlet about Marie-Antoinette but Vergennes decided that, with only a 
few copies in existence, the text was not worth chasing.  The threat posed by Duvernet 
was lessened still further in February 1785 when he was arrested and imprisoned by the 
authorities in Brussels.   
In 1781 the French state had jailed Duvernet, along with several other libellistes 
who cooperated with Jacquet.  In August 1783 and February 1785 the foreign ministry 
viewed Duvernet in a new light.  Even though he had written works maligning the 
French Queen, it was better to starve him of the oxygen of publicity than become 
embroiled in the difficult task of punishing him and halting the dissemination of any 
libelles he had composed.  However, it is important to stress here another reason why 
Vergennes was able to tolerate authors like Duvernet.  The authorities in Geneva and 
Holland complemented French efforts to police print by arresting Duvernet and La 
Tour.  The French foreign minister might have been more uneasy about these men if 
they were roaming free outside France.   
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Vergennes departed from his decision to adopt a scornful standpoint however, 
when it came to the affair of the diamond necklace.250  The cardinal de Rohan was 
Bishop of Strasbourg but spent most of his time mingling with courtiers in Paris and 
Versailles.  On 15 August 1785, Rohan was arrested on suspicion of fraudulently 
purchasing an extremely expensive diamond necklace in Marie-Antoinette’s name.  As 
the story went, Rohan had been convinced by Jeanne de Saint-Rémy, comtesse de La 
Motte, an adventuress who probably became his lover, that the Queen wanted him to 
purchase this necklace on her behalf.  The comtesse de La Motte told Rohan that 
Marie-Antoinette very much desired the necklace but felt it improper to be seen to be 
buying something so extravagant in times of financial uncertainty.  La Motte gained 
Rohan’s confidence by sending him affectionate letters in Marie-Antoinette’s name.  
More dramatically, the comtesse also arranged a brief, late-night rendezvous in the 
gardens of Versailles between Rohan and a prostitute who impersonated the French 
Queen.  Won over by this supposed display of intimacy, Rohan negotiated with the 
Paris jewellers to pay for the necklace in instalments and handed over the precious item 
to La Motte.  La Motte and her husband broke the necklace into pieces and the 
husband departed France in the hope of selling the stones abroad. 
Rohan’s arrest in 1785 brought this sensational tale out into the open.  The 
affair also had important political consequences as ministers and courtiers took the side 
of either Rohan or the Queen.251  In 1786 Rohan, the comtesse de La Motte and some 
of her associates were tried in the parlement of Paris.  In May the parlement declared that 
the cardinal had been duped by the husband and wife team.  Rohan was formally 
acquitted and the comtesse de La Motte was condemned to Salpêtrière, a prison for 
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wayward women in Paris.  The details of the scandal were made public in the 
defendants’ judicial briefs which were printed and circulated in their thousands.    
Vergennes, as a close personal friend of Rohan, was dismayed to see his ally’s 
name denigrated during this affair.  The foreign minister deviated from his new policy 
of ignoring literature which he found to be distasteful and threw himself into the tricky 
task of managing the spread of news relating to the case of the diamond necklace.  He 
used his diplomatic network to chase the key players who had fled abroad in the hope 
that they would give evidence at the trial which indicated Rohan’s innocence.252  In 
November 1785, the comte de La Motte turned up in Amsterdam trying to persuade 
jewellers there to buy the stolen diamonds from him.  Vergennes instructed Vérac, 
French ambassadeur in The Hague, to ask the authorities there to arrest La Motte and his 
servant and to seize their papers and money.253  La Motte managed to evade capture in 
Amsterdam and moved on to Britain where Vergennes continued to chase him.  The 
foreign minister engineered an elaborate plan to kidnap La Motte at South Shields in the 
spring of 1786, but the comte was forewarned and was able to escape once again.254   
Burrows has uncovered evidence that Vergennes may have tried to sabotage this 
abduction attempt after becoming concerned that the comte de La Motte might actually 
implicate Rohan if he returned to France.255 Although the foreign minister had tried to 
secure the capture of La Motte in Amsterdam, Vergennes’ perception of what the 
comte would say must have shifted by the time he arrived in Britain.  Indeed, it was the 
comte d’Adhémar, ambassadeur in London, who expended most energy trying to get the 
comte de La Motte back to France.  D’Adhémar was a close ally of Marie-Antoinette 
and believed that testimony from the comte de La Motte would underline that she had 
had no part in the affair.  Vergennes also organised the arrest and extradition of Marc-
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Antoine Rétaux de la Villette, a former gendarme who had become associated with the La 
Mottes and fled to Geneva when the diamond necklace affair became public.  In March 
1786, at around the same time as the plot to kidnap the comte de La Motte, Vergennes 
leaned on the authorities in Geneva to arrest and interrogate Rétaux.  When a report 
from an official in Geneva indicated that Rétaux possessed information on the La 
Mottes which could absolve Rohan, Vergennes arranged for the police officer Quidor 
to be sent to arrest him and bring him back to France.256   
Vergennes’ efforts to arrest – or, in the case of the comte de La Motte, prevent 
the arrest - of those involved in the affair of the diamond necklace demonstrates his 
resolve to manage the way in which this scandal was perceived.   It is doubtful that 
Vergennes explicitly wished to implicate Marie-Antoinette.  After all, he had spent his 
time in the foreign office chasing any works which maligned her.  However, Vergennes 
was determined to protect his friend Rohan and this desire clashed with the foreign 
minister’s duty to protect the Queen.  In order to defend himself, Rohan claimed that 
he genuinely believed that he had met secretly with Marie-Antoinette during a night at 
Versailles.  The idea that Marie-Antoinette would take part in such a meeting with a 
notoriously libidinous cardinal was a major slight on her character.  In trying to support 
Rohan, Vergennes could not help but undermine the Queen.   
The manner in which Vergennes attempted to bolster Rohan’s cause is 
especially striking considering the evidence that the cardinal was, in fact, guilty.  
Correspondence between Vergennes and Louis XVI indicates that Rohan actually 
confessed to forging Marie-Antoinette’s signature to obtain the diamonds as a means of 
relieving his mounting debts.257  Other incriminating evidence may have been lost when 
Rohan destroyed his private papers upon his entry to the Bastille.  In the course of his 
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interrogation in Geneva, Rétaux admitted that he was well acquainted with the La 
Mottes but did not admit to forging Marie-Antoinette’s signature.258  Vergennes may 
well have seen the opportunity to make Rétaux take the blame for Rohan’s colossal 
mistake.  The foreign minister succeeded in his attempts to stage-manage the way this 
affair was perceived within France.  Rohan was cleared of any guilt by the parlement of 
Paris.  This affair underlines that Vergennes was far from totally disinterested in the 
extra-territorial arena, even though he tried to present himself in that manner.  On this 
occasion Vergennes was largely influenced by his personal attachment to the person 
under attack and he sought to protect his ally in the way that his predecessor d’Aiguillon 
had done regularly in less extraordinary circumstances.  Vergennes’ defence of Rohan is 
all the more remarkable as it showed him to be breaking away somewhat from his new 
strategy of disregarding the printed word.  The foreign minister was determined to 
manipulate the information that was available about the affair of the diamond necklace.   
Vergennes was not, however, prepared to deviate from his policy of standing 
firm against any attempts at blackmail.  From 1786 onwards, the La Mottes repeatedly 
threatened to publish an exposé of the diamond necklace affair.259   The foreign ministry 
did not take these threats seriously and they were simply ignored.  This posture of 
indifference worked and the La Mottes’ account of the scandal was not published until 
February 1789.  Vergennes’ control of the extra-territorial arena was clearly assured here 
but his actions may have done more harm than good.  Exonerating Rohan of all guilt 
necessarily implicated Marie-Antoinette.  It seems fair to suggest that Vergennes would 
have been well aware of the wider implications of defending Rohan since he had always 
directed his diplomatic team to concentrate their attention on works which maligned 
members of the royal family.  However, the damage done by the affair of the diamond 
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necklace should not be overstated since most of the pamphlets which appeared in 1785 
and 1786 discussing the case did not assert or imply that Marie-Antoinette had been 
involved.260  Nevertheless, Vergennes overlooked the possibility of his friend’s guilt and 
the wider implications of asserting his innocence.  The foreign minister used his 
diplomatic network to ensure that a certain view of the diamond necklace affair 
prevailed.    
During this affair Vergennes showed himself to be very much in control in the 
extra-territorial sphere.  However, the assured position of the foreign ministry began to 
crumble in the final years of the old regime.  The main explanation for this change 
relates to the growing economic and political tensions of the pre-revolutionary crisis.  
By late 1786 the French state was becoming increasingly weighed down by the debts it 
had incurred in the course of the American War of Independence.261  With the parlements 
hostile to plans for financial restructuring, the government turned to another 
consultative body in the hope of legitimising its reform proposals.  The Assembly of 
Notables was convoked in December 1786 but was fundamentally mishandled by a 
succession of finance ministers.  The noblemen who sat in the Assembly of Notables 
were already predisposed to contest the government’s attempt to rescind some their 
financial privileges and tax exemptions in order to boost reserves.  The French 
government was now in a tricky position.  The state needed some form of approval for 
its financial reform plans to shore up financial confidence but the Assembly of Notables 
was decidedly unsympathetic.  The Assembly of Notables itself and a wave of 
contemporary pamphlets called for a meeting of the Estates-General.  The monarchy 
eventually bowed to this pressure and in summer of 1788 declared that the Estates-
General would meet the following May.   
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The pressures of the pre-revolutionary crisis preoccupied the French state and 
meant that managing the extra-territorial print trade became less of a concern.  The pre-
revolutionary years also changed the relationship between the French government and 
the extra-territorial print trade in another way.  This exceptional period of political and 
economic turmoil undermined the appeal of foreign texts.  Events in France were 
progressing rapidly and were being documented by hundreds of politically charged 
pamphlets.262  It is estimated that between 1787 and 1789 around 1,500 to 2,200 
pamphlets were published in France.263  Periodicals and books coming across the 
borders could simply not keep up with the pace of change.  With demand for foreign 
books at a low point, the foreign ministry had less reason to focus attention on policing 
print abroad.   
The pre-revolutionary crisis played the major role in the decline of extra-
territorial policing, but it is also pertinent that Vergennes died in February 1787.  He 
was succeeded by Armand Marc de Saint-Hérem, comte de Montmorin. Vergennes 
became involved in policing the book trade to an extent unprecedented for a foreign 
minister.  It was he who made the move in June 1783 to change the way books were 
imported into France and it was ultimately his decision to complement this measure 
with the policy of scorning literature rather than becoming engaged in long and 
complex campaigns of policing.  Vergennes was still debating the best way to prevent 
the flow of illicit literature in the months before his death.  In January 1787, he declared 
that the government should concentrate on curbing the dissemination of distasteful 
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texts rather than waste energy on repressive measures abroad.264  He clearly believed 
that the policy change he had enacted in 1783 was working.  Montmorin did not display 
the same dedication to his portion of his role.  He simply did not reply to a lot of the 
letters which he received from his diplomatic team and did not reflect upon the best of 
means of controlling print in the same way that Vergennes had done.    
The weakening of the French government’s hold over the extra-territorial print 
trade links into questions surrounding the longevity of Vergennes’ decree of 12 June 
1783.  On the basis of data mined in the course of the creation of The French Book Trade 
in Enlightenment Europe Database, 1769-1794, Curran has suggested that by the end of 
1786 books were starting to pass more freely into France again.265  A letter written by 
Vergennes to d’Ogny, the intendant général des postes, in June 1786 also indicates that crates 
of books were no longer going straight to Paris as a matter of course.266  There is also 
evidence that orders were issued to rescind Vergennes’ decree after his death.  
Correspondence from the direction de la librairie suggests that by May 1787 French 
officials were no longer willing to accept the damage that this order was doing to the 
provincial book trade.267  There were clear economic imperatives to move away from 
the edict of 1783.   
The extreme centralisation of 12 June 1783 meant that it was always difficult to 
implement.  With the state becoming distracted by other problems at the end of the 
1780s, the government put less energy into imposing this edict.  Even if the edict of 12 
June 1783 had fallen somewhat by the wayside by the end of the old regime, its effects 
remain clear.  Vergennes’ decision fundamentally disturbed the extra-territorial print 
trade.  The government’s lack of action in the extra-territorial arena in the mid-to-late 
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1780s seems to suggest a period of relative quiet when the threat of illicit literature was 
lessened.   
The impact of the decree of 12 June 1783 is clear to see in Figure 7.  From 1784 
onwards, the French government’s involvement in the extra-territorial print trade went 
into steady decline until the end of the old regime.  The policing which did occur in the 
period from 1784 to 1789 was also less intense because the texts in question were not 
seen as especially challenging.   Godeville threatened to sell her memoirs again in 1784 
but could not find a willing publisher.  Duvernet was arrested by officials in Brussels 
and was found to have copies of a Marie-Antoinette libelle at his house.  It is unclear 
whether these were manuscript or printed copies.  Les Soirées d’Antoinette was probably 
never published.  It does not appear in the exhaustive surveys of Marie-Antoinette 
material conducted by Burrows and Gruder.268  Crucially for the purposes of this study, 
the foreign ministry did not chase this text abroad.  The French government became 
more detached in its approach to extra-territorial print after 1783, but it remained 
vigilant against texts which it viewed as particular offensive.  It can be argued that in the 
eyes of French officials, the circulation of the Les Soirées d’Antoinette did seem to 
represent a serious threat.  There continued to be rumours and threats of the 
publication of libelles but the French government tried to rise above these rather than 
chase them as it had done in the past.  As Burrows has rightly suggested, this new 
strategy largely worked.269  The next significant libelle was not published until 1789 when 
the comtesse de La Motte published her account of the diamond necklace affair.    
The question of the lasting impact of the decision taken by Vergennes on 12 
June 1783 has wider implications for our understanding of the links between the pre-
revolutionary world of letters and the onset of revolution in France in 1789.  The 
                                                          
268 Burrows, Blackmail, Scandal and Revolution, p. 147-70; Gruder, ‘The Question of Marie-
Antoinette’, pp. 269-98; Vivian R. Gruder, ‘Whither Revisionism?  Political Perspectives on the 
Ancien Régime’, French Historical Studies, 20 (1997), 254-85 (pp. 256-71). 




evidence presented here suggests that the model of an ever-expanding public sphere, 
full to the point of bursting with material hostile to the French government, is too 
simplistic.   The French government was engaged in complex efforts to manage and 
manipulate the trade of foreign printers and the decisions of individual ministers like 
Vergennes could have a tangible impact on the kind of literature which circulated within 
France.  The censorship system within France was arbitrary and confused but the 
French authorities were nevertheless capable of imposing their will on foreign 
publishers.   
The trade of book dealers working outside France was damaged by the French 
Revolution and arguably by the pre-revolutionary crisis, when the French book trade 
began to open up and the public increasingly demanded speedy access to information 
about the latest developments in French politics.  However, it can be argued that the 
decline of the extra-territorial trade began even earlier than this as a result of Vergennes’ 
directive.  The decree of 12 June 1783 seems to have severely damaged the business of 
Francophone traders like the STN and their provincial trading partners within France.  
This decline arguably contributed to the growth of the Parisian trade, which was 
dominated by 36 authorised printer-booksellers.  There were issues which constricted 
the trade in Paris to an extent.  The costs associated with publishing (especially labour) 
were high and the number of printers in the French capital was restricted even though 
the population was growing.270  However, the impact of the decree of 12 June 1783 
allowed and even compelled Parisian publishers to benefit from the slowing down of 
provincial traders who could not cope with increased costs.  A decline in the provincial 
and foreign print trades which benefited those in Paris may therefore have helped to 
pave the foundations for the rapid expansion of print during the French Revolution. 
                                                          




Extra-territorial censorship did continue into the final years of the old regime 
but its extent was much reduced.  On 5 July 1788, the Bourbon monarchy formally 
requested that provincial and municipal officials report back with advice on the form 
that the Estates-General should take.271  Historians have seen this as the symbolic end 
of censorship in France, arguing that this call legitimised and encouraged the intense 
pamphleteering which dominated the pre-revolutionary crisis.272  However, it is 
important to remember that the French state had not totally given up on the idea of 
controlling the printed word.  On 19 March 1789 the government granted permission 
for anyone to report on the proceedings of the Estates-General, but on 3 April and 6 
May of that year it reaffirmed that the existing regulations which governed the book 
trade were still in force.273  Yet this stated resolve to continue to manage access to 
printed matter does not seem to have extended to the trade outside France.  Indeed, 
there was an almost total dearth of external policing during the years 1787 and 1788.  
The French government continued to attempt to manage what was printed in 
Francophone gazettes but it seems that there were only five instances in these years 
when official attention focused on foreign books across these two years (see Appendix 
A for details).  Controlling extra-territorial print had become a secondary concern.       
In 1789, as the Estates-General prepared to meet and political tension was 
reaching fever pitch, the French state did make two efforts to impose its will abroad.  
This was less of a renewed endeavour to police the trade and more of a desperate 
attempt to restrict the circulation of exceptional works.  In January 1789, Montmorin 
wrote to d’Esterno, ministre plénipotentiaire in Berlin, about Mirabeau’s provocative 
published account of his diplomatic mission in Prussia, the Histoire secrète de la cour de 
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Berlin.274  Mirabeau had been critical of Frederick the Great and this was acutely 
embarrassing for the French state.  Montmorin suggested that the text could have been 
published in Switzerland but asked d’Esterno to involve the government in Berlin in 
curbing the circulation of copies which were being sold there.275  This crusade may have 
represented a touch of posturing on the part of the French government.  Montmorin 
believed that Mirabeau’s work had actually been published somewhere in the Swiss 
states but did not pass this information to his diplomats in Solothurn or Geneva.276  The 
foreign minister concentrated his attention on the circulation of the work in Berlin as a 
means of showing Prussia that France opposed what Mirabeau had done.  
The foreign ministry also tried to halt the spread of the Mémoires of the comtesse 
de La Motte, the first edition of which was published in London in February 1789.277  
La Motte had been threatening to publish her account of the diamond necklace affair 
for years in the hope of receiving a pay-off from someone in the French government.  
Having realised that a suppression fee would not be forthcoming, La Motte decided to 
publish her memoirs.  Her account of the diamond necklace affair was a highly 
slanderous one which explicitly stated that Marie-Antoinette had manipulated both 
Rohan and the comtesse through sex.  In June 1789, Poitevin de Maissemy, the directeur 
de la librairie, informed Montmorin that new editions of La Motte’s work were being 
printed in the Austrian Netherlands and somewhere in the German states.  Maissemy 
asked Montmorin to engage his diplomatic network in the task of stopping the spread 
of the work.278  Again, it was someone other than Montmorin who pinpointed and 
wanted to act upon a threat in the extra-territorial arena.  Montmorin sent these 
                                                          
274 Paris, AMAE, CP Prusse 210, fols. 13-14, Montmorin to d’Esterno, 15 January 1789.   
275 Paris, AMAE, CP Prusse 210, fols. 41-46, d’Esterno to Montmorin, 17 February 1789.   
276 Paris, AMAE, CP Prusse 210, fols. 13-14, Montmorin to d’Esterno, 15 January 1789.   
277 Jeanne de Saint-Rémy, comtesse de La Motte, Mémoires justificatifs de la comtesse de la comtesse de 
La Motte-Valois (London: [n. pub.], 1789). 
278 Paris, AMAE, SMD France 582, fol. 398, Poitevin de Maissemy to Montmorin, 28 June 





instructions to Brussels and also asked the comte de Mercy, Austrian ambassador to 
France, to mobilise his countrymen against this text.279  The outcome of this campaign 
is unknown.  La Motte’s work was an extraordinarily bold libelle but the measures taken 
against it by Montmorin were somewhat belated.  His diplomats were focused on trying 
to stop the dissemination of later editions of the work. In some ways the damage was 
already done.  There were two notable cases of external policing in the first half of 1789 
but the effective system directed by Vergennes had not been renewed.  In spite of 
Montmorin’s apparent lack of enthusiasm for the task, the government retained its 
relatively strong hold over the trade in the closing years of the old regime.  The 
publication of La Motte’s memoirs was the first major and overt threat to state’s system 




We now have some idea of the kind of works which members of the French foreign 
ministry were most concerned about and how control fluctuated over time.  The 
government’s perspective on the extra-territorial print trade was limited and pragmatic.  
The circulation of most books was tolerated and attention was concentrated on what 
were considered to be the most reprehensible titles.  The same pragmatic attitude was 
extended to the manner in which the French authorities sought to have a hold over 
what was being printed and circulated abroad.  Total control over extra-territorial 
publishing and bookselling was impossible to realise, so French officials did the best 
they could to keep the print trade within manageable boundaries.  Lenoir underscored 
the difficulties of policing print abroad: 
 
                                                          




En général les déguisements, que ne manquent jamais d’employer les Imprimeurs et 
Libraires étrangers, pour répandre clandestinement les productions répréhensibles de 
leurs presses, ne laissent rien par des moyens d’acquérir des certitudes sur le lieu de 
l’impression et sur les noms de ces Imprimeurs et Libraires.  De leur côté les libraires ou 
colporteurs français, qui se chargent de semblables ouvrages, emploient tout le mystère 
possible dans la distribution, qu’ils en sont, et presque toujours ces ouvrages ont passé 
dans plusieurs mains inconnues avant d’arriver dans celles, qui les livrent au public.280 
 
This view of the tough task of managing the book trade was corroborated by 
Joseph d’Hémery, who, for a 25-year period, was the primary inspector of the book 
trade in Paris.281  When he was passing on instructions to his successor, d’Hémery 
acknowledged the difficulty of searching for presses which produced provocative 
literature: 
 
On ne peut donner aucun renseignement pour la découverte des imprimeries 
clandestines. Les ruses respectives s’emploient à cet égard de manière que le plus fin 
l’emporte.282  
 
D’Hémery also warned that compelling those involved with illicit literature to 
tell the truth was not easy: 
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La prudence à son égard doit être toujours la compagne d’un chef. Tel coquin qui pour 
jouer pièce à son bourgeois, déclarera plus qu’il n’y a et dira des choses qu’il ne sait pas -  
cela sent diablement l’inquisition.283  
 
As outlined in Chapter 3, when the foreign minister was alerted to the 
publication of a controversial work he asked his diplomatic team to lean on the local 
authorities.  But exerting diplomatic pressure was not sufficient.  Appreciating the 
magnitude of the challenge of external control, the French foreign ministry followed a 
consistent policy whereby it sought to make an example of at least one guilty party in 
the hope of discouraging others from becoming drawn into the kind of literature which 
the French government found to be most abhorrent.    
This was exemplary punishment in order to elicit self-censorship and was 
primarily directed towards the publishers of illicit material.  Traders were spread over 
Europe but their commercial dealings kept them in close contact, meaning that the 
actions of the French government could send shockwaves through the trade and 
persuade more cautious businesses to self-censor.  Extra-territorial book dealers 
depended upon the large and lucrative French market and were reluctant to incur the 
wrath of the French authorities.  For these traders, France was a huge market in close 
proximity which was also under-exploited due to the constraints of state censorship.  
To take the example of the STN, French sales represented around a third of the 
company’s trade. 284  Foreign reliance on the French market meant traders were 
vulnerable to the threat of being prevented from selling their wares within France.  
Publishers and booksellers were keen to stay on the right side of the French authorities 
in order to continue profiting from their French clients.  French officials maintained 
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that arresting and interrogating these individuals was also a means of unearthing new 
information on the links which sustained the illicit book trade.285  In January 1782 
Vergennes leaned on the authorities in Geneva to arrest Nouffer, the local publisher 
who had printed Histoire d’un pou françois and La Verité rendue sensible à Louis XVI.  Lenoir 
provided Vergennes with a list of questions which he wanted officials in Geneva to ask 
Nouffer, including:  
 
Quelle quantité il a tiré de chacun de ces deux ouvrages ? 
A qui et combien il en a envoyé  
Quels sont les auteurs de ces ouvrages ? 
De qui tient-il les manuscrits les a-t-il encore ? 
Avec quels libraires ou colporteurs français est-il en correspondance ?286 
 
This strategy of exemplary punishment was often expressed overtly in the 
diplomatic correspondence.  When Téron was arrested in Geneva in January 1772 for 
selling Le Gazetier cuirassé, d’Aiguillon felt that ‘L’emprisonnement du Sr. Terron 
contiendra sans doute les libraires avides et peu scrupuleuses’.287  The French publisher 
Boubers was formally admonished by the authorities in Liège in April 1777 for printing 
a work the Mémoires de M. le comte de Saint-Germain.  The foreign minister was happy with 
this outcome and declared that ‘je pense que mieux serait de faire craindre Libraire 
Boubers une poursuite rigoureuse la première récidive’.288  When Vergennes authorised 
a search for the author of the libelle targeting the comte d’Estaing in 1782, he underlined 
that the ministry ‘aurait été bien aise de faire un exemple de l’auteur d’un pareil 
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ouvrage’.289  When the diplomats had trouble determining where exactly a book had 
come from, the French foreign ministers seems to have been satisfied as long as 
someone was punished.  As an example, the French government knew that the widow 
Stockdorf traded with a number of foreign publishers including Barthélemy Chirol in 
Geneva, François Grasset in Lausanne and Jean-Gaspard Dubois-Fontanelle in the 
Palatinate-Zweibrücken.290  However, d’Aiguillon only issued orders against the 
publisher Du Four in Maastricht.   
   The recent digitisation of the STN records allows us to see how one prominent 
publisher self-censored its output in response to pressure from the French state.  When 
the French authorities pursued a particular work, the directors of the STN decided 
against sending copies into France.  Early in 1772, Samuel Fauche, one of the partners 
of the STN tried to market Morande’s Le Gazetier cuirassé in France without the 
knowledge of his associates.  The other directors of the STN were furious to discover 
these machinations in June 1772 and expelled their colleague from the company.291  The 
STN did not deal in Le Gazetier cuirassé again until 1790, when the French government 
was busy dealing with the more pressing matter of the French Revolution.292  Having 
heard that the Genevan printer Nouffer had been incarcerated for sending copies of the 
Supplément à l’espion anglois to France in January 1782, the STN only dealt in a few copies, 
none of which made their way across the border to France.293  It was a similar story 
when it came to the pamphlets which Mirabeau had printed in Neuchâtel; the firm’s 
directors consciously avoided sending the incendiary works into France.  Only 23 copies 
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of Des Lettres de cachet et des prisons d’état were sent to French clients and out of the 374 
copies of Libertin de qualité which the STN marketed, not a single one was sent into the 
French market.294  Admittedly, the STN did send 174 copies of L’Espion dévalisé to 
France but 168 of these were sent to only two dealers before the French government 
began to target Mirabeau’s works.295  
The traders who were targeted by the French government for their involvement 
with these works, Téron, Nouffer and Fauche fils aîné, Favre et Witel, all did business 
with the STN.  Even though there was a strong demand for these texts, the Neuchâtel 
publishers were not prepared to risk the same fate which had befallen their trading 
partners.  These examples provide empirical evidence that the foreign ministry’s strategy 
of very focused censorship bore fruit.  This was in spite of the problems the French 
government faced in contending with the obstructionism and unhelpfulness of many 
foreign authorities.  Propelling traders towards self-censorship was a shrewd strategy for 
French officials who were faced with a huge international network of Francophone 
publishing and bookselling.   
The STN’s reluctance to get involved with the works which most disturbed the 
French authorities also underscores the need to think more deeply about the nuances in 
the illicit print trade.  Darnton has acknowledged that the STN did not print most of 
the prohibited works it sold, but the extent to which the firm censored its own trade 
with France has not yet been recognised.296  Indeed, Darnton has painted a vivid picture 
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of the STN’s trade in contraband, describing its directors as ‘literary buccaneers’ who 
employed ‘obscure teams of smugglers’ to haul ‘crates of books over tortuous trails in 
the Jura Mountains for 12 livres the quintal and a stiff drink’.297  This portrayal of 
trading ‘under the cloak’ has been influential in our thinking about the STN and the 
illicit book trade in general.  Yet evidence from the database indicates how far the 
STN’s directors were wary of upsetting the French authorities.  There was a stark 
difference between the STN and other more daring firms like Fauche fils aîné, Favre et 
Witel whom the French government found more difficult to manage.  Ostervald, the 
main director of the STN, had a reputation for honesty and decency that he was keen to 
maintain.  He came from one of the oldest families in Neuchâtel, held a number of 
political offices, taught arithmetic and geography and was a key presence in two local 
reading societies.298  The diplomatic correspondence shows that his reputation preceded 
him and from the very inception of the STN, French officials considered Ostervald a 
respectable and loyal servant of the Bourbon monarchy.299  One of the STN’s 
correspondents explained Ostervald’s conservative attitude during the Mirabeau affair: 
  
Jusqu’il en soit M. donnez à votre société typographique la réputation d’être honnête, et 
décente, et soyez persuadé que le Débit éphémère de quelques productions méchantes 
et scandaleuses est exposé à trop d’embarras et d’inconvénients pour le suivre avec 
quelque succès.300 
 
What is more, the company’s commercial success was heavily dependent on the 
French market.  Ostervald needed to continue to trade with France and so was 
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compelled to engage in efforts to stay on the right side of the French authorities.  When 
the STN published the libelle relating to the comte d’Estaing in 1782, Vergennes called 
for the firm to be reprimanded but not punished.301  Vergennes wished instead for the 
author of the text to be pursued, which indicates that the foreign minister had a close 
relationship with the STN.  Exemplary punishment did persuade some traders to self-
censor but this policy worked better on big companies like the STN who were closely 
tied to their French customers.  More marginal dealers - those that concentrated on 
illicit titles or who did not rely so much upon the French market - were less vulnerable 
to pressure from France.  This idea of encouraging self-censorship was a viable strategy 
but it did not resonate in the same way with those who were heavily implicated in the 
production of illicit literature.  The French government was not able to completely 
eradicate the trade in works which it deemed offensive but this study suggests that it 
was able to impel print into different channels.  It could discourage respectable traders 
from becoming too heavily involved in the production and sale of the most provocative 
literature.    
The ultimate effectiveness of external censorship is a difficult question.  We 
know that on many occasions the French foreign ministers claimed to be contented 
with the work that his diplomatic team had conducted.  This was partly because the 
Bourbon state was keen to maintain the illusion of its predominance in Europe.  The 
ministry did not want to admit that they were unable to fully impose their will in the 
smaller states which surrounded France.  This level of satisfaction was also a result of 
the government’s pragmatic strategy; its decision to centre attention only on what it felt 
to be the worst aspects of the print trade.  Looking back at his time as lieutenant général, 
Lenoir had a negative view on the effectiveness of official policing.  He maintained that 
the French government was fundamentally unsuccessful in attempts to prevent the 
                                                          




circulation of texts which discussed the private life of Louis XV.302  In the hope of 
maintaining an illusion of strength, foreign ministers may thus have overstated their 
overall satisfaction with the processes of policing the print trade.  As such, there is a 
need to consider other ways of assessing the efficacy of external censorship.   
Firstly, we can take into consideration whether anyone was punished for 
transgressions relating to extra-territorial print.  The French government impelled 
foreign authorities to reprimand and punish booksellers and publishers who had been 
involved with offensive titles.  The texts in question were confiscated when they were 
found, although French officials may not have been able to commandeer all copies.  
The foreign ministry was also able to arrange for the arrest and extradition of wayward 
writers like Godeville, Linguet and Pelleport, who were put in prison for years.  Yet in 
some cases, we never find out if a punishment was applied to a particular individual.  In 
1772 the Genevan-born publisher Marc-Michel Rey upset the French government by 
publishing a reprint of Le Gazetier cuirassé in Amsterdam.  Rey was brought before local 
magistrates but it is not clear whether any penalties were administered to him.303  The 
uncertainty which surrounded the exact nature of the punishments administered by 
foreign governments is linked to the French foreign ministry’s strategy of exemplary 
punishment.  French diplomats frequently neglected to relay this information back to 
the foreign minister which suggests that it was not seen as especially important.  It was 
enough for the French government to target a particular publisher and persuade foreign 
authorities that they needed to be reprimanded.  It was more trouble than it was worth 
to extend French influence any further, particularly when local authorities tended to 
                                                          
302 Darnton, The Devil in the Holy Water, Electronic Supplement, Appendix 2, Lenoir’s Notes on 
the Book Police and Libels 
http://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/darnton_supplement.html#app2 [accessed 11 January 2013]. 
303 Paris, AMAE, CP Hollande 524, fol. 38, d’Aiguillon to Noailles, 16 February 1772; Paris, 




impede such efforts.  External censorship was very tightly focused and the French 
foreign ministry had realistic goals of what they hoped to achieve in this arena.   
Secondly, it must be pointed out that several book dealers and authors 
reoffended even after being reprimanded or punished by the French state.  Contentious 
books were a risky business by their very nature and the desire to profit was enough to 
keep opportunistic book dealers trading in illicit material even after their colleagues or 
their own business came under fire from the Bourbon regime.  For foreign publishers 
imprisoned in their locality, incarceration was only ever short-term.  Sentences generally 
lasted a few days or weeks.  It is important to recognise that a spell in prison of any 
length removed traders from their business and drained profits.  Yet these relatively 
moderate sentences raise the question of whether confinement was really much of a 
deterrent.  Moreover, there are some clear examples of recidivism in the extra-territorial 
print trade.  Although the foreign ministry’s idea that exemplary punishment would 
encourage self-censorship worked for businesses like the STN, there were other traders 
who did not scare so easily.  In Neuchâtel, the firm Fauche fils aîné, Favre et Witel 
decided to continue to print Mirabeau’s works after they were released from prison in 
Neuchâtel, where they had been detained for publishing Des Lettres de cachet et des prisons 
d’état .304   
The Imbert brothers were first sent to the Bastille in December 1772 for writing 
and selling illicit texts in Paris.305  Imbert de Boudeaux was arrested again in January 
1781 for articles he contributed to the Correspondance littéraire secrète.306  The brothers both 
then entered in an association with Jacquet which ended up transporting them to the 
Bastille in January 1782.  But these two had not been that disturbed by their experiences 
and both continued to write upon their release.  Imbert de Villebon returned to Brussels 
                                                          
304 Schlup, ‘Entre pouvoir et clandestinité’, pp. 80-81. 
305 Paris, BA, Archives de la Bastille, MS 12400, fol. 89, 1772.    




where he started working on libelles with Duvernet, another man implicated in the 
Jacquet affair.  Imbert de Boudeaux also left France and continued to write for the 
Correspondance littéraire secrète.  In 1783 he authored and had published another scurrilous 
text, La Chronique scandaleuse.307  Repeated spells in the Bastille could not deter the 
Imbert brothers from defamatory writing.  These were the kind of challenging 
individuals that the French government was battling with in its endeavours to control 
the printed word.         
Thirdly, even if we ignore the recidivism of audacious individuals, the very fact 
that the French foreign ministry repeatedly clashed with foreign states over the 
publication of literature goes some way to suggest that external policing could only be a 
temporary solution.  Foreign ministers and ambassadors repeatedly emphasised to 
regional officials that they had a duty to be vigilant, but publishers continued to print 
illicit texts as local officials turned a blind eye.  The Bourbon regime was forced to 




There were certainly limits to the extent to which France could impose its will beyond 
its borders, but French officials recognised this and tried to devise a way to work 
effectively in spite of them.  Official strategy entailed taking limited action in the hope 
of deterring foreign book traders from illicit undertakings.   
The most stringent measure implemented by the foreign ministry was the edict 
issued by Vergennes in June 1783.  As the most powerful figure in the French ministry 
at that time, Vergennes decided to severely tighten the system of inspection for 
imported crates of books.  1783 also marked a wider change in policy when it was 
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decided that it was better to ignore the threat of illicit literature as much as possible 
rather than waste energy chasing unruly authors, booksellers and publishers.  External 
censorship was more successful after 1783 because the French government focused its 
attention even more narrowly.  The foreign ministry streamlined its expectations and 
was remarkably successful in confining the extra-territorial print trade within what it 
deemed to be a set of manageable and realistic boundaries, especially after 1783.  The 
research of Burrows and Darnton has made it clear that the French government made 
more determined efforts to police the libellistes in London from 1783 onwards, but the 
European context provides evidence that this change had more impact than previously 
realised.  It was a series of prolonged affairs at the beginning of the 1780s which 
convinced French officials of the inefficacy of their current methods.  The decision to 
scorn illicit literature was an extension of the ministry’s tactic of concentrating its 
attention on what it considered to be the most intolerable titles.  This new strategy 
worked well to contain the threat of illicit literature until the outbreak of revolution in 






The comprehensive nature of this study can shed new light on the task of policing the 
printed word in eighteenth-century Europe.  The French government utilised its 
extensive network of loyal ambassadors effectively but had to contend with resistance 
from foreign authorities who frequently disagreed with the French assessment of the 
threat of foreign literature.  More significantly, the French state battled against 
journalists, authors and publishers who brought provocative works to market.   
Booksellers were continually monitored but not targeted for repressive measures.   
This thesis argues that extra-territorial policing could be successful in spite of 
these challenges.  The French government recognised the magnitude of the task it faced 
and the futility of trying to control everything.  As such, it concentrated on what it 
considered to be the very worst examples of extra-territorial journalism, writing and 
publishing.  The policing of books and gazettes went on in parallel and there were some 
areas of overlap.  The most reprehensible texts, according to the ancien régime 
government, were those which combined political commentary with slander to malign 
political elites or members of the royal family.  Repressive measures were centred on 
such texts, whether they were libelle pamphlets or defamatory journal articles.  The 
primary motivation for controlling Francophone journals was a related desire to manage 
the news information about the French state which was available to French readers.  
The French authorities were determined to suppress the transmission of information 
about the corridors of power across all mediums.  By contrast, officials were happy to 
let other topics circulate relatively freely.  Efforts were only rarely made to suppress 




censorship thus operated according to guidelines which were not formally stated but 
which were nevertheless understood. 
Geographical distinctions helped to shape the French government’s approach to 
extra-territorial policing.  Most of the works in this period which were considered to be 
particularly offensive were produced in Britain but texts which challenged the French 
state also appeared in the Swiss states, the regions of the Holy Roman Empire and in 
the Netherlands.  Political and cultural factors help to explain why the foreign ministry 
found it so difficult to control print in Britain but had greater success on the continent.  
London was a major centre for the production of illicit material whilst cities in the rest 
of Europe where very much secondary.  The French government also had much more 
influence in the Swiss states than it did in London, the capital city of a long-time enemy 
power. 
       When it came to the newspaper press, the French state could exercise a great deal 
of control.  Following Maupeou’s coup in January 1771, pressure from the French 
foreign ministry squeezed political commentary out of the foreign press.  Regulating 
periodicals was largely a reactive operation.  The foreign minister and his diplomatic 
team responded to the publication of inappropriate articles by communicating with (and 
threatening) editors and foreign powers to insist that a retraction was printed.  The 
nature of the press meant that any success in controlling it was often short-lived.  The 
government recognised that prohibiting gazettes entirely was not a viable option and so 
employed French diplomats to manage the press and make it clear what kind of 
coverage was acceptable.  Although French officials continued to find fault with the 
extra-territorial press right into 1789, the state had a relatively efficient system of 
noticing and correcting any lapses.   
Controlling the circulation of books and pamphlets was a trickier task.  When 




at least one of the individuals involved.  It was hoped that these penalties would 
encourage other writers, publishers and booksellers to self-censor.  In the case of the 
STN, we have evidence that French campaigns dissuaded the firm from becoming 
engaged with a number of inflammatory titles.  The problems the French state was 
having in managing print reached a head in the early 1780s.  Feeling bombarded by 
illicit material, Vergennes decided to change tack in the hope of gaining back some 
power over the trade.  In 1783 Vergennes’ reform devastated the trade of extra-
territorial publishers who could no longer afford to trade with France to the same 
extent.  At the same time, Vergennes altered his attitude.  He encouraged French 
officials to ignore the threat of illicit literature as much as possible. The foreign minister 
was now only prepared to authorise external policing in the most extreme cases.  Extra-
territorial control was focused more tightly than ever before and in the process, it 
became more efficacious.  The wave of contentious literature which the French 
government had endured during the early 1780s did not appear again.  This effective 
arrangement only began to crumble towards the end of the old regime.  Vergennes’ 
death and the pressures of the pre-revolutionary crisis meant that extra-territorial 
policing became less of a priority.    
The success of 12 June 1783 suggests that control of the book trade was at its 
strongest when the French government combined external policing with tough internal 
reforms.  Policing of the print trade was less active in the early 1770s when the French 
government was upholding a tax on book importation.  The change in the inspection 
system which was implemented in June 1783 had a similar, although much greater, 
effect in undermining the extra-territorial trade.  The success of these two measures 
shows that the French state did have sufficient power to enforce its will on extra-
territorial print.  It was ultimately economic factors which meant that these two reforms 




booksellers which meant that the French government could never be confident enough 
to uphold them in the long-term. 
In many ways French officials only increased the difficulties they faced in 
managing the print trade by becoming complicit in the production of controversial 
literature.  The French government was well aware of much of the illicit publishing 
industry and often chose to turn a blind eye.  Moreover, individual officials deliberately 
authorised illicit activities.  Popkin was one of the first to highlight the extent to which 
French ministers sponsored the production of pamphlet literature but this kind of 
complicity also occurred on a wider scale.  Publishers and booksellers were routinely 
employed as police spies and it should not have come as much of a surprise to the 
French government when they reverted to their old ways.  Yet to some degree the 
Bourbon regime was compelled to act in this manner.  Preventing powerful elite figures 
from patronising pamphleteers was not a feasible course of action.  What is more, the 
French government needed to consult individuals who were involved in the print trade 
in order to get a better idea about its workings.  It was the information provided by its 
spying network which helped to inform the French government’s approach to the print 
trade both within and outside France.   
The decades of the 1770s and 1780s represent a substantial period of time 
across which fluctuations in external censorship can be perceived.  Yet, it would also 
make sense to extend the study back still further to 1758 when the duc de Choiseul was 
made foreign minister for the first time.  In 1761, he was succeeded by his cousin César 
Gabriel de Choiseul, duc de Praslin, who occupied the post until 1766.  From 1766 to 
1770, the duc de Choiseul was foreign minister once more.  A starting point of 1758 
would facilitate a deeper exploration of both how censorship shifted over time and the 
role played by individual foreign ministers in its development.  Investigating how far the 




as foreign minister would presumably prove fruitful, as would an analysis of any 
similarities in strategy and viewpoint which might have been shared by the two cousins.   
Widening the scope of this study would also deepen its engagement with the key 
scholarship on which it currently builds.  The research conducted by Rétat and 
Vercruysse on the Dutch newspaper press encompasses the 1760s and 1750s 
respectively.1  Burrows’ work on the London libellistes commences in 1758 and much of 
Darnton’s research on the print trade also covers this period.2  Research directly related 
to wider developments in this earlier period would also help to contextualise a broader 
study of the policing of the extra-territorial print trade.  The 1750s and 1760s were 
punctuated by high points of political, religious and cultural tension.3  The 1750s were 
marked by the campaign, led by Christophe de Beaumont, the archbishop of Paris, to 
dissuade priests from administering the last rites to Jansenists.  The Paris parlement, 
under the influence of a limited number of vocal Jansenist magistrates, forcefully 
countered this offensive.  The initiative of the parlementaires brought them into conflict 
with the crown, setting in motion a cycle of remonstrances, resignations, forced exiles 
and governmental attempts at rapprochement which extended beyond Paris to the 
provinces through the late 1750s and 1760s.  Difficult relations between crown and 
parlement were especially problematic in the aftermath of the Seven Years War when the 
government aimed to lessen the war debt by impelling the parlements to approve 
measures of financial reform.  The conflict between crown and parlement in this period 
has obvious parallels with the Maupeou coup in the early 1770s and the enforcement of 
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the May Edicts in the later 1780s.  The French government’s attempts to prevent 
commentary on its struggle with the parlements from appearing in the foreign newspaper 
press have been considered by Popkin, Rétat and Vercruysse but would merit further 
exploration in a comparative context.     
The agitation of the parlements was also an important factor in cultural and 
intellectual developments around mid-century.  It was in this period that the 
Enlightenment was at its peak.4  Many of the texts which have come to be known as the 
key works of the Enlightenment were published in these years, most notably the 
Encyclopédie.  The city of Paris developed and cemented its reputation as the cultural 
centre of Europe and the influence of the Enlightenment began to be felt in some 
sections of government.  Most notably, the famed liberal minister Malesherbes was 
directeur de la librairie from 1750 to 1763 and is credited with expanding the boundaries of 
tolerance in matters of censorship.5   
Yet support for the Enlightenment was not unanimous.  The Paris parlement 
made this clear in the late 1750s when it issued condemnations of the Encyclopédie and 
De l’Esprit by Claude Adrien Helvétius, two works of philosophy which had won the 
approval of French censors.6  The French government bowed to the consequent 
pressure and revoked the privileges which had been granted to these texts.  The state 
was perhaps especially mindful of potential subversion following the 1757 attempt on 
Louis XV’s life by Robert-François Damiens.  Further research would illuminate how 
these tensions over the acceptability of Enlightenment philosophy were dealt with by 
officials with responsibility for policing the extra-territorial print trade.  This study has 
shown that suppressing the dissemination of religious or philosophical material was not 
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a priority during the 1770s and 1780s and the antecedents of this trend may be 
discerned in this earlier period.    
Extending this study would help to situate the problems the French government 
faced in its attempts to police print abroad in a broader context.  A government 
memorandum which considered the implications of the edict of 12 June 1783 described 
the trade in distasteful literature as a constant problem, ‘la prudence et la vigilance de 
l’administration ne sont prévoyantes mais ce mal a été de tous temps, il ne faut point 
espérer le couper dans sa racine, mais en empêcher, et retarder le plus possible les 
progrès’.7  The evidence presented in this study does go some way to confirming this 
view that the print trade was a continuing issue which the government struggled to deal 
with.  The French state was not able to eradicate the trade in contentious texts but it 
was able to impose clear limits on the production and circulation of this material.  
French officials recognised that complete control of foreign print would probably 
always be beyond their grasp.  Yet perceptions of the intensity of the problem, the 
desired reaction and the level of official satisfaction were factors which were variable 
when it came to the matter of imposing control over the extra-territorial print trade.   
The rationale and enthusiasm for rigorously policing the extra-territorial print 
trade disappeared during the French Revolution.  This was partly because the 
revolutionary regime deliberately rescinded the structures for controlling print.  Pre-
publication censorship was abolished by the National Assembly in August 1789.  
However, the decline of censorship should not be overstated.  The French state 
continued to use surveillance, raids, arrests and seizures to manage print throughout the 
French Revolution.8  More important was the extent to which the extra-territorial print 
trade lost its raison d’être due to the outbreak of revolution.  Events were progressing so 
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rapidly within France that the Francophone newspaper press could simply not keep up.  
Both newspapers and books published abroad suffered from the competition of 
political newspapers and pamphlets which were now permitted to be published within 
France in unprecedented numbers.  250 new gazettes flooded the market in the six 
months following the storming of the Bastille alone.9  With freedom of the press 
reigning inside France, the print industry beyond its borders came to be more associated 
with the forces of counter-revolution.10  
International comparisons could also help to put France’s strategy of external 
censorship in perspective.  The method of using an ambassadorial network to inhibit 
the circulation of offensive literature was certainly not unique to France.  Indeed, 
French diplomats sometimes referenced the objections of other powers as a means of 
justifying their own protests.11  There is a need for more sustained studies of how this 
technique was employed by other European powers.  Further research could show how 
these foreign complaints interacted or clashed with the French strategy of external 
censorship. 
Regions like the United Provinces, the Swiss states or those of the Holy Roman 
Empire where political authority was fragmented were unlikely to have sufficient power 
to influence the literary trade far beyond their borders.12  By contrast, the states of 
Austria, Britain and Prussia had cohesiveness and strength.  Looking at external 
censorship from the point of view of these powers could thus go some way to shaping 
an understanding of the interaction between domestic and external censorship in this 
period.  Subsequent to the lapse of the Licensing Act at the end of the seventeenth 
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century, there was no formal structure of censorship in place in eighteenth-century 
Britain.  In Austria during the 1780s, Joseph II made moves to liberalise his censorship 
regime; first by establishing a centralised censorship commission in Vienna in 1781 and 
then by abolishing pre-publication censorship in 1786.13  By contrast, Frederick William 
II of Prussia tightened censorship laws in 1788 as part of his campaign to maintain 
standards of religious orthodoxy.14  The extent to which tolerance was extended abroad 
in line with a government’s internal stance on censorship is certainly worthy of further 
study.   
However, it must be acknowledged that the question of censoring foreign 
material was less pressing where Austria, Britain and Prussia were concerned because 
they were not Francophone states.  French-language periodicals, books and pamphlets 
were sold all across Europe but these regions did not constitute the primary audience 
for this material.  These states could still be motivated to control the importation of a 
smaller proportion of French-language print, as well as literature published abroad in 
German and English.  Yet it seems fair to conclude that external censorship was more 
crucial in the French market than elsewhere.   
There is some extant research to indicate how these other states extended their 
influence abroad.  The work of Schlup suggests that the state of Prussia generally left 
Neuchâtel to its own devices in matters of the book trade during the eighteenth century 
but Prussia may have been more active in its other dominions.15  Surveillance over the 
importation of books certainly took place in Austria.16  In 1750 for example, it was 
decreed that any individual caught importing subversive books would face the death 
penalty.  It might be thought that the British government would take a liberal attitude to 
foreign publishing.  Yet British MPs protested against what they saw as the misreporting 
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of their speeches in the Irish newspaper press.17  In addition, British diplomats 
complained about reports in the Dutch periodical press in a similar manner to their 
French counterparts.18   
Yet it remains to be seen if the external censorship undertaken by other states 
was as systematic and significant as it was in the French context.  Considering this 
question would be a way to build upon the ideas about attempts to police the extra-
territorial print trade which have been elaborated upon in this thesis.  The working 
relationship between diplomats and foreign ministers, the influence of individual 
officials and the potential for cooperation with foreign authorities are all factors which 
affected how censorship worked in practice.  The idea of a focused censorship strategy 
could also be applied internationally.  The extent to which official attempts to censor 
foreign material have continued to the present day underscores the persistent nature of 
this issue.  Attempting to escape the jurisdiction of their government will always be an 
option for writers and publishers who are involved in the production of potentially 
controversial material.  Governments in turn need to decide if they want to find ways to 
respond to this impulse.  In the present day, the People’s Republic of China places 
foreign content providers such as Google and Skype under strict surveillance and 
control.19  This practice continues in spite of China being alleged to be in contravention 
of the First Amendment to the US Constitution which upholds the right to freedom of 
expression.  Policing print across European borders was a challenge which encouraged 
French officials to concentrate on restricting the dissemination of what they considered 
to be the most offensive titles.  Examining how far such pragmatism was applied by the 
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authorities in other regions of Europe would facilitate a closer appreciation of the 
motivations behind and efficacy of these methods.  
This thesis places emphasis upon the perspective of the French government but 
it must be acknowledged that statements made by official figures cannot be entirely 
depended upon.  There is the potential for other sources to be integrated into this study 
which could help to compensate for the limitations of documentation from the French 
government.  One avenue would be to explore more closely how foreign powers 
reacted to the French censorship strategy.  Some evidence of this can be found within 
the diplomatic correspondence itself in the form of letters from foreign officials where 
they outline their response to protests made by the French authorities.  This 
information cannot be relied upon with complete confidence since there is evidence 
that foreign powers deliberately constructed an image of obedience whilst in practice 
making efforts to resist French demands.  Further investigation of the actions of foreign 
authorities would broaden appreciation of how French censorship worked on the 
ground, especially the extent to which it engaged with local mechanisms of censorship 
which operated outside the borders of France.  Geneva would constitute an appropriate 
case study since its relations with France were ambiguous.  Geneva was dependent 
upon French political support but its officials consistently disrupted French attempts to 
control Swiss publishing.    
Private papers and memoirs relating to French diplomats and foreign ministers 
could broaden comprehension of their individual points of view and thus, of the way in 
which they approached the extra-territorial print trade.  Complementary to this would 
be a detailed study of chronicles, literary reviews and journals written by other late 
eighteenth-century contemporaries.  Such an exploration would shed light on the 
perception of literature at this time and help to explain how individuals within the 




types of material.  This study could also be expanded through further bibliographical 
work, similar to that which has been conducted on the STN under the aegis of The 
French Book Trade in Enlightenment Europe Database project.  The STN archives are 
something of a unique resource but records relating to the publishing business of the 
Dutch Luchmans family are extant.  Some documentation from the business of 
provincial booksellers is also scattered across France.20  Further exploration of these 
areas could therefore give a greater idea of the books, pamphlets and journals which 
were sent into and then sold within France.  However, it must be remembered that 
material which references the texts which were chased by the French government is 
unlikely to have survived in large quantities because the trade in the most offensive texts 
was illicit and potentially dangerous.    
This thesis argues that extra-territorial policing was highly focused and could be 
effective when it was centred on certain texts.  In his work, The Corpus of Clandestine 
Literature in France, 1769-1789, Darnton compiled a list of 720 illicit titles which 
circulated under the old regime.21  With the Corpus and its companion volume The 
Forbidden Best-Sellers of Pre-Revolutionary France Darnton’s findings indicated that there was 
a huge network of underground book dealing which the French state struggled to 
control.  Darnton claimed that through repetition, the messages in these books (when 
combined with public discourse) had an effect ‘like the drip, drip of water on a stone’, 
wearing away the sacred legitimacy of the French monarchy.22  Part of the reason for 
reaching this conclusion is that Darnton’s data is concentrated in the period from 1780 
to 1782.  As we have seen, this was an atypical period when the French government 
became overwhelmed by illicit literature.  The French state was able to regain command 
over the extra-territorial sphere with the new approach it pursued in 1783.   
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It is also important to recognise that French officials did not ever aim to have 
total command over the printed word.  They were not chasing all of the 720 titles with 
the same vigour.  The authorities in France were prepared to tolerate much and put 
their energy into suppressing what they considered be the most dangerous texts.  
Indeed, Darnton has shown appreciation of this in his recent work, The Devil in the Holy 
Water.23  Darnton considers the way in which the regime worked to smother libelles but 
only mentions a handful of titles which were targeted.  Many of the texts which have 
been uncovered in the course of research for this thesis are the same titles which have 
already been pinpointed as points of external censorship by Burrows and Darnton.  Yet 
this is a finding in itself.  This study provides evidence that the intense policing of illicit 
works was a relatively rare occurrence.  The notion of self-censorship could help to 
explain why this was the case.  Extra-territorial writers and traders had a good idea of 
what kind of literature was unacceptable to the French government.  Many of them 
avoided becoming engaged with works which touched upon the most intolerable topics.  
The change of strategy in 1783 was also crucial.  When libellistes and publishers realised 
that the French government was no longer willing to pay suppression fees, there was 
less incentive for them to produce this kind of material.    
The illicit book trade under the old regime, then, was finite and there were only 
a few key moments when these dangerous discourses entered the public sphere.  These 
titles were printed abroad but the foreign ministry did its best to ensure that the extra-
territorial trade was kept within something approaching acceptable limits.  The corollary 
of this is that the print trade in the ancien régime was more constrained than we might 
once have thought.  The explosion of press freedom in 1789 thus represented a marked 
transformation from what had gone before.  It was not simply the inevitable zenith of 
an expanding print trade which the French state was failing to keep in check.  The pre-
                                                          




revolutionary crisis in 1787 and 1788 was period of intense pamphleteering but this 
literature was different; it was legitimised and accepted by the French government.  Up 
to and possibly beyond 1789, the state remained determined to police and suppress 
what it considered to be the most offensive texts and it was remarkably successful in 
this endeavour.     
If extra-territorial policing was working, this means that the texts targeted by the 
French government had less of an impact within France.  The ministry was able to 
restrict the readership of the material which it considered to be most offensive, such as 
the libelles.  The dramatic nature of the foreign policing campaigns has directed 
historiographical attention towards these titles.   But perhaps scholars need to think 
instead about the rest of the literary market.  The successes of extra-territorial control 
had implications for the trade within France.  The strong stance of the French 
government, especially in 1783 and beyond, undermined the foreign print trade.  This in 
turn adversely affected the provincial book dealers who were dependent on trading with 
their counterparts outside France.  With the provincial and foreign trade both relatively 
weak, the dominance of the Parisian print industry was reinforced.  In addition, it could 
also be argued that the effects of the pronouncement of June 1783 were encouraging 
for Parisian writers.  Across the eighteenth century, it was common for prominent 
essayists such as Brissot and Mirabeau to seek shelter with foreign publishing houses 
when their writings came under fire within France.  Vergennes’ decision to restrict 
access to the French market meant that such opportunities dried up and expatriate 
writers were forced back to France.  Eisenstein has suggested that ‘When the events of 
1789 paved the way for freedom of the press, the francophone Republic of Letters 
could reclaim its central city at long last’.24  Certainly, Brissot, Mirabeau and many other 
pamphleteers were back in Paris by the mid 1780s, much earlier than 1789.  The success 
                                                          




enjoyed by Parisian authors and printers in this decade potentially placed these 
individuals in a prime position to profit from both the pre-revolutionary fervour and 
the revolution itself.  Historians have yet to reach a firm conclusion as to how and why 
the press expanded so rapidly during 1789-1790 and this premise could provide a 
plausible explanation.  Even before the pre-revolutionary crisis, Parisian printing 
accelerated as a consequence of the decline of foreign publishing.   
Another outcome of this study has been to highlight the impact that individual 
officials had on the processes of censorship.  The work of the diplomatic team was 
crucial, especially when it came to managing the extra-territorial periodical press.  
Officials had to stay alert lest they miss the appearance of any potentially dangerous 
pieces.  The influence of the French foreign minister was huge.  This was particularly 
the case when the position was occupied by Vergennes, an individual who spent time 
contemplating the best means of imposing his will on the foreign print trade.  It was 
these officials who made the decisions about which texts were threatening and the level 
of the punishment which was to be handed out.  In challenging circumstances, they 
came to understand the trade and made difficult decisions about whether writers and 
publishers should be trusted or targeted. 
This focus on individual perspectives and decisions is important when thinking 
about the kind of works which were targeted for suppression.  It is important to 
remember that the majority of literature was permitted to circulate in eighteenth-century 
France; only a minority of titles were actively suppressed.  This study has shown that 
the French authorities were primarily concerned with suppressing information about 
two topics: French state affairs and political elites or the royal family.  When it came to 
the book trade, it was overwhelmingly libelles which were pursued with vigour by the 




subversive impact by encouraging a loss of respect for royal rulers.25  Some readers 
undoubtedly took away such messages and official anxieties were not without 
foundation.  Sovereignty in eighteenth-century France was concentrated in the hands of 
the King.  France’s political and financial stability rested upon those at the top of 
French society.  A traditional code of honour which placed paramount importance on 
matters of reputation also lay at France’s heart under the ancien régime.  The content of 
many of the libelles thus represented a direct challenge to the very foundations of French 
state and society.  It would thus be going too far to say that the French government was 
paranoid about the effects of libelles.  Officials had good reasons to fear their potential 
to incite sedition in the context of eighteenth-century France.  Nevertheless, it could be 
said that a preoccupation with defamatory texts blinded French officials to other 
potential threats.  Part of the reason why libelles were frequently targeted in the extra-
territorial arena might be that they were texts which were easy to recognise. The threat 
posed by other types of literature might have been harder to perceive and thus more 
difficult to evaluate and control.   
Works which circulated with the tacit approval of French officials might have 
had just as much of an impact on public opinion as the texts which French officials saw 
as offensive and intolerable.  Philosophical treatises, anti-clerical tracts or the legal briefs 
prepared and circulated in pamphlet form by magistrates were all in demand and readily 
available.26  As such, they were able to make their mark on French readers.  Circulation 
figures also tempered the influence of literature which the French government found to 
be particularly distasteful.  The most controversial books and pamphlets which were 
printed abroad only reached a limited market and this was partly thanks to the efforts of 
the French government.  The French state concentrated on the texts it perceived as 
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threatening, but a range of other literature could have been just as important in 
destabilising the ancien régime.  
The French government’s objectives of external censorship were largely satisfied 
but its campaigns could also have had a wider significance.  Forceful policing may have 
driven the book trade further underground; large businesses like the STN were worried 
about the French government’s reaction and so largely stayed away from the most illicit 
material.  The clandestine book trade existed in different channels and it remained a 
threat.  Yet the bolder printers who were prepared to deal in this literature faced a 
problem.  They needed to advertise their texts for sale without provoking the wrath of 
the French authorities.  They could sell their copies door-to-door or give copies away 
but they could not advertise them widely without a significant risk of the French 
government finding out what they were up to.  This desire to stay underground and 
remain unexposed can be seen in the decision of Morande and Godeville to set up their 
own printing presses.  So, it is possible that the French foreign ministry was able to 
reach even the darkest corners of the extra-territorial print trade by making trading 
difficult for its participants.  This line of argument has not yet been fully substantiated 
and should not be overstated.  There were still five editions of Le Gazetier cuirassé which 
made it to market in these years, in spite of the French government’s strong opposition 
to this text.  Moreover, the marginal nature of many of these traders means that 
documentation relating to their business has probably not survived.  Further 
bibliographical research on the circulation of editions pursued by the French 
government in this period (such as that conducted by Gruder) could shed further light 
on whether the trade of those figures who were truly immersed in illicit book dealing 
was really that substantial.27  
                                                          




If the French government was broadly successful in its attempts to police the 
worst aspects of the print trade, does this undermine ideas about the connection 
between the print trade and the French Revolution?  This discussion links into the 
debate on continuity and change with regards to the origins of the revolution.  Research 
centred on the earlier years of the eighteenth century such as that conducted by Peter 
Campbell has underscored that the pre-revolutionary upheaval was in many ways a 
repeat of earlier political crises which beset the ancien régime.28  This thesis acknowledges 
and supports this line of thinking since it suggests that the policing of extra-territorial 
print was in many ways a continuing problem which the French government never 
managed to fully surmount.  Yet there is also evidence that the literary landscape shifted 
in significant ways during the later eighteenth century.  The chronology of policing 
outlined in this study indicates that the change implemented in 1783 was fruitful; the 
threat of illicit literature was much lessened in its aftermath.  With this chronology in 
mind, the French Revolution does not seem to have been foretold by an increasingly 
intense offensive of illicit texts.  The French government was in control over the extra-
territorial trade in the later 1780s and the pamphlet literature of the pre-revolutionary 
crisis was somewhat different to the texts which the French government had attempted 
to suppress through most of the 1770s and 1780s.  If foreign libelles really served to do 
such damage to the old regime, we might have expected revolution to explode a few 
years earlier in 1782 or 1783.  We can only speculate about the impact of libelles on 
readers, but it is important to recognise how far the French government was able to 
keep them in check.  When thinking about the link between print and revolution, it may 
thus make more sense to consider the effects of the works that the French state allowed 
to circulate.   
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It seems pertinent here to underline that at the turn of the century Napoleon 
constructed a successful system of censorship by consolidating old regime techniques of 
bribery, coercion and diplomatic pressure.29  Napoleon’s hegemonic power made his 
system decidedly stronger than that of pre-revolutionary France but he nevertheless 
deliberately built upon the successes of previous strategies of state control.  This link 
between ancien régime and Napoleonic censorship suggests that we need to re-evaluate 
the efforts of the French monarchy on its own terms.  Rather than focusing our 
attention on everything that the French officials did not do, it seems more helpful to 
consider what exactly they were trying to achieve, how realistic these aims were and 
how far they were followed through.  The French state recognised that it did not 
possess enough centralised authority to force through total control of print.  Yet, it was 
still in a position of real strength.  As the events in the year 1783 illustrate, censorship 
was at its most powerful when internal and external measures were combined.  
Censorship at the end of the old regime was tightly focused and French officials 
cooperated effectively to restrict the circulation of a limited range of provocative texts. 
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The table presented in this appendix contains details of the 193 instances when the 
French government objected to or attempted to regulate the extra-territorial print across 
the period from 1770 to 1789.  In some cases, all the pertinent details cannot be 
gleamed from extant documents and these instances have been presented as ‘unclear’ or 
‘unknown’ in this table.  The data upon which this thesis is based is grouped here 
according to the following headings: 
 
Date: The initial date represents the first time that the title in question began to 
concern the French government.  In most cases, a specific date can be pinpointed.  
Additional dates are provided in brackets when a title continued to trouble the French 
authorities for a period which lasted beyond a single month.   
 
Location: The French government usually objected to the production and 
dissemination of literature in certain towns.  The geographical region of each town is 
provided in brackets.  This information provides the basis for Figure 4, which suggests 
how extra-territorial policing differed according to geography. 
 
Title: This column provides the title of the works which were targeted by the French 
government, or a description of the texts in question if the titles are not known. 
 
Book/Pamphlet or Journal: This column simply designates the format of the material 




together to reflect the difficulty of determining between these two formats in the 
eighteenth century.  Journals are presented separately.  This distinction also reflects the 
French government’s different approaches to the policing of journals and of books and 
pamphlets, which are explored in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively.  
 
Subject Matter: This column uses keywords to summarise a simplified version of the 
content of the texts that the French government protested against.  In relation to books 
or pamphlets which were never published, remarks about their content have been 
informed by official correspondence or deduced from their titles.  French officials 
sometimes objected to foreign journals in general terms and did not elaborate further 
upon the reasons for their remonstrances.  In these cases, it can be assumed that official 
complaints were targeted towards coverage of French current affairs and politics.  This 
was the main subject which was absent from French journals and thus was the topic 
which the French government watched over most closely when it came to the extra-
territorial press. 
 
Writers, Editors and Publishers:  Information is provided here on any writers, editors 
and publishers who were known to be involved with the production of particular texts.  
Initials are given in brackets to designate whether each individual was an editor (E), a 
writer (W) or a publisher (P).  In the case of journals, this column acknowledges that the 
editorship of certain journals changed hands across the period covered by this study.   
 
Initial Response: A summary of the French government’s initial response to each title 
or group of titles is given here.  When it came to journals, the official response was 
usually a complaint relating to a specific article or a more generalised objection to the 




foreign periodicals to circulate within France.  In the case of books and pamphlets, the 
French authorities mostly complained about the threat or publication of seemingly 
subversive texts.   
 
Outcome: This column provides a condensed version of the actions taken by the 
French government in response to the publication and dissemination of these titles.  
Again there are differences in the responses which followed the appearance of journal 
articles as opposed to books and pamphlets.  The Bourbon regime admonished editors 
who had printed inappropriate articles, requested that retractions be printed and 
prevented journals from reaching the French market.  The state was more active when 
faced with books and pamphlets which it disapproved of.  It involved foreign powers 
and its own police agents in its attempts at suppressing this literature. 
 
Diplomat source: This column outlines those instances where a French diplomat was 
the first to perceive a potential threat in the extra-territorial print trade. 
 
Foreign govt. involved: This column reflects occasions when the French government 
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Paris, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères 
 
Correspondance politique Allemagne 635-60 
Correspondance politique Allemagne supplément 20-22 
Correspondance politique Angleterre 497-98, 505, 516-17, 520-30, 533-36, 541-45, 547, 
549-50, 552, 554, 558-59, 563 
Correspondance politique Angleterre supplément 17 
Correspondance politique Bade 1 
Correspondance politique Bâle 5-8 
Correspondance politique Cologne 104-11 
Correspondance politique Cologne supplément 4-5 
Correspondance politique Genève 70, 78-96 
Correspondance politique Genève supplément 1, 7 
Correspondance politique Grisons 36 
Correspondance politique Hambourg 96-106 
Correspondance politique Hambourg supplément 13 
Correspondance politique Hesse-Cassel 13-14 
Correspondance politique Hesse-Cassel supplément 1-4 
Correspondance politique Hesse-Darmstadt 1 
Correspondance politique Hesse-Darmstadt supplément 1 
Correspondance politique Hollande 521-79  





Correspondance politique Liège supplément 2, 11 
Correspondance politique Lorraine 30-31 
Correspondance politique Mayence 60-69 
Correspondance politique Mayence supplément 2-3 
Correspondance politique Mecklembourg supplément 2-3 
Correspondance politique Münster supplément 1-2 
Correspondance politique Neuchâtel supplément 3-4 
Correspondance politique Palatinat-Deux-Ponts 114-26 
Correspondance politique Palatinat-Deux-Ponts supplément 5 
Correspondance politique Pays-Bas Espagnols et Autrichiens 168-77 
Correspondance politique petites principautés 1, 2, 9, 15, 17, 24-26, 76-77    
Correspondance politique Prusse 188-210 
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